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This study closely examines the language of desire in the dramatic works of John 
Lyly and William Shakespeare, and argues that contemplative and analytical speeches 
about desire function as modes of action in their plays.  Erotic speeches do more than 
express desire in a purely descriptive or perlocutionary capacity distinct from the action 
of the play—they incite, circulate, and create eros for characters, exposing audiences to 
the inner workings of the desiring mind and body.  For many of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s 
characters, words come to constitute erotic experience.  My approach to dramatic 
language draws from the work of cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson who argue that our basic conceptual system, according to which we think, speak, 
and act, is metaphorical in nature.  My focus on primary metaphors, which are based on 
sensorimotor experience, foregrounds the interdependence of erotic language and early 
modern notions of embodiment.  Since language, thought, and action are all subject to 
this embodied metaphorical system, conceptual metaphors allow Lyly and Shakespeare to 
  
dramatize the often invisible, paradoxical, and potentially unknowable experience of 
erotic desire. 
My understanding of language as dramatic action derives from a theory about the 
attribution of human motives that Kenneth Burke, in The Grammar of Motives (1945), 
called dramatism.  Burke uses five key terms to address human motivation—Act, Scene, 
Agent, Agency, Purpose—and I in turn use each of these terms to make sense of erotic 
desire on the early modern stage.  I begin my study by exploring conceptual metaphors of 
physical motion that characterize desire as an action rather than a state of mind.  In my 
second chapter, I investigate metaphors of permeability that dramatize erotic desire as a 
rupture between “agents” and their “scenes,” between self and world. My third chapter 
analyzes “purpose” and “agency”—the ways characters make intimate relationships—by 
exploring metaphors in which eros is conceptualized as a dynamic process of creation. 
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Introduction 
 
“Things untold are undone” 
Erotic Language as Dramatic Action 
 
For Shakespeare’s Troilus, erotic language is dramatic action.  Things happen to 
him as he speaks these lines: 
I am giddy. Expectation whirls me round. 
Th’imaginary relish is so sweet 
That it enchants my sense. What will it be 
When that the wat’ry palates taste indeed 
Love’s thrice-repured nectar? Death, I fear me, 
Swooning destruction, or some joy too fine, 
Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness 
For the capacity of my ruder powers. 
I fear it much, and I do fear besides 
That I shall lose distinction in my joys 
As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps, 
The enemy flying. 
(Troilus and Cressida 3.2.16-27)
1
 
 
While awaiting Cressida in the orchard, Troilus experiences giddiness and “sweet” 
pleasure, followed by fear, first of a “joy too fine” and then of “losing distinction in [his] 
joys.”  His desire for Cressida “whirls” and “enchants” him even as he stands alone 
onstage, arguably doing nothing at all except talking to himself, or perhaps to us.  Troilus 
undoubtedly is different at the end of his soliloquy than when he began: his initial 
giddiness gives way to, or is supplemented by, fear—fear of a very particular kind of 
loss.  Speaking his desire, even to himself, is enough to change him, and change is the 
surest marker of action.  But how does this change occur, and what can it tell us about the 
workings of erotic desire on the early modern English stage?  
                                                
1
 All quotations of Shakespeare’s plays are from The Complete Pelican Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Orgel and 
A.R. Braunmuller (New York: Penguin, 2002). 
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These questions begin to address the relationship between erotic language and 
desire that is the focus of my dissertation.  In this study, I argue that erotic speeches do 
more than express desire—they incite, circulate, and create desire for characters and for 
audiences.  My dissertation analyzes some of the richest and most potent erotic language 
in plays by John Lyly and William Shakespeare.  I discuss the advantages of examining 
Lyly’s language alongside Shakespeare’s later in this introduction; for the moment, 
suffice it to say that although they wrote for different types of theaters and only partially-
overlapping audiences, both dramatists created characters who speak erotic language at 
considerable length and in extraordinary depth.  For such characters, words constitute 
erotic experience.  While Troilus waits for Cressida to appear in the orchard, erotic 
language acts on him and it alters him.  It even objectifies him: Eros is the subject of his 
action verbs.  It is “expectation” that “whirls [him] round”; “imaginary relish” that 
“enchants [his] sense”; and his “joys” are what “charge on heaps.”  Desire is happening 
to Troilus, whose only “I” in the soliloquy governs verbs of being (“I am giddy”), of 
feeling (“I fear”), and of loss (“I shall lose…”).  It might be argued that he is merely 
imagining future events, but is not the act of imagining itself a source of drama in the 
present?  The prospect of future pleasures is enough to create present-tense fear (“I do 
fear”) and even present-tense pleasure (“th’imaginary relish is so sweet / That it 
enchants”).  By imagining, conceptualizing, and articulating his erotic desire, Troilus 
experiences its terrors and joys through the action of speaking.   
My study of the interplay of erotic speech and action responds to longstanding 
critical questions about the relationship between linguistic representation and erotic 
desire, both on and off the stage, within and beyond the early modern period.  Most 
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theorists have conceived of this relationship in terms of lack, emphasizing the gap 
between language and the erotic experience it struggles to name.  As Judith Butler puts it, 
“language is bound to founder on the question of desire.”
2
  The failure of language to 
approximate or represent erotic desire lies at the core of the psychoanalytic narratives that 
have been the touchstone for several generations of scholarship on early modern desire.
3
  
According to Butler, 
Desire guarantees a certain opacity in language, an opacity that language  
can enact and display, but without which it cannot operate.  We can’t trust 
language to give us a clear picture of desire, because they’re bound up  
together.  No exposition of desire can escape becoming implicated in that  
which it seeks to clarify.
4
 
 
My study of erotic language shifts emphasis from what Butler calls the “exposition of 
desire” to erotic desire understood semantically and performatively.  Although erotic 
desire can function in a purely descriptive, expository, or perlocutionary capacity distinct 
from the action of the play, it also can become a mode of dramatic action, provoking the 
desires of characters onstage and exposing audiences to the inner workings of the 
desiring mind and body.  Even though Troilus’s speaking situation arises from a certain 
kind of lack—of Cressida’s physical presence and of the sexual release he anticipates—
his words still create a dynamic erotic experience as he speaks them.  By shifting our 
attention away from the failures of language, my dissertation asks, what can words 
accomplish for characters who experience erotic desire?  My approach to the study of 
Shakespeare’s and Lyly’s language emphasizes the potential of Troilus’s words to create 
                                                
2
 See Butler’s essay “Desire,” in Critical Terms for Literary Study, 2
nd 
ed., edited by Frank Lentricchia and 
Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 369-85, 370. 
3
 Two foundational studies are Janet Adelman, Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in 
Shakespeare’s Plays, Hamlet to The Tempest (New York: Routledge, 1992), and Valerie Traub, Desire and 
Anxiety: Circulations in Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
4
 Butler, “Desire,” 369. 
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sexual desire and even pleasure, foregrounding the question, what does erotic language 
do on the early modern stage? 
 My theoretical and methodological approach to the study of erotic language is 
indebted to two critical traditions that share an emphasis on the dramatic and active 
properties of language: dramatism, a theory of human motives developed by Kenneth 
Burke in A Grammar of Motives (1945), and the work of cognitive linguists such as 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who also study the connections between language, 
thought, and action.  Later in this introduction, I will address the ways in which Kenneth 
Burke’s dramatism has shaped the argument and the structure of my dissertation.  
Although his Grammar of Motives predates the field of cognitive linguistics by a few 
decades, Burke’s focus on the dramatic properties of language—not simply the 
expressive but the creative potential of words—is a basic feature of most cognitive 
approaches to language.
5
  Dramatism and cognitive linguistics both provide essential 
tools for my study of the mechanics of Shakespeare’s and Lyly’s speeches, from the 
grammar of their verbs to the entailments of their metaphors.   
Because cognitive linguistics emphasizes the interdependence of linguistic 
structures, the embodied mind, and lived experience, it opens up new ways of 
understanding how Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s words dramatize the often invisible, 
inward, and deeply embodied experience of erotic desire.  Desire itself is understood 
differently in cognitive theory, which breaks away from Lacanian models in which desire 
                                                
5
 The field of cognitive linguistics developed in the 1970s out of research on the connections between 
language and extra-linguistic phenomena (its cognitive and communicative contexts).  The website of the 
International Cognitive Linguistics Association provides a basic history of the field (see Suzanne Kemmer, 
“About Cognitive Linguistics: Historical Background,” ICLA [2002], 
http://www.cognitivelinguistics.org/cl.shtml).  For a comprehensive survey of the field, see William Croft 
and D. Alan Cruse, eds., Cognitive Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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is believed to be a product of the fragmentation of the self.  Cognitive theory instead 
posits that desire plays a fundamental role in the emergence and formation of the self.  As 
Mary Thomas Crane writes, “a cognitive approach…emphasizes a feeling of presence 
(rather than lack) as the basis of the self…. Desire is seen to be bound up with the 
emergence of both consciousness and thought… [r]ather than a Lacanian scenario of 
desire emerging from a sense of loss in the mirror stage that is intensified by the 
acquisition of language.”
6
  My own work draws from this cognitive approach to desire in 
two ways.  First, I treat language as constitutive of erotic desire, exploring the potential of 
words to create eros and conjure the beloved, rather than marking a lack, loss, or absence.  
Second, my analysis of language aims to understand the way characters experience eros 
by analyzing how they conceptualize it.  Language, according to cognitive theory, is a 
product of cognition—thus, to study erotic speech is to access how a character 
conceptualizes desire.  
 It may seem odd or even counter-intuitive to consider erotic experiences such as 
desire, pleasure, or fantasy, in cognitive terms.  Is eros really a cognitive event, 
something we “conceptualize”?  Given all of the body parts that are involved in erotic 
experience, is the mind the place where love or lust or desire are experienced?  According 
to many of Shakespeare’s and Lyly’s characters, yes, it is.  Shakespeare’s Berowne tells 
Rosaline of his “wooing mind” (Love’s Labors Lost 5.2.413), and Helena tells us in the 
opening scene of A Midsummer Night’s Dream that “Love looks not with the eyes but 
with the mind” (1.1.234).  Any number of Shakespeare’s sonnets debate this point.  
Lyly’s love-struck nymph Telusa first feels the pangs of erotic desire as “new conceits” 
                                                
6
 See Mary Thomas Crane, Shakespeare’s Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 95-96. 
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that “breed in thy mind” (Galatea 3.1.1-2).
7
  Of course, the mind does not operate in 
isolation from the body, particularly when we consider all of the early modern notions of 
embodiment according to which the body and the mind relate reciprocally, both to one 
another and to the outside world.  Recent scholarship on humoral theory has illuminated 
the interpermeability of the early modern body, mind, and world, all of which were 
composed of the same four humors.  Connected at the most basic level of material 
substance, the desiring body and mind were one and the same. Gail Kern Paster describes 
the mind-body connection as “psychophysiological”; emotional, mental, and psychic 
experiences were inextricable from the physical body and the world that contained them.
8
  
Love in particular was understood in material terms, sometimes as a humoral imbalance 
but even as a physical disease.  Robert Burton devotes the third of three sections that 
comprise The Anatomy of Melancholy to the subject of “Love melancholy,” detailing the 
physical causes, symptoms, and potential cures for the illness.
9
  Different medical tracts 
from the period locate lovesickness in various parts of the body (the liver, the eyes, and 
the heart are among the most common), but most agree that the disease circulated 
throughout the body and brain, emphasizing its power to afflict the mind.
10
 
                                                
7
 All quotations of Lyly’s Galatea are from The Revels Plays John Lyly Galatea and Midas, ed. G.K. 
Hunter and David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
8
 Gail Kern Paster, Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 19. 
9
 See Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, especially the Third Partition, “Love melancholy.” 
(Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda 
L. Blair, vol. 3 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994].)  
10
 Burton notes that “the Symptoms of the minde in Lovers, are almost infinite, and so diverse, that no Art 
can comprehend them” (148). For a comprehensive study of lovesickness in the early modern period, see 
Mary Frances Wack, Lovesickness in the Middle Ages: The Viaticum and its Commentaries (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).  Early modern medical accounts of lovesickness include Jacques 
Ferrand’s 1610 tract, A treatise on lovesickness, trans. and ed. Donald Beecher and Massimo Ciavolella 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), and the English translation of André Du Laurens’ A 
Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight (1599).  I am grateful to Ian Frederick Moulton for pointing out a 
passage from A Discourse in his seminar paper for the Shakespeare Association of America meeting 
(Boston, 2012) in which Du Laurens details love’s physical movement throughout the body: “Love 
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Although our understanding of the scientific underpinnings of the mind-body 
continuum has changed considerably during the last four hundred years, their connection 
is still understood to be as rich and complex as it was in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s day.  
The reciprocal relationship between body and mind also lies at the core of contemporary 
cognitive theory.  Paster has noted the similarities between early modern humoral theory 
and more recent cognitive theories of the embodied mind: “such an emphasis on the 
biological functionality of the passions sounds strikingly like the interest of modern 
cognitive science in the evolution of the emotions.”
11
  According to George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson, the first of the three major findings of cognitive science is that “the mind 
is inherently embodied… in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon 
the commonalities of our bodies and the environments we live in.”
12
  Lakoff and Johnson 
emphasize the role of our physical and spatial orientation in the world as a primary 
source for our cognitive patterning.  When Troilus talks of anticipation as a force that 
“whirls” him, he conceptualizes erotic desire in physical and spatial terms.  To 
experience erotic “expectation” as a physical force that can send one’s body into frenzied 
motion is to conceptualize desire as an action, and perhaps more significantly for 
Troilus’s particular experience, it is to conceptualize oneself as a separate entity 
vulnerable to desire’s whims and subject to its power. 
                                                
therefore having abused the eyes… and passing without any perserverance in this sort through the veines 
unto the liver, doth suddenly imprint a burning desire to obtaine the thing, which is or seemeth worthie to 
be beloved, setteth concupiscence on fire, and beginneth by this desire all the strife and contention: but 
fearing her selfe too weake to incounter with reason, the principal part of the minde, she posteth in haste to 
the heart.” 
11
 Paster, Humoring the Body, 18. 
12
 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 3 and 6.  According to Lakoff and Johnson, thoughts are 
embedded in our basic sensory experiences: “An embodied concept is a neural system that is actually a part 
of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains. Much of conceptual inference is, therefore, 
sensorimotor inference” (20). 
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Of course the best evidence for the profound interdependence of erotic and 
conceptual experience is found in the language of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s characters.  
Troilus’s speech provides a telling example of the role of cognition in the experience of 
erotic desire and even pleasure.  He spends many of his lines detailing his fear of the 
sexual pleasures that await him, and although we might expect him to be frightened of 
their intensity or sheer force, it is their nuance and refinement that scare him the most.  
He worries about pleasures that are “too fine, / Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in 
sweetness / For the capacity of my ruder powers” (21-23).  While the intensity of his 
impending orgasm is the source of some trepidation (Troilus does use the word “potent” 
in his account), it is the acuteness of his pleasures (his joys will be “too subtle-potent”) 
that unnerves him, because he may not have the requisite perceptual and conceptual 
acuity to process them.  Put another way, Troilus is afraid of his inability to conceive of 
his pleasure.  It is as though his conceptual system is too coarse a sieve to capture the fine 
grain of the “joys” that await him, dooming them to be lost to him forever.  According to 
Troilus, it is our ability to process erotic experience mentally that grants us access to it—
action and contemplation are both vital ingredients in erotic experience.  Not only is 
erotic pleasure potentially meaningless and inaccessible without the ability to make sense 
of it, but Troilus’s conceptual failing is akin to “death” (20) and “destruction” (21).  The 
stakes are high for Troilus (as they are for Bassanio and Romeo), whose words do more 
than narrate erotic experience.  They engender fear and pleasure, they “whirl” and 
“charge on” him: they make eros happen by making erotic meaning. 
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As Troilus’s fears become more pronounced, so do the connections he draws 
between cognitive and erotic experience.  He ends his speech by naming a new fear, the 
source of which is found in Troilus himself rather than in the pleasures that await him:  
I do fear besides 
That I shall lose distinction in my joys 
As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps,  
The enemy flying. (24-27) 
 
To be overwhelmed by such powerful sexual pleasures constitutes for Troilus not an 
ecstatic fantasy but a nightmare; sexual release becomes a threat both to his sense of self 
and to his cognitive faculties.  At risk in the loss of “distinction” is not only the power to 
discriminate—to identify, isolate and define each joy—but to distinguish himself from 
Cressida amidst lovemaking.  Such “distinction” is, then, profoundly physical and 
embodied; at the same time, its loss jeopardizes for Troilus access to, and knowledge of, 
erotic pleasure.  Although his fear may seem hyperbolic or unwarranted, maintaining 
distinction is crucially his means of experiencing eros.   
This is also the means by which Lyly and Shakespeare dramatize eros: by shaping 
a character’s desire into words, they give it distinction, what Shakespeare’s Theseus calls 
“a local habitation and a name” (A Midsummer Night’s Dream 5.1.17).  Although 
Theseus’s account of language appears quite static—words are where “things unknown” 
are housed, where they are fixed, captured, and pinned down—his story of how poetic 
language is produced is extraordinarily dynamic: 
The poet's eye, in fine frenzy rolling,  
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven, 
And as imagination bodies forth  
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen  
Turns them to shapes…  (5.1.12-17) 
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A few lines earlier in his speech, Theseus compares poets to lovers, showing how lovers 
share in the kind of “frenz[ied]” imaginative activity he ascribes to the poet.  The words 
of lovers are as dynamic as are Theseus’s verbs: erotic language “bodies forth” erotic 
experience (and even sometimes an absent beloved), and it “turns” unknown fears, 
fantasies, and pleasures “to shapes.”  Because language is our window into conceptual 
and inward experience, the language of erotic desire on the early modern English stage 
must be active and dramatic. 
 A close look at the “shapes” which comprise Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s erotic 
language reveals this language to be conspicuously metaphorical.  Both playwrights make 
use of rich, complex conceptual metaphors to dramatize erotic desire.  The study of 
metaphors that enable us to conceptualize our everyday experiences in language is the 
work of cognitive linguists.  George Lakoff defines “metaphor” as “a cross-domain 
mapping in the conceptual system. The term metaphorical expression refers to a 
linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface realization of such a 
cross-domain mapping (this is what the word metaphor referred to in the old theory).”
13
  
Take, for example, the “argument is war” metaphor: the features of wars are mapped onto 
the experience of argument.
14
  In this instance, war is the “source domain” because it is 
being used to conceptualize, or “profile,” the more abstract “target domain” of argument.  
Mapping across domains creates a whole host of entailments that allow us to generate 
novel metaphors about arguments as war (e.g., “she attacked his thesis” and “I had to 
defend my side”).  Lakoff draws a sharp distinction between metaphor and a 
                                                
13
 George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” Metaphor and Thought, 2
nd
 Ed, ed. Andrew 
Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), cited from 
http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~market/semiotic/lkof_met.html. 
14
 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), for a more extensive discussion of the “argument is war” metaphor and its entailments. 
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metaphorical expression.  The former is crucially not a feature of language.  Instead, a 
metaphor is a way of conceptualizing (not articulating) experience.  A metaphorical 
expression is the linguistic counterpart of metaphor.  According to Lakoff and Johnson, 
“metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action.  
Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature.”
15
 
Conceptual metaphor theory can help us understand how Lyly’s and 
Shakespeare’s characters experience, think about, and talk about erotic desire.  Lakoff 
and Johnson emphasize the power of metaphors to structure our experiences of the target 
domains they elaborate.  So, for example, characters who tap into metaphors of desire as 
a physical struggle experience desire as a physical struggle.  Troilus’s speech exemplifies 
this metaphor: his anticipation is a physical force that “whirls him,” and his joys are 
armies “that charge on heaps.”  This is to conceptualize sexual desire and pleasure as 
physical struggles and Troilus as victim.  Because Troilus conceptualizes desire as a 
struggle, his metaphors deploy the elements from this source domain.  Both the content 
and the structure of each source domain shape our experience of the target.  The skeletal 
structure of the source domain, according to Lakoff and Mark Turner, is known as a 
“schema.”
16
  Each schema has slots, which stand for participants in the schema, or 
elements that are to be filled in.  In the example of desire as a physical struggle, the slots 
would include an aggressor, a victim, a physical encounter, perhaps a weapon, some kind 
of motive, etc.  Each of these slots profiles the participants of the desire domain.  The 
metaphor itself constrains us to assign particular roles (e.g., aggressor, victim) and 
                                                
15
 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 3. 
16
 See George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), especially “Part II – The Power of Poetic Metaphor.” 
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relations between the roles (e.g., the aggressor attacks/ destroys/“charge[s] on” the 
victim), even though these may not be necessary parts of the target domain or pertain to 
other metaphors.  Desire as a journey does not have a “victim” slot.   
Recent work on conceptual metaphor theory suggests that lived, physical 
experiences produce our most basic metaphors.  Joseph Grady identifies a special class of 
metaphor called “primary metaphors,” or deeply entrenched metaphorical patterns, which 
are based on experiential correlations.
17
  Grady discusses the cross-cultural definition of 
“coldness” as “lacking in emotion.”  Languages ranging from Latin to Chinese to Old 
Irish associate coldness with indifference.  There is, unsurprisingly, a similar association 
between heat or warmth and aroused emotion.  Grady’s primary metaphors are based on 
our physical experiences, not on shared features between source and target domains.  
That is, we feel warm when we experience affection, or any extreme emotion such as 
love or anger.  Moreover, extreme emotion causes the change in body temperature.  So, 
while other instances of metaphor may be considered correlations, there is a class of 
primary metaphors that have causal relationships.   
Because it is both abstract and physical, conceptual and experiential, erotic desire 
is a particularly interesting object for scrutiny using conceptual metaphor theory.  
Conceptual metaphor theory would have it that complex ideas and emotions are 
understood in terms of tangible, physically-based source domains, such as temperature 
and motion.  But temperature and motion, to name only two, are key ingredients in the 
experience of desire (especially the early modern caloric analysis of desire, according to 
which the heat generated during lovemaking made for a better chance of conception).  
                                                
17
 Joseph Grady, “Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Integration,” Journal of Pragmatics, 37 
(2005): 1595-614. 
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When we feel erotic attraction, our body temperatures rise, our blood circulates more 
quickly.  We get butterflies in our stomach (another metaphor) and our pulse accelerates.  
We sweat.  Our mouths water.  Our bodies move, stiffen, swell.  Hence the relationship 
between physical source domains and the target domain of erotic desire is especially 
complex.  Sometimes we use a particular metaphor because of correlations or shared 
characteristics between the two domains.  At other times, we rely on primary metaphors 
to elaborate an experience of desire, revealing how difficult it is to abstract desire from 
the physical sensations it generates in our bodies. 
My study of erotic language in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays is, at its core, a 
study of the principal erotic metaphors that they employ.  In the appendices to my 
dissertation, I chart the entailments of, and the relationships among, some of these 
playwrights’ more prominent metaphors, along with examples of erotic language from 
their plays.  Because conceptual metaphors emerge in language, because they are 
fundamental features of cognition, and because they are embodied, analyzing such 
metaphors foregrounds the connections between erotic language, thought, and action on 
the early modern English stage.  Alongside the work of cognitive linguists, my 
understanding of erotic language as dramatic action derives, as I have noted, from 
Kenneth Burke’s dramatism.  While Burke does not treat the subject of erotic desire in 
particular, he does focus on the attribution of motives, a topic closely related to desire in 
all of its forms.  Desire – for power, for survival, for closeness or contact – is a 
fundamental human motive.  Burke begins by posing the question, “What is involved, 
when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?”, a question which 
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establishes the strong linguistic component in his survey.
18
  Investigating the ways we 
linguistically attribute motives, Burke develops his grammar according to five key terms 
that situate human motivation: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose.  His terms give us a 
cognitive and linguistic scheme for analyzing (respectively): what happened, in what 
situation the action occurred, who acted, by what means the action was performed, and 
the reason behind the action.  All of this falls under the rubric “dramatism” because “it 
invites one to consider the matter of motives in a perspective that, being developed from 
the analysis of drama, treats language and thought primarily as modes of action.”
19
  Since 
I argue that the language of desire has a dynamic and kinetic power in early modern 
drama, often changing the course of a play’s action and its audience’s response, Burke’s 
work is extremely apt. 
Burke’s dramatism emphasizes the ability of words to do—to create action, to 
make meaning, to constitute experience.  His study of language derives from drama but it 
also extends beyond its bounds.  Debra Hawhee writes about Burke’s tendency “to figure 
verbalizations as acts themselves.”
20
  Burke’s approach to language illuminates the erotic 
experience of characters like Lyly’s Phao, who can hardly distinguish between erotic 
language and love in the first place.  Upon falling in love with Sappho, Phao tells 
himself, 
 Let thy love hang at thy heart’s bottom, not at the tongue’s brim.  Things 
 untold are undone; there can be no greater comfort than to know much, 
 nor any less labour than to say nothing.  But, ah, thy beauty, Sappho, thy 
 
                                                
18
 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), xv. Hereafter 
cited as GM. 
19
 Ibid., xxii. 
20
 See Debra Hawhee, “Language as Sensuous Action: Sir Richard Paget, Kenneth Burke, and Gesture-
Speech Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92, no. 4 (2006): 331-54, 342. Hawhee refers to Kenneth 
Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 1st ed. Vol. 2. (New York: The New Republic, 1937), 1e, 2: 249. 
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 beauty!  Beginnest thou to blab?  Ay, blab it, Phao, as long as thou blabbest 
 her beauty.          
       (2.4.28-34)
21
 
 
Phao’s astounding reason for holding his tongue is that “things untold are undone.”  The 
words “untold” and “undone” are increasingly problematic in the context of Phao’s 
speech because, while he struggles over the question of telling Sappho his feelings, he is 
telling himself in this speech, and telling us.  It seems, therefore, that he is “doing” 
whatever it is that one does when “blabb[ing]” these feelings.  What does Phao mean by 
“undone”?  Is it his hope that keeping his feelings secret will make them untrue, or not 
real, for him as well as for his beloved?  But Phao does not say that things untold are 
untrue—he says they are undone.  What is clear from this line is that, for Phao, “to say” 
is to act; he makes a powerful connection between saying and feeling, between 
“blabbing” and loving. 
 The connection that Phao explores is representative of the erotic language in 
much of Lyly’s drama.  It is probably no exaggeration to say that the language of desire is 
spoken and explored more exhaustively by Lyly’s characters than by any others in the 
sixteenth century.
22
  Almost all of his plays are about erotic desire, and almost all of them 
have been characterized at one point or another as un-dramatic.
23
  To date, most 
scholarship on Lyly’s drama has characterized his plays as largely allegorical, interesting 
mostly for their euphuistic style and for their commentaries on Elizabeth’s court but 
generally lacking in dynamism.  G.K. Hunter has observed that Lyly’s comedies “depend 
                                                
21
 All quotations of Lyly’s Sappho and Phao are from The Revels Plays John Lyly Campaspe and Sappho 
and Phao, ed. G.K. Hunter and David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). 
22
 Compelling evidence for this claim may be found in my very lengthy Appendix B, which lists examples 
of erotic language from Lyly’s plays. 
23
 See for example Mary Beth Rose, The Expense of Spirit: Love and Sexuality in English Renaissance 
Drama (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), who describes Lyly’s “view of sexual love as abstract and 
impersonal, polarized, static, emotionally simple, and morally predictable” (35).  For “undramatic,” see 26. 
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on a much more static and passive mode of contemplating and analyzing the conflicting 
emotions of love.”
24
  While I agree with Hunter’s claim that contemplation and analysis 
comprise a good portion of Lyly’s drama, my dissertation challenges his characterization 
of these activities as “static.”  My study of Lyly’s dramatic language reveals that erotic 
contemplation, even analysis, can be vibrant, frenzied actions on a stage.  The active 
language of anticipation and fantasy, insinuation and confession, permeates Lyly’s plays 
as they dramatize a variety of erotic experiences.  Lyly’s Campaspe and Sappho and 
Phao stage the overpowering desires of monarchs who struggle to maintain control and 
authority when burdened by the oppressive weight of love.  In Galatea, Love’s 
Metamorphosis, The Woman in the Moon, and Mother Bombie, Lyly explores the 
confusions and misdirections of erotic desire by dramatizing disguised identities and 
changing attitudes toward chastity and sexuality.  Lyly’s Endymion is one of the few 
early modern plays that dwells and remains in the realm of erotic desire.  It is not hard to 
see why David Bevington describes it as “uneventful” twice in his introduction to the 
Revels Plays edition of Endymion, since after five acts of so-called drama, the play ends 
more or less where it began.
25
  So what makes Endymion dramatic, besides the fact that it 
is, generically, a drama?  What happens to Lyly’s hero?  Or to pose a more apt question 
for this dissertation, what does he do in the play?  The answer must be that Endymion 
desires.  He does not attain, he does not marry, he does not really even court or seduce.  
He solely, and fiercely, wants.  Wanting is the main event, the protagonist’s primary 
action, in Lyly’s play.  And as in so many others of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays, the 
hero’s desire is dramatized through speech. 
                                                
24
 G.K. Hunter, introduction to Galatea in The Revels Plays John Lyly Galatea and Midas, 3-25, 15. 
25
 See Bevington’s introduction to the Revels Plays Endymion (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
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 My emphasis on the active properties of Lyly’s erotic language contributes to 
recent work by scholars such as Kent Cartwright, who calls for a reassessment of 
Hunter’s claim about the static nature of his plays.  “Although Lyly’s plays have been 
treated by modern critics as static and intellectual dramas of ideas,” Cartwright argues, 
“Galathea generates emotional and visceral delight from not exactly ideas, but a 
pleasurable ‘confusion’ that displays theatrical values one expects from popular plays.”
26
  
Cartwright’s study of theatricality and dynamism in Galatea is a marked departure from 
much of the scholarship on desire in Lyly’s plays.  Earlier criticism of Lyly’s work tends 
to focus more on his prose works than his drama, and it is mostly occupied with close 
formal analysis of allegory and euphuism in his drama.
27
  Ruth Lunney’s 2011 collection 
of essays on John Lyly (the first compilation of its kind) offers some useful categories for 
the types of scholarship typical of Lylyan studies over the past half century.
28
  She 
divides her edition into four parts: “Lessons in Wit,” which studies the Euphues books as 
Lyly’s contributions to humanist education; “Courting the Queen,” which focuses on the 
political aspects of Lyly’s plays; “Playing with Desire,” which considers the subject of 
love in several of his works; and “Performing Lyly,” which contains essays on 
theatricality and theater history.  Only two of the eight essays in the section on “Playing 
with Desire” were published within the past decade, and many of these contributions 
focus on Lyly’s portrayal of desire as it illuminates an earlier formal or literary tradition 
(Ovidian myth, Petrarchanism) or a historical feature of the early modern world, most 
                                                
26
 Kent Cartwright, “The Confusions of Gallathea: John Lyly as Popular Dramatist,” Comparative Drama 
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often the court and the figure of Elizabeth I.
29
  While such scholarship is important to our 
understanding of Lyly’s political and literary contexts, my aim in this study is to focus 
attention on what Lyly’s language can tell us about the experience, and the theatricality, 
of erotic desire itself.
30
   
 To date, there exists no full-length study that pairs Shakespeare’s and Lyly’s 
plays.  My dissertation aims to fill this critical gap, and perhaps more importantly, my 
intention is to make use of the rich variety of linguistic resources that each playwright 
brings to bear on the drama of erotic desire because such analysis alters our 
understanding of both playwrights.  Lunney writes that “Lyly’s claim to critical attention 
has rested largely on his reputation as the playwright who introduced the comedy of love 
to the English stage, providing an example for Shakespeare and others to follow.”
31
  
Generally speaking, when scholars pair Lyly and Shakespeare together, the words 
“example” and “influence” are usually close behind.
32
  Critics have long suggested that 
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Shakespeare turned to Lyly’s comedies as models for his own early plays about love. 
There are a number of advantages to these studies of Lyly’s creative influence on 
Shakespeare.  For one, they contextualize Shakespeare’s dramatic language.  They also 
bring Lyly’s plays in closer relation with those of a conventionally “popular” playwright, 
thus affirming Kent Cartwright’s claim that Lyly’s plays had popular theatrical value in 
their own right.  A disadvantage to any study of influence is, of course, that it privileges 
the plays of the later dramatist over those of the earlier.  If Lyly’s plays are considered 
alongside Shakespeare’s primarily because of influence, Shakespeare becomes the 
destination and Lyly is reduced to a glorified pit stop on the Bard Highway. 
My reading Lyly alongside Shakespeare, Shakespeare alongside Lyly, is neither 
teleological nor strictly comparative.  Some chapters of my dissertation do devote more 
attention to Shakespeare’s plays than to Lyly’s, but others emphasize Lyly’s drama; 
either way, I examine both playwrights’ erotic language at length because they both use 
the same essential metaphors to dramatize erotic desire.  Such metaphors often exceed the 
particularities of individual authors or genres because they are fundamental to erotic 
experience.  Thus, my study of a single erotic metaphor has led to some unconventional 
pairings of plays; for example, I analyze early Lylyan comedy in tandem with late 
Shakespearean tragedy.  I also have found it useful to introduce secondary literature 
eminently familiar in Shakespeare studies into my readings of Lyly’s plays, even though 
this is uncommon in Lyly studies.  Guided by the five terms of Burke’s pentad and the 
conceptual metaphors they marshal, I turn to theoretical models inspired by philosophers 
as diverse as Aristotle, Giordano Bruno, Emmanuel Levinas, Gaston Bachelard, Stanley 
Cavell, and Gilles Deleuze.  Their thinking offers new ways to understand Lyly’s genius 
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for staging the dynamic experience of erotic desire while they make for fresh insights into 
Shakespeare’s erotic language, too. 
 Each of the succeeding chapters explores a basic conceptual metaphor of erotic 
desire in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays, and each of these metaphors is derived from the 
terms of Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad.  Chapter 1, which focuses on Burke’s term 
“Act,” considers primary metaphors of physical motion that characterize desire as an 
action rather than a state of mind.  This chapter provides a survey of fundamental 
physical metaphors found in several of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays (some of which I 
explore in greater depth in later chapters), and it introduces the ways such metaphors 
dramatize the dynamic features of erotic experience.  I begin by considering the meaning 
of “act,” along with its relationship to physical motion, according to Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics and Burke’s Grammar, exploring the ways erotic desire may be 
conceptualized as different degrees of action.  Although some characters experience 
desire as idleness or stasis that acts upon them, desire is often conceptualized as a 
stirring, literally “moving,” experience, even a physical struggle.  To study the various 
entailments of the “Desire as Act” metaphor (e.g., the object, the telos, and the force of 
erotic desire), this chapter analyzes language from several of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s 
plays but it focuses on metaphors of physical stillness and motion in Galatea, Othello, 
and Measure for Measure. 
  Kenneth Burke analyzes the five terms of dramatism individually but also in 
dialogue with one another, and I take my cue from him in my own analysis of erotic 
language.  Hence my second and third chapters relate the terms from Burke’s pentad to 
one another by pairing them in what he refers to as “ratios.”  In Chapter 2, I investigate 
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metaphors of permeability and containment that dramatize erotic desire as a rupture 
between “agents” and their “scenes,” what Burke refers to as the “scene-agent ratio.”  I 
focus on speeches by Shakespeare’s Valentine and Lyly’s Endymion, and on language in 
Antony and Cleopatra, in which characters conceptualize their lovers as identical to their 
scenes.  I also bring to bear different theories of place (or “scene”) as they have been 
articulated by Aristotle and Gaston Bachelard, but also by early modern cosmologists 
such as Francesco Patrizi and Giordano Bruno—each examines changing relationships 
between self and world.  The stakes of erotic desire shift when characters open 
themselves to their beloved as place.  Valentine imagines Silvia as the “day for me to 
look upon” (Two Gentlemen of Verona 3.1.181), Antony sees Cleopatra as “thou day o’ 
th’ world” (Antony and Cleopatra 4.8.13; emphasis mine), and Endymion falls in love 
with the very moon in the night sky.  Intimacy with a beloved as “scene” means that 
characters make themselves vulnerable to the world.  This precipitates a degree of 
exposure that can even be painful, as when Endymion longs for Cynthia to “see every 
vein, sinew, muscle, and artery of my love” (Endymion 2.1.49-50).  With their personal 
boundaries so fiercely compromised, lovers risk displacement from their own secure 
sense of self, but they also gain access to new forms of intimacy—with the distant moon, 
or the “demi-Atlas of this earth” (Antony and Cleopatra 1.5.23), or even the 
unfathomable expanse of “oblivion” (Antony and Cleopatra 1.3.90) and “vacancy” 
(Antony and Cleopatra 1.4.26).   
Finally, Chapter 3 explores the ways characters make intimate relationships, via 
the metaphor “desiring is creating.”  Burke’s terms “agency” and “purpose”—the means 
and ends of erotic desire—guide this chapter’s analysis of erotic language, in which eros 
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is conceptualized as a dynamic process of creation.  Burke’s understanding of “agency” 
(how we desire) leads me to consider the role of erotic instruments as a means of mutual 
creation and love-making.  In Lyly’s Campaspe, the instrument of Apelles’ erotic relation 
with his model is painting.  Lyly’s lovers are transformed not only by pigment, brush, and 
canvas, but also by the dynamic process of artistic creation itself.  Shakespeare’s lovers in 
The Taming of the Shrew employ fictions and lies to make their marriage.  The 
instrument of storytelling allows Petruchio and Kate to build a private world together that 
turns out to be artful and poetic; the friction of their words ignites the creative and erotic 
charge of their intimate world.  In both Campaspe and The Taming of the Shrew, 
language itself becomes an instrument that lovers craft and refine as their very means of 
desiring. 
My dissertation concludes with three appendices that gather and organize 
representative erotic language from Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s dramatic works.  Appendix 
A provides a chart of prominent erotic metaphors in plays by Shakespeare and Lyly.  
Presenting metaphors in this format reveals relationships among them—where they 
overlap and correlate, where they diverge and conflict—along with their entailments.  
Appendices B and C list specific examples of erotic language from Lyly’s and 
Shakespeare’s plays, respectively.  I define “erotic language” broadly for this purpose, 
including speeches that describe, evaluate, and enact erotic desire, along with speeches 
about sexual activity and courtship.  Such language is spoken by characters who are in 
the throes of erotic experience, but also by their witnesses.  I aim to uncover the 
extraordinary richness and variety of erotic language in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays.  
Readers may discover a good deal of overlap between plays and authors—similarities are 
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found at the micro-level of particular locutions, but perhaps more significantly, at the 
macro-level of metaphorical structure.  Taken together, the three appendices illuminate 
the connections between metaphorical language and thought that dramatize erotic 
experience in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays. 
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Chapter 1 
“I’ll do, I’ll do, and I’ll do” 
Desire as Act 
 
He eats nothing but doves, love, and that breeds hot blood, and hot blood begets hot thoughts,  
and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love. 
 
      Troilus and Cressida (3.1.119-21) 
 
 
 What happens if we, like Paris in my epigraph, think of love as an action?  In 
Troilus and Cressida, Paris traces the genealogy (what Pandarus calls the “generation” 
[3.1.122]) and the course of Troilus’s love, beginning with eating doves and ending with 
hot deeds.  Actions (eating and “hot deeds”) bracket the apparent states (hot blood and 
hot thoughts) that we might typically equate with erotic desire.  Humoral psychology is 
of considerable importance to Paris’s diagnosis, but perhaps not quite so important as 
action in this conceptualization of love.  Of course, not all of Shakespeare’s characters 
are of Paris’s mind.  In Two Gentlemen of Verona, Julia wonders about “know[ing] the 
inly touch of love” (2.7.18), evoking a mental or inner life that is as active as Paris’s 
presumably physical “hot deeds.”  For Shakespeare’s Troilus, the difference between hot 
thoughts and hot deeds comprises “the monstruosity of love… – that the will is infinite 
and the execution confined; that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit” 
(Troilus and Cressida 3.2.75-77).  How does the early modern stage accommodate an 
infinite will or a boundless desire?  How does it dramatize the “enraged affections” of 
Shakespeare’s Beatrice, which her uncle describes as “past the infinite of thought” 
(2.3.95)?  How does it overcome what for Troilus is the mutual exclusivity between “the 
desire” and “the act” of love? 
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In this chapter, I argue that Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s characters often understand 
desire as an act.  I begin by considering what it means to act, according to Aristotle and 
Kenneth Burke, and then canvas the ways desire may be conceptualized as different 
degrees of action.  Next, I introduce the event structure metaphor, a useful vehicle for 
studying the active qualities of language that dramatizes desire.  In section three, I survey 
metaphors of action and movement in Lyly’s plays, looking most closely at their 
development in Galatea.  Finally, section four investigates these metaphors in 
Shakespeare’s plays, focusing specifically on Measure for Measure and Othello.  By 
studying dynamic metaphors of desire across Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays, we can 
begin to appreciate the ways that erotic language itself functions as a kind of dramatic 
action. 
 
I. The Name of Action 
Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard 
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on; 
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear’d, 
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone: 
Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave 
Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare; 
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss, 
Though winning near the goal – yet, do not grieve; 
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss, 
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair! 
 
     -John Keats, “Ode on a Grecian Urn” (11-20)
1
 
 
These lines have much to say about the experience of desire, about the sweetness 
of an “unheard melody” and the conviction that we can sustain desire, either through 
artistic representation or by withholding satisfaction.  For as long as the “bold lover” is 
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 See A Longman Cultural Edition John Keats, ed. Susan J. Wolfson (New York: Longman, 2007), 358-60. 
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unrequited, he will escape the pain of loss or regret.  Always and unbearably close to his 
beloved, never enjoying her but persistently wanting her, he is both a potential and an 
actual lover.  What does it mean to be a lover in Keats’ poem?  How might we define 
desire as it is depicted on the urn?  The lover “winning near the goal” is in motion, and 
his pursuit of “bliss” exemplifies desire as an action: a deliberate movement towards a 
goal.  Love promises permanence at the cost of bliss: “though thou hast not thy bliss, / 
For ever wilt thou love.”  “For ever” because the lover is fixed within the marble of the 
urn, untouched by time and impervious to change, eternally performing the same action.  
The next stanza continues to depict “happy love” as both an act and a state: “For ever 
panting, and for ever young; / All breathing human passion far above” (27-28).  Both “for 
ever panting” and far from “breathing human passion,” love tremors with vigor and yet is 
almost lifeless at the same time.  As for Keats’s lover, he both acts and is acted upon, he 
loves and he is in love. 
The commonplace expression, “falling in love,” assumes that love is a state into 
which we fall, not an action we take.  Being “in love” appears to correspond with the 
scene for an act, rather than the act itself.  So understood, love provides an environment 
in which other acts (wooing, sex, etc.) may occur.  At stake in this conceptualization of 
desire are questions of agency, choice, and control.  The scene of desire is only 
occasionally within a lover’s control; because she is situated within its confines, she 
cannot very well govern it.  To consider desire as a scene, then, is to absolve lovers of 
much of the responsibility for controlling desire.  Desire contains us, not we it. 
We may, however, conceptualize desire and love not as scenes but as acts.  
According to Kenneth Burke, “whereas the scientist beginning with ‘the object’ explains 
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abstraction, generalization, classification as a process having to do with nouns, a 
dramatist stress upon act suggests an origin in verbs.”
2
  Of Aristotle’s six elements of 
tragedy, Burke notes that “action” or plot is preeminent.  For Aristotle, action is the very 
soul of tragedy: 
 Tragedy is a representation not of human beings but of action and life. Happiness
 and unhappiness lie in action, and the end [of life] is a sort of action, not a quality;
 people are of a certain sort according to their characters, but happy or the opposite
 according to their actions.  So [the actors] do not act in order to represent the
 characters, but they include the characters for the sake of their actions.
3
  
 
Not only is living itself an act, but, Aristotle writes, the telos of life is action.  Happiness, 
the goal of life, is something we do, not something we simply feel.  The same may also 
be said of desire. 
Up to this point, I have suggested that there are at least two distinct 
conceptualizations of desire: as scene and as act.  Desire as scene is static to the extent 
that it corresponds to a state of being; desire as act is obviously active.  Burke pays 
particular attention to the dialectic of acts and states, which he refers to as the actus-
status pair.  For Burke, there is quite a lot of overlap between these terms, as is so often 
the case with binary relations. Grammatically, we tend to describe our state of mind or 
emotion in the terms of “being” or “essence,” which Burke reminds us is not a 
“demonstrative noun, but a verbal noun, the most abstract and general form of the most 
abstract and general act.”
4
  Here, as elsewhere, Burke is making his way toward a 
complex theory of action, one in which passivity, or status, is always deeply indebted to 
action.  Even seemingly static uses of language, such as simple description, have active 
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 Burke, GM, 249. 
3
 Ibid., 241. 
4
 Ibid., 249.  “Being” as a kind of action is evident in Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” soliloquy, where he 
identifies being as a choice and a kind of action (Hamlet 3.3.58-90). 
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properties.  Burke calls to mind our descriptions of personality: when we try to describe 
someone’s essence (what Burke calls quiddity, or “whatness”), we often use the 
expression “he has a way with him.”  This is to acknowledge that “a thing’s essence or 
quiddity can become identical with its principle of action.”
 
 A person’s unique, often 
unspeakable essential quality goes beyond substance; it is a “way,” a process – a kind of 
action.
5
 
Burke’s analysis of the actus-status pair reveals the interconnectedness of “static 
desire” and “active desire.”  What emerges is a theory in which desire is situated on a 
continuum of activity, with status/scene at one end and actus/act at the other: 
 !----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------" 
Status/Scene              Actus/Act 
“I am in love”                    “I love” 
 
Of course, there is still more to interrogate about desire as act.  In particular, what might a 
purely or absolutely “active” conceptualization of desire look like?  The image of the 
lover on Keats’ urn offers an example.  That the lover moves “near the goal” suggests 
that his desire is an action he takes.  The same lover, forever leaning in for his kiss, 
moves permanently toward an unattainable target.  Such is desire, driving toward its 
object and driven to weariness, both moving and moved.  When Burke discusses Keats’ 
ode in an appendix to The Grammar of Motives, he notes the way that Keats presents us 
with a form of thought “in terms of an eternal present.”  There is, Burke writes, “a 
quality of suspension in the erotic imagery, defining an eternal prolongation of the state 
just prior to the fulfillment – not exactly arrested ecstasy, but rather an arrested pre-
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ecstasy.”
6
  And yet Burke’s notion of an arrested pre-ecstasy, a frozen piece of history, 
somehow takes place in “an eternal present,” and is therefore continuously happening, 
again and again.   
This “eternal present” calls to mind Aristotelian “entelechy.”  Although Aristotle 
never explicitly defines it, he describes “entelechy” in his Metaphysics as a type of 
motion in which the end, or completion, is always present.  For his part, Burke defines 
entelechy as “having its end within itself.”
7
  The Greek word entelechia translates 
literally as “having the telos, or goal, inside” (translators conflate the word “entelechy” 
with a host of English words, including “action” and “actuality”).  Aristotle contrasts 
entelechy with other forms of movement.  Ordinary movement, writes Aristotle, may be 
exemplified by the process of weight-loss – body parts move toward thinness but are not 
yet thin.  As an incomplete process, this is not an action.  Aristotelian action accounts for 
processes such as happiness, understanding, seeing, and thinking, where “at the same 
time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood.”
8
  As we will 
see in examples from Lyly and Shakespeare, desire often approaches but rarely achieves 
entelechy.  Characters in their plays range in their expressions of desire from the scenic 
(falling “in love”) to various degrees of active (struggling with desire) to occasional 
conceptualizations of desire as entelechy, as depicted below: 
!-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
State/Scene    — Action "    Entelechy 
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 Just as the “eternal present” complicates the actus-status pair, so too does 
“incipient action,” a concept Burke borrows from I. A. Richards.  Richards defines 
incipient action as the impulse to act, prior to any overt action taking place; he argues that 
art often generates this impulse within an audience.
9
  Where erotic desire is 
conceptualized as an impulse to act, we might situate it somewhere in the middle of our 
continuum, perhaps closer to status than actus.  But Burke points out that it is difficult to 
separate impulse (or “attitude,” as Burke more frequently terms it) from act: 
 Note, however, that the concept of incipient acts is ambiguous.  As an attitude can
 be the substitute for an act, it can likewise be the first step towards an act.  Thus,
 if we arouse in someone an attitude of sympathy towards something, we may be
 starting him on the road towards overtly sympathetic action with regard to it.
10
 
 
This is to make incipient action proximate to entelechy.  As “the first step towards an 
act,” an incipient action already contains at least a measure of its telos.  The ambiguity 
Burke identifies in this passage rings true of desire. 
 
II. “My desire… did spur me forth”: The Event Structure Metaphor 
 
Burke’s description of an incipient act as “the first step . . . on the road” towards 
an act conjures up a traveler.  This is to conceptualize desire as a path, characters as 
travelers, and plays as surroundings.  I comprehend desire in these terms probably for the 
same reason that Burke does – we can talk about desire only if we can ground it.  
Metaphor allows us to conceptualize (and therefore to express) our ideas in concrete, 
graspable ways.  In the following sections, I survey Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s metaphors 
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of desire as physical stillness and motion.  Although there are many different metaphors 
that characters can access to conceptualize their desires, particular dramatic 
circumstances (for example, character or situation) determine specific metaphors.  The 
deployment of any one metaphor will highlight certain features of erotic desire and 
occlude others.  Unsurprisingly, both Lyly and Shakespeare use especially complex 
metaphor blends.  For example, Romeo’s desire is at one moment a war and at another a 
gastronomic delight –sometimes these overlap so closely that it is hard to unravel one 
metaphor from another, and impossible to extricate them from the experience itself.  
Because of such complexities, any analysis of metaphors (especially metaphors of desire) 
in Lyly and Shakespeare will be incomplete.
11
  In this chapter I concentrate on the basic 
metaphor structure that undergirds conceptualizations of desire in general: the “event 
structure metaphor.” 
In “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” Lakoff notes that “various aspects 
of event structure, including notions like states, changes, processes, actions, causes, 
purposes, and means, are characterized cognitively via metaphor in terms of space, 
motion, and force.”
12
  Some of the basic entailments of the event structure metaphor 
include mapping changes as movements, causes as forces, and difficulties as 
impediments to motion.  For example, the metaphor of desire as a physical struggle 
associates the changes brought on by desire as physical conflicts and the desirer as either 
an impediment to motion or as an aggressor.  Force proves central to any dramatization of 
the experience of erotic desire.  When Lyly’s Phao asks the witch Sibylla for her help in 
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wooing Sappho, the old woman imparts the unsettling advice that “women strive because 
they would be overcome.  Force they call it, but such a welcome force they account it that 
continually they study to be enforced” (Sappho and Phao 2.4.105-8).  The force of desire 
is sometimes active and aggravating, and at other times, passive and immobilizing.  
Lakoff’s event structure metaphor is based on the same premises as Burke’s dramatism: 
both emphasize motion and tension as primary forces in all events, and both foreground 
language as the site where these tensions are played out. 
There are two primary branches of the event structure metaphor—the Location 
Event-Structure and the Object Event-Structure metaphors—and each produces different 
metaphors for erotic desire in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays.  The Location Event-
Structure metaphor maps all aspects of events (actions, causes, difficulties, purposes, etc.) 
according to our experience of motion in space.  This branch of the event structure 
metaphor is especially relevant for a study of desire as action, because it leads characters 
to experience love in terms of movement, often as a journey from one location to another.  
A sampling of this metaphor’s submappings follows: 
States Are Locations (interiors of bounded regions in space) 
Actions Are Self-propelled Movements 
Purposes Are Destinations  
Freedom Of Action Is The Lack Of Impediments To Motion.
13
  
 
These submappings illuminate the correlations between physical motion and personal 
agency that distinguish so much of the erotic language in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays.  
For example, the “States Are Locations” metaphor, which enables us to conceptualize 
abstract states of being (emotional and mental states, moods, etc.) as bounded regions in 
space, often leads to passive conceptualizations of love.  On the continuum of action 
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outlined in the previous section, the “States Are Locations” metaphor is what allows 
characters to experience erotic desire as a scene they inhabit.  Unsurprisingly, Lakoff and 
Johnson’s first linguistic example of this mapping is the expression, “I’m in love.”
14
  
According to the location branch of the event structure metaphor, physical stillness 
typically results from a challenge, blockage, burden, or a lack of freedom.  Physical 
motion, for its part, gives us a way to conceptualize progress, change, and even our own 
freedom of choice.  Metaphors of stasis and movement are the ways we place ourselves 
on the continuum of erotic action, allowing us access to different degrees of agency in 
erotic experience. 
The second branch of the event structure metaphor is the Object Event-Structure 
Metaphor, which maps the features of events in terms of the transfer, movement, and 
attainment of objects.  Some of its submappings are: 
Attributes Are Possessions 
Changes Are Movements Of Possessions (acquisitions or losses) 
Causation Is Transfer of Possessions (giving or taking) 
Purposes Are Desired Objects.
15
 
 
Because this metaphor objectifies the features of an event, rather than locating them as 
points along a path or journey, it is often found in conceptualizations of sexual 
fulfillment, marriage, or other means of possessing the beloved.  The stakes of imagining 
the beloved as an object to be acquired, rather than a physical location to be reached, are 
explored later in this chapter, and in the following chapter of my dissertation, which 
considers the effects of conceptualizing one’s lover as a place.   
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Both branches of the event structure metaphor speak to fundamental aspects of 
erotic desire, particularly its agency, its causes, and its telos.  This chapter’s analysis of 
Galatea, Measure for Measure, and Othello will reveal the ways that characters in Lyly’s 
and Shakespeare’s plays are constantly gauging these facets of their erotic experience.  
Causation is one of the most vexed aspects of desire for many characters (Shakespeare’s 
Othello is notoriously preoccupied with “the cause” [5.2.1 and 3]) because it entails 
ethical questions of personal responsibility, agency, and purpose.  For the self-loathing 
Angelo in Measure for Measure, gauging the cause of erotic desire is a matter of 
assigning blame: “Is this her fault or mine?” (2.2.162).  At stake for Angelo are not only 
questions of personal agency, but also more fundamental questions about his own evil 
and sinful nature.  If Angelo tries to locate a cause for erotic desire, Lyly’s Galatea 
dramatizes an erotic attraction with no apparent cause at all.  Unlike the nymphs who 
have been struck by Cupid’s arrows (a clear source for their longing), the source for 
Galatea and Phillida’s erotic attraction is unnamed.  Neptune criticizes the girls for falling 
in love with one another “where there can be no cause for affection” (5.3.141; emphasis 
mine), implying that “no cause” is tantamount to a lack of purpose.  Purpose and 
directionality are also crucial to erotic experience in Lyly’s Galatea, whose love-stricken 
characters conceptualize desire through the domain of hunting.  Lakoff and Johnson 
identify the hunting metaphor as a submapping of Object Event-Structure—“Achieving A 
Purpose Is Acquiring A Desired Object” —which privileges pursuit and possession over 
physical motion that lacks a specific telos.
16
  Even Aristotle’s conceptualization of 
entelechy is guided by the event-structure metaphor, since the primary metaphor 
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“Causation Is Action To Achieve A Purpose” lies at the core of our most basic 
experiences of teleology.  According to Lakoff and Johnson, “Aristotle… took this 
metaphor as a truth.  Causes conceptualized according to this metaphor are what Aristotle 
called final causes, that is, causes constituted by purposes, either the purposes of a person 
or purposes conceptualized as being in nature.”
17
 
Because the event structure metaphor maps causes, changes, and purposes as 
types of physical motion—forced movements to and from locations, or movements and 
exchanges of possessions—it enables characters to see the “event” of erotic desire as a 
dynamic and active experience.  Even when their desire stymies them completely—when 
they are passive, subdued, immobilized by its force—eros is still an action.  Because 
desire is most often conceptualized in terms of motion and stasis, these metaphors guide 
my analysis of the plays in the following sections.  Physical motion sometimes takes the 
form of struggle, and at other times, of chaos.  Stasis partakes of inertia, of imprisonment, 
and in some cases, of death.  These metaphors never operate in isolation from one 
another; often, they collapse together.  Death may be the ultimate example of stasis, but it 
is often likened to chaos, an extreme form of motion.
18
  Especially in the cases where 
metaphors of stillness and motion collapse, erotic language begins to exceed its own 
bounds, spilling into paradox, action, and entelechy. 
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III. “Entrapped in love”: Metaphors of Desire in Lyly 
 
Lyly’s characters frequently activate metaphors of stillness (or idleness, the form 
that stillness most regularly takes in Lyly) when they are in the throes of desire.  The 
women in Lyly’s Midas at first identify love as the remedy for idleness, and then 
immediately change their minds and decide that love is its cause.  Midas’s daughter 
Sophronia tells her ladies-in-waiting that “there are other things to keep one from 
idleness besides love; nay, that there is nothing to make idleness but love” (3.3.25-27).
19
  
Idleness in this account is probably not meant to evoke a physical stillness such as a 
trance or a sleep.  But in Lyly’s Endymion, the idleness that Sophronia gestures toward is 
represented as a staggering, physically felt event.  When the love-struck Corsites realizes 
he cannot lift the sleeping Endymion, he asks: 
Have my weak thoughts made brawnfallen my strong arms?  Or is it the nature of
 love or in the quintessence of the mind to breed numbness, or litherness, or I
 know not what languishing in my joints and sinews, being but the base strings of
 my body?  Or doth the remembrance of Tellus so refine my spirits into a matter so
 subtle and divine, that the other fleshly parts cannot work whilst they muse? 
(Endymion 4.3.19-26)
20
 
 
Corsites’ experience is far from peaceful or soothing, neither is it perfectly still.  His 
suspicion that his arms are “made brawnfallen” by his desire for Tellus suggests that his 
desire feels more like a downward pull than a complete stillness.  Even his numbness 
entails motion, since love “breed[s]” it throughout Corsites’ body.  Idleness and atrophy 
are events in Corsites’ account: they languish, they breed, they muse, they fall.  In short, 
these stilled and passive experiences of desire are pieces of drama in their own right.  Not 
the staged action of Corsites trying to lift his sleeping friend, but Corsites’ language 
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dramatizes the force of his “weak thoughts” as they bear down on his “strong arms.”  In 
contrast to the numbness and idleness in Corsites’ account, we see versions of more 
mobile desire earlier in the play.  Epiton, Sir Tophas’s page, recalls the origins of his 
master’s desire, when “love crept into his mouth before he could close it, and there kept 
such a tumbling in his body that he was glad to untruss the points of his heart and 
entertain love as a stranger” (Endymion 3.3.154-57).
21
  Epiton’s depiction of love as a 
creature that enters a scene, as the subject of the sentence instead of its verb, corresponds 
to a special class of metaphors known as ontological metaphors. 
 Lakoff and Johnson define these metaphors as “ways of viewing events, activities, 
emotions, ideas, etc., as entities or substances.”
22
  Such metaphors allow us to talk easily 
about abstract events, to identify them as subjects or objects, and to understand them in 
relation to one another.  Lakoff and Johnson use the example of inflation, reminding us 
that it is not a substance or entity, but rather an experience of rising prices.  But we talk 
about and conceptualize inflation by turning it into a noun, allowing for sentences such as 
“inflation caused our country’s economic problems,” and “we studied the effects of 
inflation in our class.”  Apparently, it is easier to conceptualize experiences, ideas, and 
emotions when we turn them into nouns.
23
  When we refer to something like desire as a 
noun, we assign it agency.  We can blame desire for our miseries.  We can speak lines 
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like “love crept into his mouth before he could close it” and so protest that love did it, not 
he!  After all, Sir Tophas was asleep. 
 Ontological metaphors also allow characters to position themselves as direct 
objects in sentences about desire.  When “desire” is the subject, characters are on the 
receiving end of its transitive verbs; they are governed, grammatically as well as 
emotionally, by erotic desire.  Ontological metaphors allow them to conceptualize desire 
as an entity that beats down on them, subdues them, imprisons them.  Such metaphors 
also enable characters to restore their subjectivity by conceiving of a desire that they can 
dominate, quell, overmaster.  Within the domain of motion and stillness, ontological 
metaphors add elements of force and struggle.  This in turn provides Lyly with a 
powerful way of capturing in miniature a variety of political and social power struggles in 
his plays. 
 Desire in Lyly’s Campaspe is bound to be deeply embedded in the experience of 
physical struggle, since the cast of desirers includes a king, a lowly painter, and a 
prisoner.  The play opens as Alexander the Great meets and falls in love with Campaspe, 
a captive from the newly conquered Thebes.  A conqueror who finds himself attracted to 
his captive, Alexander’s desires are predictably onerous.  When he reveals his desire for 
Campaspe to his confidante Hephestion, his friend’s response is laced with metaphors of 
political and sexual struggle.  Hephestion asks him if he has become Campaspe’s 
“subject” and “captive.”  “Shall it not seem monstrous to wise men that the heart of the 
greatest conqueror of the world should be found in the hands of the weakest creature of 
nature – of a woman, of a captive?” (2.2.61-65).
24
  Here and elsewhere, the mapping of 
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physical struggle onto desire has overt misogynistic and political overtones.  Hephestion 
goes on to remind his king that he has “a camp to govern, not a chamber” (68), indicating 
that Alexander’s political power and manly virtu are at stake in his desire for Campaspe.  
But for his rival Apelles, the struggle for Campaspe’s love entails a shift from metaphors 
of conquest to those of nature and art. 
 Apelles’ desire for Campaspe betokens not only a struggle for self-control, but a 
struggle to obtain a woman who has caught the prince’s eye.  Once his desire for 
Alexander’s captive is aroused, Apelles launches into a soliloquy riddled with metaphors 
from the physical struggle domain: “O Campaspe, Campaspe, art must yield to nature, 
reason to appetite, wisdom to affection” (3.5.20-21).  The metaphor of physical struggle 
offers Apelles a way to conceptualize his internal conflicts as well as the social obstacles 
he faces.  In the same soliloquy, Apelles conceives of his desire as “against” the natural 
order of things, since he wishes to preempt the prince’s choice.  He tells himself, “thou 
mayst swim against the stream with the crab, and feed against the wind with the deer, and 
peck against the steel with the cockatrice; stars are to be looked at, not reached at; princes 
to be yielded unto, not contended with” (3.5.39-43).  As a resource for metaphor, it turns 
out that the physical struggle domain is neutral, or at least very accommodating.  It 
enables Apelles to conceive of his desire as both natural and unnatural.  Initially, he 
remarks that “art must yield to nature,” but swimming “against the stream” suggests that 
his desire for Alexander’s favorite is unnatural.  Apelles’ locutions are capacious within 
the physical struggle domain; they also reveal the different “natures” with which he 
struggles (individual human nature versus the natural order of princes and subjects) and 
the extent to which they too are at odds. 
  40   
 Alexander and Apelles are still drawing upon the physical struggle domain when 
the play comes to a close.  Apelles decides to “Dispute not the cause […] but yield to it; 
for better it is to melt with desire than wrestle with love” (5.2.12-14).  He gives in to the 
struggle between reason and desire, preferring the experience of surrender to “wrestling.”  
Alexander, however, begins to tease out the differences between the source and target 
domains, realizing that he “cannot subdue the affections of men though he conquer their 
countries” (5.2.141-43).  Perhaps it is necessary for Alexander to draw this distinction 
because of his political power.  For him, the domain of physical struggle is not simply a 
source for the target experience of desire; as a king and conqueror, Alexander engages in 
physical struggles regularly.  As it happens, Alexander’s decision to allow Campaspe to 
marry Apelles is itself seen as a conquest, the conquest of a prince’s duty over his desires.  
Hephestion compliments him on his restraint in his last line in the play: “The conquering 
of Thebes was not so honorable as the subduing of these thoughts” (5.4.166-67).  In his 
introduction to the play, G.K. Hunter notes Lyly’s elevation of “the denial of love as a 
sufficiently heroic value.”
25
  Together with conquest, denial and abstinence develop the 
experience of erotic desire in Campaspe by means of the domain of physical struggle. 
 That the erotic struggles in Campaspe are shaped by social and political conflicts 
among its characters does not quite account for the breadth or capaciousness of Apelles’ 
metaphors.  The physical struggle domain enables Apelles (who speaks at much greater 
length than Alexander about his love for Campaspe) to test the scope of his power in the 
various conflicts in the play – art against nature, reason against desire, subject against 
king.  Apelles imagines himself both as a conqueror over reason (“reason [must yield] to 
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appetite” [3.5.20-21]) and as a captive to desire (“dispute not the cause…but yield to it” 
[5.2.12-13]).  His conflicting metaphors dramatize his inner struggle not only for self-
mastery but also for the mastery of his beloved through art.  Although he wins Campaspe 
at the end of the play, Apelles conceptualizes what should be a triumph as a defeat.  
While Alexander’s loss is considered a conquest, a king’s victory over desire, Apelles’ 
victory entails “melt[ing] with desire” (5.2.14), like a contented prisoner of conquering 
love.  Just as primary metaphors exemplify how cognitive structures are often based on 
physical realities, the metaphors in Campaspe reveal how the language of desire is borne 
out of the characters’ social realities, even as they work against their prescribed roles.  
The sociology of cognition, more than its physiology, shapes erotic desire throughout the 
play.  In a world where Apelles cannot be a king, where he cannot escape the realities of 
his social status, his metaphors allow him to play both the king and the subject of his 
desire – sometimes in the same moment – even as they confirm his status as a poor 
painter.  His natural and yet unnatural love, his mastery of and enslavement to Campaspe, 
are all dramatized through his metaphors of desire as a physical struggle, where power 
and control are contested but ultimately reaffirmed in Campaspe.   
 Physical struggle is also central to the experience of desire in Lyly’s Galatea, 
where the nymphs of Diana’s order are actually pierced with Cupid’s arrows.  The once-
chaste minds of Telusa, Ramia, Eurota, and Larissa become instantly infected with 
thoughts of love.  Discovering the sensations of sexual desire, Telusa asks, “What new 
conceits, what strange contraries, breed in thy mind?” (3.1.1-2).  Telusa first feels and 
describes the experience of erotic desire as an act that occurs not in the body, not in the 
forest or at court, but rather, in the scene of the mind.  For any dramatist or scholar of 
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drama, “the mind” is a problematic setting: outside of the medieval psychomachia, how 
can one dramatize an act that takes place in the immaterial “space” of the mind?   
Following Burke, who in his work on dramatism, correlates acts and the scenes which 
contain them, we might consider what sorts of acts are set in a mind like Telusa’s, and 
how these acts can be expressed on the stage. 
 The conversations among Diana’s nymphs expose their difficulties in expressing 
desire.  Although they all share roughly the same experience (and often, their desire is 
directed at the same objects), they seem to be unable to communicate it: not only are they 
unable to tell us what it is, but Lyly’s drama is unable to show us where it is.  Ramia tells 
her friends, “If myself felt only this infection, I would then take upon me the definition, 
but being incident to so many I dare not myself describe it” (3.1.86-88).
26
  The women 
come closest to describing or defining desire when they identify with each other’s 
inability to fix the experience in language.  Eurota tells her friends that she is in love, “yet 
swear that I know not what it is” (3.1.51-52), only that she is “myself in all things unlike 
myself” (3.1.55).  To this paradoxical description, Telusa responds, “Thou hast told what 
I am, in uttering what thyself is” (3.1.57).  The nymphs share this indirect, circuitous 
language, defining themselves and their desires by negation and self-comparison.  They 
relate to each other in their failures to express desire, so much so that they become these 
failures (e.g., Telusa = Eurota = “unlike myself”).
27
  Yet we have reason to attribute some 
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 Ramia implies that there is something presumptuous about “defin[ing]” or “describ[ing]” her desire to 
the other nymphs because they are experiencing it too.  Ramia’s reluctance suggests that the act of 
describing desire has a power, perhaps the power of deepening attraction, over those who are experiencing 
it.  I will explore the implications of this suggestion in Chapter 3, which considers erotic language as an 
instrument of desire. 
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 In Judith Butler’s discussion of the ways desire eludes linguistic expression, she writes that language “is 
forced to seek modes of indirection, and that the writings of and on desire that we might consider are ones 
which seek, in the end, to cancel themselves as writing in order to better approximate the desire they seek 
to know” (Butler, “Desire,” 370). 
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modicum of success to the nymphs’ conversation, since they appear to understand each 
other.  As Telusa indicates, Eurota has in fact “told what I am” by “uttering” her own 
experience, however imprecisely she does so. 
 The imprecise, yet strangely effective, nature of the nymphs’ conversation 
suggests that there may be a way of dramatizing if not defining desire, and that this may 
be it: staging the experience of trying to express desire and necessarily falling short of the 
precision that we hope to find.  That is to say, the dramatic language of desire is 
metaphor.  Robert Y. Turner argues that Lyly’s indirect dialogues about love stage 
“conversations not about love but conversations that dramatize love.”
28
  Turner has noted 
that Lyly is the first English playwright to dramatize love, the first successfully to 
negotiate the delicate balance between action and language.  This balance is subtle and 
difficult to maintain.  If it tips to the side of action, Turner observes, “love” can be 
dramatized as a series of chivalric feats; if it tips too much to the side of language, love 
becomes lyrical and therefore undramatic.  “Lyly avoided both extremes of direct 
statement and irrelevant action,” Turner writes, “by creating dialogues which contribute 
to the plot while still expressing the emotions of love.”
29
  Lyly’s is an art of indirectness.  
Characters who are in love talk around the topic, or, to put it in cognitive linguistic terms, 
they use different domains to elaborate their experience of desire.  In Campaspe, Apelles 
and Campaspe use the metaphor of painting; in Sappho and Phao, the eponymous 
characters avail themselves of the language of disease to express love.  In Galatea, 
Turner notes, the lovers’ dialogues make use of ambiguous speech and asides in order to 
dramatize the conflicted experience of desire. 
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 Robert Y. Turner, “Some Dialogues of Love in Lyly’s Comedies,” ELH 29, no. 3 (1962): 276-88, 276. 
29
 Ibid., 277. 
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 Although there are several sets of desiring characters in Galatea, the principal 
pair is comprised of two women, Galatea and Phillida, who are both disguised as boys by 
their fathers in order to avoid a being taken by the monster Agar, sent by Neptune.  When 
the girls first meet they fall in love instantly, but they are unable to reveal their desires 
because of their male disguises.  Their first conversation hardly qualifies as a dialogue, 
since almost every line appears to be spoken in aside: 
Gal:  I would salute him, but I fear I should make a curtsy instead of a leg. 
Phill:  If I durst trust my face as well as I do my habit, I would spend some time 
to make pastime; for say what they will of a man’s wit, it is no second 
thing to be a woman. 
Gal:  All the blood in my body would be in my face if he should ask me (as the 
question among men is common), ‘Are you a maid?’ 
Phill:  Why stand I still? Boys should be bold.  But here cometh a brave train that 
will spill all our talk.   (2.1.25-35) 
 
This “dialogue” of alternating asides is cut off by the entrance of Diana and her nymphs.  
Although it does not appear that the girls have actually spoken a word to each other, 
Phillida worries that the intruders “will spill all our talk” (2.1.35).  Perhaps Phillida is 
acknowledging that their “talk” exists only in their minds (precisely where Telusa locates 
the experience of desire later in the play), and the intrusion of the nymphs will cause their 
thoughts to “spill” out and be heard.  Gallatea and Phillida’s first encounter is not the 
only one which dramatizes love as a solipsistic act which occurs in the scene of the mind.  
When they meet for a second time in the woods, the girls continue to talk in asides, 
perhaps because they have begun to suspect each other’s disguises, each girl seeing her 
own situation reflected in the other.  Kent Cartwright observes that the dramatic energy 
and dynamism of the scene comes from the women’s deferred acknowledgment of what 
they know to be true: that they are, in fact, both women in disguise.  “For the two girl-
boys,” Cartwright notes, “pleasure and titillation arise from unknowing, postulating, 
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guessing, hypothesizing – that is, deferring certainty.”
30
  Not only does this conversation 
dramatize love’s indirection, but, as Cartwright points out, it dramatizes the pleasures of 
desire as well. 
 Cartwright argues that much of the play’s dynamism is to be found in moments 
that stage indirectness, such as we see in Galatea and Phillida’s conversations.  But even 
in soliloquy, the young girls use dynamic language to conceptualize their situations.  
Galatea and Phillida both appear alone onstage, contemplating their love for each other 
and deciding whether to “act” on their desires.  In her soliloquy, Phillida conceptualizes 
her desire for Tityrus (Galatea’s male name) as a state that she is in, about which she 
needs to “do something.”  Her speech is replete with stops and starts, dramatizing the 
conflicts in her mind.  She wavers as she tries to decide if she should go into the woods to 
follow Tityrus: “I will – I dare not.  Thou must – I cannot.  Then pine in thine own 
peevishness.  I will not – I will.  Ah, Phillida, do something – nay anything, rather than 
live thus” (2.5.8-11).  Phillida’s soliloquy is her call to action.  She shifts from 
conceptualizing love as a state (pining “in thine own peevishness”) to “do[ing] 
something” instead.  On the continuum of desire, Phillida’s locutions shift from “desire 
as scene” to “desire as act,” at which point she finally decides to “go” (2.5.12) into the 
woods after her love.  Galatea’s soliloquy ends with a similar resolution to do something 
instead of pining away: “Let me follow him into the woods, and thou, sweet Venus, be 
my guide” (2.4.13-14).  Instead of going on her own, Galatea “follow[s]” Phillida, and 
only will do so with Venus as her guide.  Even grammatically, Galatea is not the subject 
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 Kent Cartwright, Theater and Humanism: English Drama in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 179.  Cartwright’s observation about the pleasures of deferring 
certainty accounts for the pleasures of using metaphor to conceptualize erotic experience.  Metaphors often 
cloak the experience of desire in complex and provocative garments (pardon my own metaphor here), 
which suggest that a naked erotic truth lies beneath them. 
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of her sentence, placing the authority to “let me follow him” in the hands of the fates.  
Here and elsewhere, the language in Galatea’s soliloquy reveals the loss of control that is 
so much a part of the experience of desire.
31
  Earlier in her speech she says, “Oh, would, 
when I hunted his eye with my heart, he might have seen my heart with his eyes!” (2.4.7-
8).  The parallel structure of this line gives equal weight to Galatea’s hunt and Melbeus’ 
(Phillida’s male name) acknowledgment of her desire.  The active language of hunting is 
tempered in the second half of the line by the passive experience of being seen and 
acknowledged by one’s prey. 
 The metaphor of desire (and wooing) as hunting, found throughout Galatea, takes 
on added significance when Cupid appears.  As he plans to pierce Diana’s nymphs with 
his love darts, Cupid declares, “Let Diana and her coy nymphs know that there is no heart 
so chaste but thy bow can wound, nor eyes so modest but thy brands can kindle, nor 
thoughts so staid but thy shafts can make wavering, weak, and wanton” (2.2.2-6).  The 
chaste hearts of Diana’s maids were initially “staid” and fixed in their virtue, but Cupid 
plans to set them in motion with his dart.  As we might expect, the nymphs describe 
themselves as “unstayed” (3.1.53) and “unbridled” (3.1.58) once they are launched into 
the sexual scene.  Although Diana chastises them, imploring that “the more [your 
thoughts] are assaulted with desires, the less they should be affected” (3.4.25-26), the 
women are still moved by desire. 
In the final scene of the play Diana and Venus confront each other face to face, 
trading accusations and insults that reflect the metaphors of stasis and motion established 
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 Cartwright regards this loss of control as another way Lyly’s plays achieve their theatrical liveliness.  
Characters who acknowledge the loss of identity and control in their experience of desire also suggest an 
emotional and psychic interiority.  Cartwright notes, “as Gallathea and Phillida sense an alienation from 
their own identities they suggest an inchoate subjectivity” (Theater and Humanism, 178). 
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earlier in the play.  Diana accuses Venus of having “untamed affections” (5.3.44), telling 
the goddess of love that “your tongue is as unruly as your thoughts, and your thoughts as 
unstayed as your eyes.  Diana cannot chatter; Venus cannot choose” (5.3.59-61).  
Unruliness is metaphorized as both physical motion and verbal activity, or “chatter.”  In 
the binary relation between Diana and the goddess of love (one that Venus appears to 
accept), love is a moving force which only Diana can resist.  Venus describes her nemesis 
as “she that hateth sweet delights, envieth loving desires, masketh wanton eyes, stoppeth 
amorous ears, bridleth youthful mouths…” (5.3.31-34).  Venus sets things in motion.  
Diana retards motion.  Where Diana argues that love is a scar, Venus corrects her, saying 
that love causes “bleeding wounds” (5.3.50-51), ever fresh and in motion. 
 While the fixed-chastity moving-desire binary runs throughout the play, the 
metaphor of hunting complicates the nature and quality of mobility in Galatea.  Although 
Cupid is conceptualized as a hunter constantly on the move, Diana and her company of 
chaste nymphs are themselves huntresses.  Moreover, even though Lyly’s lovers often 
conceptualize their desire as immobilizing, they use the metaphor of hunting to do so.  
The nymphs, once pierced by Cupid’s darts, find their “conquering modesty [turned] to a 
captive imagination” (3.1.3-4).  Their thoughts are free and suddenly “unbridled,” but the 
nymphs also feel stuck, captivated, and imprisoned, by desire.  The hunting metaphors 
allow Lyly to interrogate the quality of desire’s mobility.  By their very nature, Diana and 
Cupid both hunt, pursue, attack.  Both are mobile.  Yet the quality of Diana’s mobility is 
contrasted sharply with Cupid’s.  Cupid is described as “wander[ing]” (5.3.86) by Venus, 
and “idle” (4.2.64) by the nymphs.  Love’s arrows, according to Diana, “drib…up and 
down Diana’s leas” (3.4.6-7), instead of surging forward.  His appetites are “loose and 
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untamed” (3.4.77).  In short, Cupid’s movements are notable for their laziness, 
carelessness, sloppiness.   
When Cupid first meets one of Diana’s nymphs, he assumes that she has 
“strayed” (1.2.1) from the group, and now “wander[s] solitarily” (1.2.2), narcissistically 
describing the nymph in language that characterizes his own movements.  The nymph 
responds that “these woods are to me so well known that I cannot stray though I would” 
(1.2.4-5).  Diana’s nymphs are incapable of drifting because their aim is sure and their 
movements deliberate.  Later in this scene, Cupid describes love to the nymph and asks 
her if she will yield to it.  She replies, “I have neither will nor leisure, but I will follow 
Diana in the chase, whose virgins are all chaste, delighting in the bow that wounds the 
swift hart in the forest, not fearing the bow that strikes the soft heart in the chamber” 
(1.2.25-29).  Anything but idle, this is movement with a purpose.  We might say that 
Diana’s movements have a telos, whereas Cupid “straggleth up and down these woods” 
(3.4.7), seemingly without a goal.  In his work on dramatic action, Burke captures the 
difference between motion and action by drawing on Aristotle’s stipulation that action is 
a specific kind of motion, one with a deliberate goal.
32
  Hence Cupid is in motion 
throughout the play, but he is never quite “active.” 
The final scene of the play returns to the nuances of the motion-action ambiguity 
when Galatea and Phillida reveal their true identities.  The gods intervene in the girls’ 
plight, eventually turning one of them into a boy so that they may marry.  Before this 
happens, however, Neptune mocks the objects of the women’s desires, calling their love 
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 Burke extends his analysis of the motion-action distinction when he considers “The Pathetic Fallacy,” 
where human beings (presumably members of an audience) assign purpose to seemingly random 
movements, making every movement an “action” through empathy (GM, 233-34).  Within the context of 
Galatea, this fallacy may explain our tendency to think of Cupid as “active” in his movements and 
deliberate in his choice. 
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“[a]n idle choice, strange and foolish, for one virgin to dote on another and to imagine a 
constant faith where there can be no cause for affection” (5.3.139-41).  The language of 
“constant faith” signals that whatever “unstaid” affections were at work must now 
stabilize with marriage.  The word “constant,” derived from the Latin “constare,” to 
“stand together,” indicates a stasis in desire, a standing still.  Deciding whether she will 
change one of the maidens into a boy, Venus picks up on Neptune’s language, asking the 
pair, “[i]s your loves unspotted, begun with truth, continued with constancy, and not to be 
altered till death?” (5.3.145-47).  Venus, who was described as “unruly” and “unstayed” 
less than one hundred lines earlier in this scene, now insists that the girls’ love is “not to 
be altered till death.”  If Venus and Diana must resolve their quarrel in the final scene, so 
too must errant desire reconcile itself to something more permanent and fixed.  The word 
“constant” is an accommodating one, since it is often used to describe motion.  What it 
excludes, in Venus’s account, is change. 
The ending of Galatea stages an attempt to discover a telos for desire, making 
Cupid’s arrows more like Diana’s.  Venus’s uncharacteristic language of constancy in the 
final scene gestures toward such a recovery, though it never quite gains momentum.  The 
word “constant” crops up one final time in Galatea’s epilogue, addressed to the women in 
the audience, imploring them to “[y]ield ladies, yield to love, ladies” (5), even though 
love is described as dangerous and enervating.  Galatea notes that “Venus can make 
constancy fickleness, courage cowardice, modesty lightness…” (2-3).  The telos that was 
almost at hand has once again receded: yet again, “constancy” is “fickleness” under 
Venus’s government.  The nuances of desire, motion, and action finally escape 
resolution; indirection once again prevails. 
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Indirectness is not merely a property of the language in Galatea; it is fundamental 
to the experience of desire in the play.  If we imagine an ideal love relationship as an 
unbroken line or connection between two lovers, the lack of direct interaction in Galatea 
must give us pause.  What are we to make of so many conversations in which characters 
emphasize their private experience of love instead of a particular beloved?  When Cupid 
first schemes to pierce the nymphs, he plans to entangle them in their own emotions, 
boasting that “while [the nymphs] aim to hit others with their arrows, they shall be 
wounded themselves with their own eyes” (1.2.35-37, emphases mine).  The reflexive 
pronouns in Cupid’s line imply that love is a solitary enterprise; instead of relating to 
“others,” the attentions and aims of the nymphs will turn inward.  Later in the play, Cupid 
plans to “confound [the nymphs’] loves in their own sex” (2.2.7-8), again suggesting that 
desire in Galatea is more about the self than about another.
33
 
Although Galatea and Phillida are not stricken by Cupid’s arrows, their love 
relationship is likewise characterized by a kind of enforced solipsism.  From their first 
“dialogue” of asides in which they hardly interact, we witness a depiction of love that is 
almost unbearably lonely.  Romeo and Juliet make a sonnet together upon their first 
encounter in a crowded room.  Galatea and Phillida, all alone onstage, can hardly 
exchange a single word.  In their later dialogues, each girl is preoccupied with defining 
the other in terms of herself.  As the layers of their disguises slowly peel back, their 
interactions become increasingly opaque.  Galatea, suspecting Phillida’s disguise, tells 
her to “Admit that I were as you would have me suppose that you are” (3.2.25-26), 
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 These reflexives circulate back to Cupid later in the play when he is captured and tortured by Diana, who 
intends to turn all of his wickedness back onto him, shooting “thine own arrow…into…thine own bosom” 
(93-94).  She threatens, “Thou that fattest others with hopes shalt be fed thyself with wishes, and thou that 
bindest others with golden thoughts shalt be bound thyself with golden fetters” (86-89).  Both Cupid and 
Diana punish their enemies by inflicting this kind of inwardness upon them. 
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causing Phillida to fear that “he is as I am” (3.2.31-32).  For each mention of the other 
girl, the speaker conjures herself in this dizzying language, as though the girls are in love 
with their own images rather than someone outside of themselves.
34
  Desire in Galatea, 
whether imposed by Cupid or by the girls themselves, is dramatized as an affair with love 
itself (or Love himself) rather than a beloved.  Whereas characters in Campaspe 
experience desire in terms of their social roles, desire in Galatea is asocial and reticent, 
isolating characters in speech and in action.
35
 
This isolation has been interpreted by scholars such as G.K. Hunter as “static and 
passive,”
36
 since it leads characters to contemplation more than it prompts overt stage 
action.  While it is true that Lyly’s characters are not likely to slay dragons (or each 
other) in the name of love, there is an important distinction between “static and 
passive…contemplation” and what Gallatea, Phillida, and the nymphs do.  Lyly’s 
characters act and react, but the direct object of Lylyan desire is also the subject of it – 
the desirer herself.  Stage action alone will not do to dramatize the tensions that are 
particular to this private experience.  Just as two objects in conflict, exerting powerful yet 
equal force against one another, appear to be static, so might characters who are fraught 
with tension suffer this fate in the eyes of the audience or critic.  The only way to 
dramatize such desire is to open it to our ears where our eyes cannot behold it, to speak it 
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where it cannot be seen.  Its language, like the nymphs’ arrows and like desire itself in 
Galatea, is “aim[ed]” at “others,” but never quite reaches this telos.  
 
IV. “Our Raging Motions”: Metaphors of Desire in Shakespeare 
If Lyly explores the directionality of erotic desire, Shakespeare gauges its 
intensity.  Shakespeare raises the stakes of motion and stasis, amping up his metaphors to 
those of escape and imprisonment, chaos and death.  Armado wants to “take desire 
prisoner” (Love’s Labors Lost 1.2.57) with his sword; Cleopatra is Antony’s “conqueror” 
(Antony and Cleopatra 3.11.66); Demetrius and Chiron rape Lavinia with “their worse-
than-killing lust” (Titus Andronicus 2.3.175); Proteus is “yoked” (1.1.40 The Two 
Gentlemen of Verona) by the fool Love; Juliet “should kill [Romeo] with much 
cherishing” (Romeo and Juliet 2.1.227).  These metaphors charge motion with turbulent 
force and stasis with paralyzing tension, prompting Shakespeare’s characters to explore 
not only the power of desire itself, but they also offer characters a means for testing their 
own power over erotic desire.  Whether casting themselves as captors or as victims, 
characters find agency on both sides of the verb.  Take, for example, Shakespeare’s 
Helena, as she navigates the formidable currents of desire in A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream.  Desire is never a static business in the forest, where lovers shift their attentions 
as quickly as they shift their gazes.  And yet, Helena feels stuck, lamenting the 
helplessness of her position.  She begs Hermia to “teach me how you look, and with what 
art / You sway the motion of Demetrius’ heart” (1.1.192-93).  For Helena, desire is 
something that can be controlled, directed through particular actions, or “art” as she puts 
it. 
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Needless to say, the play itself is less confident.  Shakespeare saddles Helena with 
metaphors of motion and attraction that restrict her desire.  Although she wants to learn 
Hermia’s seductive “art,” in her speeches to Demetrius, Helena admits her 
powerlessness: 
 You draw me, you hard-hearted adamant, 
 But yet you draw not iron; for my heart 
 Is as true as steel.  Leave you your power to draw, 
 And I shall have no power to follow you.   
(2.1.195-98) 
 
Magnetism complicates our account of action and stasis.  Is Demetrius’s magnetism the 
same as action?  Kenneth Burke addresses the distinction between action and motion, 
following Aristotle’s example.  Action, in Burke’s view, is deliberate and purposive 
motion, although deliberation may be difficult to ascertain.
37
  Helena seems to confer all 
agency on Demetrius: he has the “power to draw” her; if he relinquishes this power, she 
will “have no power to follow” him.  What does it mean to have the “power to follow” 
someone who draws you?  Does not the one who follows a magnetic pull submit 
passively to the force of attraction?  Is this a case in which motion develops into action?  
If to follow Demetrius’s pull is to act, then even as she casts herself as a pure object of 
desire, Helena cannot quite cancel out her agency.   
The agency that Helena finds on her side of the magnet corresponds with 
Aristotle’s notion of passive power.  In the Metaphysics, Aristotle defines passive powers 
in his discussion of dunamis (“strength” or “power”).  Aristotle’s ontology accounts for 
two types of dunamis: the power to cause a change in something else, and the “power of 
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suffering” a change.
38
  The latter, which Charlotte Witt describes as “the power of being 
perceptible,” applies to Helena’s relation to Demetrius.  Throughout the play, Helena 
wields passive power in order to be perceived and acknowledged by Demetrius.  She 
famously demands that Demetrius “spurn me, strike me, / Neglect me, lose me; only give 
me leave, / Unworthy as I am, to follow you” (2.1.205-07).  Here, her authority and 
abjection collide.  To insist that Demetrius spurn and beat her is to affirm her passive 
power, to command him to command her.  Helena’s passive power falls in line with 
Aristotle’s example in The Metaphysics: “For that which is oily can be burnt and that 
which yields in a particular way can be crushed.”
39
   The power to yield or be crushed is 
Helena’s dunamis in the play; it abets her pursuit of Demetrius in the forest.
40
  Hence for 
Shakespeare, submission—a mix of action and stasis—is always a form of erotic agency.  
Characters acknowledge the loss of control that is part and parcel of erotic desire; they 
submit to desire, instead of being overcome by it.  They choose. 
Erotic agency is interrogated still more shrewdly through metaphors of illicit sex 
and desire in Measure for Measure, a play where characters are hard at work analyzing 
the etiology and significance of their lustful impulses.  Analytical, often reproachful, 
speeches crop up early in the play, structured by metaphors that obscure rather than 
illuminate the origins and telos of erotic desire.  A particularly dense example is provided 
by Claudio, who has just been sentenced to death for the crime of fornication.  On his 
way to prison, he explains to Lucio that his “restraint” comes “from too much liberty” 
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(1.2.105).  To describe the nature, causes, and consequences of this sexual liberty, 
Claudio draws from a series of conflicting domains of experience: 
As surfeit is the father of much fast, 
So every scope, by the immoderate use, 
Turns to restraint.  Our natures do pursue, 
Like rats that ravin down their proper bane, 
A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.  
(1.2.106-10) 
 
In these lines Claudio weaves together several different stories of what has happened to 
him, and more generally, what happens to any of us when we fall prey to erotic desire.  
Untangling these stories allows us more fully to understand how different domains 
combine to create Claudio’s experience, and the mechanics of the rich, complex language 
that expresses it.  An analysis of the placement, structure, and entailments of Claudio’s 
metaphors will reveal the subtle tensions between unlawful sex and illicit desire, frenzied 
motion and purposive action, volition and compulsion, which Claudio assumes animate 
erotic desire in all of us when he speaks of a universal “we,” of “every scope,” and of 
“our natures.” 
Claudio twice depicts sexual liberty as something else.  In lines 106-108, it is filed 
under the category of “every scope.”  In 108-110, it is “a thirsty evil.”  Each metaphor – 
of sex as scope, sex as thirst, and sex as evil – comes with entailments that highlight 
different aspects of Claudio’s situation.  Taken together, the different domains of 
experience answer to conflicting rules governing lust and sex.  At the structural level, 
then, Claudio’s speech consists of a set of metaphors which themselves rely on similes 
(overeating, fasting, drinking poison), all of which elaborate the target domains of illicit 
sex, desire, and prohibition. 
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At the same time, Claudio explores some of the most vexed aspects of erotic 
desire:  Who or what calls the shots?  What choices are available?  What role does 
necessity play?  What role ethics?  By mapping the features of concrete domains (eating 
and drinking, animals and poison, kinship and death) onto experiences like desire or 
restraint, Shakespeare produces something of an elucidation-effect.  But in Claudio’s 
case, each simile, each new source domain, takes us further from the discrete object that 
is desire.  Broadening the target domains of sex, desire, and prohibition, Claudio reveals 
new roles and new relations between them.  Like a camera that keeps pulling back, 
Claudio’s story gradually widens our field of vision at the cost of blurring the focus 
within the frame.   
What, then, do Claudio’s metaphors say about his evaluation of his experience of 
desire, and how do they bear upon our understanding of that experience?  Claudio begins 
by comparing scope (prior fornication) and restraint (immanent imprisonment) with 
surfeit and fast.  Below I emphasize the relationship terms that connect these experiences 
to one another: 
As surfeit is the father of much fast, 
So every scope, by the immoderate use, 
Turns to restraint.   
(1.2.106-08) 
 
Claudio begins by using a metaphor of kinship, cued by the word “father,” to describe 
how “surfeit” causes “much fast.”  Surfeit, in Claudio’s account, begets fast like a father 
begets a child.  According to Mark Turner, this is a “causation as progenation” 
metaphor.
41
  In order for Claudio’s simile to match up with the experience it profiles, 
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scope ought to be the “father of” restraint.  But it is not.  Claudio says that scope “turns 
to” restraint because of “immoderate use.”  Instead of begetting a separate entity, a child, 
like surfeit did for fast, scope here becomes restraint by engaging in an action 
(immoderate use).  This is a “causation as action” metaphor, which Turner defines as 
“someone directly manipulating some preexisting objects from one state into another 
state… Causation as action requires an initial state, a transformation, and a consequent 
final state.”
42
  Begetting turns out to be quite different from turning. 
 What does this discrepancy tell us about Claudio’s (and the play’s) 
conceptualization of illicit sex and imprisonment?  It would appear that the “causation as 
progenation” metaphor expresses a more intimate affiliation between scope and restraint 
than the “causation as action” metaphor.  After all, what two entities could be closer than 
father and child?  But the “causation as action” metaphor does not express an affiliation 
between two separate entities – scope and restraint are the same entity at different points 
in time and experience.  Although father and child also share essential features, in the 
end, they are ontologically separate.  Both metaphors prompt us to consider the intimacy 
between scope and restraint, but the “causation as action” metaphor takes this a step 
further and treats them as the same entity, the same person.  And, in Measure for 
Measure, they are.  Angelo, “[a] man of stricture and firm abstinence” (1.3.12), turns into 
someone who “give[s] [his] sensual race the rein” (2.4.160).  Isabella’s zeal for “a more 
strict restraint / Upon the sisterhood” (1.4.4-5) is a testament to the scope of her 
                                                
essential to our basic understanding of metaphor itself: “We explain metaphor to ourselves in terms of what 
we know about family” (12), since Aristotelian metaphor is defined in terms of relations and resemblances. 
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abstinence.
43
  Katherine Eisaman Maus has observed that “the concepts of restraint and 
transgression, discipline and capitulation… profoundly structure the experience of desire 
in Measure for Measure.”
44
  Thus, Angelo conceptualizes his attraction to Isabella as a 
“desire to raze the sanctuary” (2.2.175).  Thus, the “duke of dark corners” (4.3.157) dons 
the habit of a friar as he arranges a sexual tryst.  And thus Claudio seems to cling to his 
chains as he is carted off to prison, noting how “just” (1.2.122) his punishment is, how 
even “to speak of [his offense] would offend again” (1.2.136).  But Claudio does speak of 
his offense, however obliquely, in the lines that follow. 
 The ratsbane simile in the second part of Claudio’s speech ostensibly builds upon 
the description he gives in the first part.  We might expect the metaphor of overeating to 
arise again, or the causal link between sex and imprisonment to be developed.  In general, 
we expect the constraints of the first few lines to hold true for the rest.  The first part of 
Claudio’s speech depicts his pursuit of illicit sex as more or less volitional – surfeiting, 
fasting, and “immoderate use” are predominantly voluntary acts, since they imply a will 
and choice on the part of the agent.  The kinship metaphor in the opening line reinforces 
this conclusion since surfeit does not always compel one to fast, although it might well 
lead one to make this choice.  However, the second part of Claudio’s speech is marked by 
an abrupt shift in agency: 
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Our natures do pursue, 
Like rats that ravin down their proper bane, 
A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.   
(1.2.108-10) 
 
Here Claudio tells us that our own natures compel us to pursue evil – an evil which is 
somehow “proper” to us –which in turn leads us to the restraint of death.  The ratsbane 
metaphor marks not only a shift in agency, but also a shift in intensity.  The stakes of 
fasting and restraint are high, but they pale in comparison to “thirsty evil” and death.  
Lines 108-110 turn our attention from people to rats (to our rat-like natures), from 
overeating to drinking poison, and from restraint to death. 
 Although the first half of Claudio’s speech depicts volitional acts, it makes no 
mention of human agency.  There is no person who surfeits, no person who “uses” 
immoderately.  The second sentence, although it strips away volition, introduces rat-like 
human agents.  Where there is no obvious human agency there is volition, but where 
there appears to be human agency there is compulsion.  Is this because Claudio, like 
many of us, can imagine controlling erotic desire only in the abstract?
45
  Rat-like Claudio 
is doomed to drink the “thirsty evil,” imagining that the poison he drinks is “proper” to 
him.  Shakespeare ratchets down from tidy sententiae to graphic and grotesque bodily 
metaphors.  Claudio devolves from a father to a rat, and the puritanical deputy who 
“scarce confesses / That his blood flows” (1.3.51-52) turns into an erotically charged 
character who actively pursues a “strong and swelling evil” (2.4.6). 
Still more is going on in Claudio’s story than the shift from abstract volition to 
concrete compulsion.  The first part of his speech is conspicuously devoid of action 
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verbs.  The first two roles in the source domain, surfeit and fast, are connected by the 
linking verb “is.”  Then three roles—scope, immoderate use, and restraint—are joined by 
another linking verb, “turns to.”  Something transpires, but it does so in a notably passive, 
and static, fashion.  Then Claudio ramps up the active terms.  Suddenly all of us are said 
to “pursue,” “ravin,” and “drink.”  “And when we drink, we die.”  This is especially 
dynamic; it takes place in a concrete moment (Claudio doesn’t say, for example, “if we 
drink, we die”), and it depicts a surprisingly clear chain of action.  What accounts for this 
shift?  If we trace the progression of Claudio’s metaphors across all five lines, we 
discover that each new source domain introduces a new character, or role, which must be 
mapped onto the target.  Beginning with only two roles (surfeit and fast), he makes his 
way toward the source domain of ratsbane, which tells its own, much more complicated, 
story. 
 Ratsbane, after it is ingested, induces unquenchable thirst.  Rats typically die from 
overhydration; the water that they compulsively drink to slake their thirst eventually 
causes their bodies to burst.  While the ratsbane domain entails four roles – the rat, the 
poison, the water, and death – it is clear only that the rat profiles us and that death 
profiles “restraint.”  Poison and water are more difficult to map.  Instead of consuming a 
single substance that would clearly profile illicit sex, the rats glut themselves on both 
poison and water.  Both substances have a hand in killing the rat.  Although the poison is 
ultimately responsible for the death, Claudio tells us “when we drink [water, presumably] 
we die.”  Claudio’s metaphor adds depth and complexity to the story of sex and restraint, 
since he opens up a new slot (poison or water) to be filled in the target domain.  So, what 
can poison and water profile?  Water, a natural and essential substance that fuels life, is 
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tainted by the ratsbane that then corrupts the judgment of the one who drinks it.  The rats, 
no longer able to calibrate how much water is too much (they “surfeit”), are never 
satisfied, and effectively kill themselves under the misapprehension that they are 
nourishing themselves.  Water, then, seems to profile sex, since both (in moderation) are 
natural, essential, and promote life.  Something else (something “proper” to us) beguiles 
us before we take a drink, poisoning our relation to what might otherwise have been 
healthy, infecting our judgment. 
 What comes before sex and ruins it for us?  What poison did Claudio “ravin 
down” before bedding down Juliet?  As Angelo marvels after his first encounter with 
Isabella, “What’s this” (2.2.167)?  Angelo’s poison seems to be a kind of original sin.  In 
his opening soliloquy, he decides that Isabella is not at fault for his lust: “Not she… but it 
is I / That, lying by the violet in the sun, / Do, as the carrion does, not as the flower, / 
Corrupt with virtuous season” (2.2.169-72).  For Angelo, the “proper bane” is in his own 
carrion-like nature, which condemns him to rot just as Claudio’s rat-like nature condemns 
him to chase after the “thirsty evil.”  Although Angelo’s metaphor has a different starting 
point than Claudio’s – the carrion is already poisoned – the two metaphors run a similar 
course.  Angelo and Claudio conceive of their natures as both contaminated and 
contaminating.  The sunshine, another natural and life-promoting substance, only deepens 
the effects of the poison, “corrupt[ing]” Angelo further, just as the water does to the rats.  
For Claudio and Angelo both, ratsbane profiles erotic desire.
46
  In Measure for Measure, 
desire is suicidal; it causes characters to lose their judgment, to surfeit, to pervert 
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something “healthy” like sunlight or water.  The first part of Claudio’s speech details 
causal relationships but never really accounts for the prior cause or assigns agency.  
Finally, with ratsbane, we encounter desire in the form of a thirst-inducing poison that 
sets us in motion towards a painful, gluttonous, but “proper” death. 
 Claudio’s metaphors illuminate the difference between abstractions and 
dramatizations, stasis and action.  They distinguish abstract notions of sex and its 
consequences (exemplified by the domain of Viennese law) from the actions of erotic 
desire and sex that are part of the drama itself.  Once human agents enter the field of 
metaphor, action verbs follow.  Desire enters the picture not only through the ratsbane 
role but also through words like “pursue” and even “thirsty” in the second half of 
Claudio’s speech, words that signal intention and motive.  But what sort of action is 
erotic desire in Claudio’s account, or in the play at large?  Where might we plot it on the 
continuum in Section 1 of this chapter, and how can this help us to understand the nature 
and consequences of desire in Measure for Measure?  In Claudio’s account, desire is an 
active business that causes us to pursue the ostensible relief of sex again and again until it 
kills us.  We may plot motion of this sort somewhere near the middle of our continuum.  
But over desire which moves in this way – as a compulsive ravining – we have no control 
at all.  Passivity affords A Midsummer Night’s Dream’s Helena a modicum of power, but 
nothing like this is available to the rats or to Claudio.  Their very frenzy renders them 
powerless. 
 The ratsbane metaphor, like the hunting metaphor in Galatea, interrogates the 
quality of desire’s mobility.  If desire is an action in this play, what is its telos?  Is desire 
entelechic; is its goal achieved in process?  Claudio’s lines suggest that our inability to 
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understand our telos undoes us; scurrying along the path towards the goal of survival, 
relief, and satisfaction, we end up guzzling our way to the gluttonous demise that we 
have coming to us (“proper”).  As with Lyly’s Cupid, erotic desire in Measure for 
Measure suffers from its misguided telos.
47
  Like hamsters on a wheel, we tirelessly if 
assiduously move from thirst to drink, thirst to drink.  But unlike in Galatea, in Measure 
for Measure there is nothing idle about motion.  Neither is there idleness in Angelo’s 
“going to temptation” (2.2.63) nor in Isabella’s “moving graces” (2.2.36).  An excess of 
motion, erotic desire in Measure for Measure is, for Angelo, a “fall” (2.1.18).  Mariana’s 
thirst for Angelo is also described as unquenchable, uncontrollable, and it, too, is without 
a telos.  The Duke remarks that Angelo’s “unjust unkindness, that in all reason should 
have quenched her love, hath, like an impediment in the current, made it more violent and 
unruly” (3.1.238-41).
48
  Mariana’s unruly current, Angelo’s downward plunge, and 
Claudio’s misguided pursuit of a thirsty evil, constitute hyperactive forms of desire, 
lacking any telos except for death.   
Erotic desire in Measure for Measure shares properties of entelechic desire, since 
the telos of death is achieved in process.  Restraint is part of the experience, often fuelling 
sexual attraction for characters such as Mariana and the Duke.  But paradoxically, 
restraint only increases the velocity of desire in Measure for Measure.  Where we expect 
to see characters immobilized by their feelings and actions, they move like the rats, with 
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violent speed.  For a character like Angelo, whose lust for Isabella both “stirs [his] 
temper” (2.2.189) and “subdues [him] quite” (2.2.190), erotic desire is in motion, spurred 
on even further by the habits of restraint.  Later in the play when Angelo is praying, the 
metaphors of stasis and motion again collide.  His “invention . . . [a]nchors on Isabel” 
(2.4.2-3), and yet his heart contains “the strong and swelling evil / Of my conception” 
(2.4.6-7).  At once “swelling” and “anchor[ed],” both “stir[ring]” and “subdued,” desire 
in Measure for Measure seems only to billow and blister under the pressure of death. 
Angelo is not the only Shakespearean character who feels subdued by the force of 
erotic desire.  The word “subdue” appears six times in Othello.  In its first two 
appearances, aggression is emphasized.  Brabantio furiously orders the guards to 
“subdue” (1.2.81) Othello, by force if necessary, so that he may be brought before the 
Senate.  The first Senator then asks Othello if he “by indirect and forced courses / 
Subdue[d] and poison[ed] this young maid’s affections” (1.3.111-12).  These charges 
against Othello recall Claudio’s metaphor of erotic desire as a poison.  Where we might 
expect to hear that Desdemona’s “affections” were inflamed or aroused, control and 
contamination are instead anticipated.  In its succeeding four appearances, “subdue” is a 
marker of conjugal generosity and affection.  When asked if Othello obtained her love by 
witchcraft, Desdemona responds that “My heart’s subdued / Even to the very quality of 
my lord” (1.3.249-50).
49
  A subdued heart suggests a quiet stillness, preferable to both the 
“raging motions” of lust described by Iago (1.3.325) and the “chaos” that Othello predicts 
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will “come again” (3.3.93), when he falls out of love with Desdemona.  Othello imagines 
the unruly energy of chaos as an agitating force opposed to the subduing counterforce of 
marriage or love.  Chaos is frenzied action in its own right, but Othello anticipates the 
whole force of it “com[ing]” towards him in the absence of Desdemona’s love.  
According to the event structure metaphor, in which an external event is conceptualized 
as a large moving object, Othello, minus Desdemona’s love, will be surrounded and then 
finally subdued by chaos.
50
 
Although Desdemona describes her heart as “subdued,” the other parts of her 
body seem to resist this subjection, even in Othello’s accounts.  In his speech to the 
Senators, Othello describes his courtship of Desdemona, the life stories he told her, and 
her enthusiastic response to them:  
These things to hear 
Would Desdemona seriously incline 
     . . . and with a greedy ear 
Devour up my discourse . . .  
(1.3.144-45, 148-49) 
 
On the one hand, Desdemona is said to have been a submissive listener.  On the other 
hand, she “seriously incline[d]” to hear his stories, leaning forward or, as Keats puts it, 
“winning near the goal.”
51
  Hardly passive, this Desdemona listens “with a greedy ear” 
that “devour[s]” like a mouth.  Stephen Greenblatt has noted that Desdemona’s love here 
has “a quality. . . that unsettles the orthodox schema of hierarchical obedience and makes 
Othello perceive her submission to his discourse as a devouring of it.”
52
  Here and 
elsewhere, Othello’s alludes to the active, even aggressive and excessive quality of 
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Desdemona’s sexuality.  Her “subdued” heart has the capacity to overwhelm what 
Othello feeds it, challenging Orsino’s claim in Twelfth Night that there is “no woman’s 
heart / So big, to hold so much. They lack retention” (2.5.93-94).   
In general, metaphors of movement, change, and increase are ominous in Othello.  
Even before the temptation scene, Othello expresses a fear of change, of augmented love.  
When he arrives at Cyprus after enduring a harsh storm at sea, he tells his wife that he 
would be “most happy” to die now, because his soul is absolutely content with the way 
things are.  Life could just end here, Othello muses – things are as good as they can get.  
Desdemona responds, 
    The heavens forbid 
But that our loves and comforts should increase 
Even as our days do grow.   
(2.1.190-92) 
 
For Othello, love and desire are bounded experiences; for Desdemona, their “loves and 
comforts” ought steadily to grow.  Othello is happy to die now because his content is 
“absolute” (2.1.188); his desire has peaked.  Greenblatt notes the contrast between the 
chaos of the tempest that Othello has just endured and the calmness which follows it: 
“The ‘calmness’ of which [Othello] speaks may express gratified desire, but, as the 
repeated invocation of death suggests, it may equally express the longing for a final 
release from desire, from the dangerous violence, the sense of extremes, the laborious 
climbing and falling out of control that is experienced in the tempest.”
53
  What Greenblatt 
calls “gratified desire” and “release from desire,” Iago calls “satisfaction.”
54
  Derived 
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from the Latin satisfacere, “to make enough,” satisfaction –intellectual, sexual, psychic, 
or any other kind – implies a completion which falls in line with Othello’s desire for 
“stops” (2.1.194), and which is at odds with Desdemona’s seemingly boundless 
“increase.”  In the temptation scene, Othello demands certain knowledge of Desdemona, 
a satisfying truth that only Iago possesses.
55
  This kind of knowledge, according to 
Stanley Cavell, is often metaphorized as a kind of ownership or a violence that Othello 
wishes to exact on his wife, and as a dominion that he fears Desdemona has achieved 
over him.
56
  Another kind of stasis, stasis as attainment, is something Othello both aspires 
to (in his relation to Desdemona) and fears (in her relations with him). 
According to Desdemona’s more dynamic conceptualization, their “loves and 
comforts should increase” with time, apparently without end.
57
  For Desdemona, as for 
Juliet, love is dynamic.
58
  However, the dynamism to which she subscribes corresponds 
neither with the tempest Othello has come from, nor the “chaos” which he predicts.  
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Thus, to describe Desdemona’s lines as “a vision of unabating increase” of love and 
desire is to miss the stability and regularity of the love she imagines, the loves and 
comforts that will grow in proportion to time.
59
   Desdemona’s ability to reach toward the 
future without crushing the present, her patience and measuredness, distinguish her desire 
as entelechic.  She finds a way to imagine and anticipate the future without doing 
violence to it or to the present, a violence that Othello succumbs to.  Othello also misses 
Desdemona’s commitment to order by “increase,” doubting as he does that any change in 
their loves could be positive.  When he responds to Desdemona, he continues to speak the 
language of stasis, describing his happiness as so overwhelming that “It stops me here, it 
is too much of joy” (2.1.194).  Othello’s static metaphors of love and happiness entrap 
him every bit as much as Iago does. 
What is responsible for Othello’s “stops”?  Male anxiety in the face of female 
sexuality is frequently adduced as “the cause” for Othello’s uneasiness.
60
  When Iago 
hatches his plan to “abuse Othello’s ears,” his ambiguous pronouns suggest that he will 
encourage Othello to identify with Cassio as a defiler of Desdemona.  Iago plans to 
mislead Othello into believing “That he [Cassio? Othello?] is too familiar with his wife” 
(1.3.388; emphasis mine).  Greenblatt finds that “the dark essence of Iago’s whole 
enterprise. . .  [is] to play upon Othello’s buried perception of his own sexual relations 
with Desdemona as adulterous.”
61
  Likewise, Snow writes that Othello has “released the 
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sexual flow in her, and transformed her from a chaste object of desire into a sexually 
demanding woman.”
62
  Having unlocked what he perceives to be Desdemona’s 
overpowering and sometimes even repulsive sexuality, Othello resorts to metaphors of 
stillness (subduing, stopping, satisfying) to control the apparent chaos of Desdemona’s 
“increase.”  Yet even as Othello is committed to stasis, he too is set in motion by the 
sexual anxieties that he has unleashed in himself by (presumably) deflowering his wife.
63
  
The man who in 2.1 was ready to “die now” first falls into a fit described as both “a 
trance” and “an epilepsy” (a physiological manifestation of stillness and motion 
combined) and then barrels toward the play’s murderous conclusion. 
Set in motion by his own anxieties and suspicions, Othello is also propelled by 
Iago’s insinuations.  Twice within ten lines, Iago perceives that Othello has been 
“moved” by talk of Desdemona’s adultery (“But I do see you’re moved” [3.3.217], “My 
lord, I see you’re moved” [3.3.224]).  Although Othello denies these charges, his 
agitation grows.  Toward the end of the temptation scene, Othello’s thoughts are indeed 
violently in motion: 
  Like to the Pontic Sea, 
Whose icy current and compulsive course 
Ne’er feels retiring ebb, but keeps due on 
To the Propontic and the Hellespont, 
Even so my bloody thoughts, with violent pace 
Shall ne’er look back, ne’er ebb to humble love, 
Till that a capable and wide revenge 
Swallow them up.     (3.3.453-60) 
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The “compulsive course” of Othello’s bloody thoughts contrasts starkly with his earlier 
“stops” of joy with Desdemona, just as the “violent pace” of the temptation scene itself 
disturbs what Iago calls “dilatory time” (2.3.360), time that unfolds slowly and expands 
steadily.  Patricia Parker has noted that Iago’s insinuations in this scene are examples of 
rhetorical dilation; he offers glimpses of a narrative which prompt Othello to flesh out a 
fuller story of Desdemona’s infidelity.  Dilation and “dilatory time” are responsible for 
the dramatic progression of much of the play, its expansiveness recalling Desdemona’s 
desire, which also steadily “increase[s]” with time.
64
  Yet dilatory time also governs the 
rhythms of Othello’s own jealousy, which, according to Parker, “is also founded on a 
principle of enlargement (‘Trifles light as air / Are to the jealous confirmations strong / 
As proofs of holy writ’ [III.iii.322-24]).”
65
  Othello’s jealousy causes him to inflate the 
intensity and the frequency of Desdemona’s adulterous encounters with Cassio.  As 
Edward Snow points out, “once planted in his mind, the adulterous relationship quickly 
grows into something Cassio and Desdemona have committed ‘a thousand times.’”
66
  
Iago’s “trifles” turn into full-blown actions.  The “violent pace” of Othello’s thoughts 
reaches an apex in Act 4, when he falls into his epileptic fit.  In a speech full of “stops” 
(“—Handkerchief—confessions—handkerchief!—” (4.1.37)), Othello first “tremble[s]” 
(4.1.39), then “shakes” (4.1.41), and finally falls into a fit.  Unable to keep up with the 
wild pace of his own thoughts, Othello’s body suffers passively, immobilized by the 
chaos within. 
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Perhaps Othello’s father suffered similarly – perhaps it was the function of the 
handkerchief to subdue his chaos to love, too.  Othello tells Desdemona that, “while [his 
mother] kept it / ‘Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father / Entirely to her love” 
(3.4.61-63).
67
  The quality of being subdued (somewhat captured by the modern-day 
idiom “settled down”) is crucial to Othello’s conception of his marriage.  When he begins 
to suspect Desdemona of infidelity, he imagines her in motion, changing: “she can turn 
and turn, and yet go on / And turn again; and she can weep, sir, weep; / And she’s 
obedient, as you say, obedient; / Very obedient” (4.1.250-53).  These lines are prompted 
by Lodovico’s request that Othello call his wife back to speak with them.  What begins as 
a test of Othello’s power to “make her turn” (4.1.249) ends as an image of Desdemona 
spinning out of control.
68
  Paradoxically, Othello imagines Desdemona’s very obedience 
– her willingness to be subdued in their marriage – as a kind of motion that prompts her 
to “go on / And turn” without his bidding.
69
  Here, as in the scene of Othello’s trance, 
stillness and motion collide. 
When the play arrives at its “bloody period” (5.2.357), violent action and stillness 
coalesce one last time in the act of suffocation.  Parker observes that “there is, finally, as 
the tragedy moves towards its ending, an increasing sense of the need to keep ‘dilation’ 
itself under control, both to prevent further amplification or unfolding and to bring an end 
                                                
67
 On the handkerchief’s symbolic significance, see Lynda Boose, “Othello’s Handkerchief: ‘The 
Recognizance and Pledge of Love,’” in Critical Essays on Shakespeare’s Othello, ed. Anthony Gerard 
Berthelemy (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1994), 55-67. 
68
 When Othello conceptualizes Desdemona’s changing affections as a kind of physical turning, he taps into 
a special case of the event structure metaphor called “Changing Is Turning” (Lakoff and Johnson, 
Philosophy in the Flesh, 207). 
69
 Snow points out that once Desdemona starts to turn, Othello believes that she will “turn again,” 
exercising the autonomous sexuality he has unleashed and which is now “beyond his capacity to satisfy.”  
See Snow, “Sexual Anxiety,” 398. 
  72   
to delay.”
70
  Othello appears to endorse static love when he avows, “Be thus when thou 
art dead, and I will kill thee / And love thee after” (5.2.18-19).  This is to stop her life 
only to set things in motion again by loving her “after.”  What can it mean that Othello 
gives equal rhetorical weight to the verbs “kill” and “love” and what can it mean that the 
former must precede the latter?  Othello’s necrophiliac fantasy suggests that to love 
Desdemona is an act of violence similar to “knowing” her in Cavell’s account, where 
knowledge is conceptualized as an act of conquest, possession, or assimilation.  
Emmanuel Levinas, who defines knowledge similarly, observes that human beings are 
never able to know one another.
71
  For Levinas, knowledge falls within the provenance of 
“Sameness” because it is an act of totalization by which we try to possess ideas, to 
synthesize the universe, to claim the outside world as our own.  But the provenance of 
(erotic) relations between human beings is the “Other” because such relations are “non-
synthesizable.”  The Other is always infinite, wholly separate, and therefore unable to be 
assimilated.
72
  Stanley Cavell has noted that Desdemona is “everything [Othello] is not,” 
and that the two of them “together form an emblem of human separation” that is too 
much for Othello to bear.
73
  Othello’s inability to assimilate or to know Desdemona 
prompts a crisis marked by both sexual and epistemological anxiety; his problem of 
knowledge centers on his failure to know female sexuality.  This crisis also gives rise to 
Othello’s necrophiliac fantasy, his dream of total erotic assimilation.  Once she is dead, 
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he need not grasp or keep her; finally he can possess her as if she were indeed made of 
“monumental alabaster” (5.2.5). 
Othello’s desire to possess Desdemona, his desire to “know” her with certainty, 
and especially his desire not to desire (“Would I were satisfied!” [3.3.390]), are all 
conceptualized by the same metaphors of motion and stillness that govern erotic desire in 
the play.  As we have seen, Othello is in his element either when he is stopped or when 
he moves at a “violent pace.”  Iago’s slowly unfolding “dilatory time” and Desdemona’s 
steady “increase” are uncongenial to Othello’s psychology of “honorable stop[s]” (2.3.2).  
According to Snow, “‘Killing’ Desdemona (either again and again or once and for all) is 
a way of extinguishing what threatens to turn her from a passive object of desire into an 
actively dangerous lover; at the same time it is a displaced means of killing the feelings 
that threaten to engulf his own inner being.”
74
  Othello’s vulnerability in the face of 
female sexuality is hardly unique in Shakespeare’s plays, and it has been much 
commented on.
75
  The First Witch in Macbeth plans to “drain [a sailor] dry as hay. / 
Sleep shall neither night nor day / Hang upon his penthouse lid. / He shall live a man 
forbid” (1.3.18-21).  Like a succubus, she will deplete him, leaving the sailor “a man 
forbid.”  According to Enobarbus, Cleopatra “makes hungry / Where most she satisfies” 
(2.2.247-48).  Once again, female sexuality presents men with a paradox; in this case not 
so much both turning and obeying, but stimulating and allaying at the same time.
76
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Orgasmic release is itself an engine of desire.  For Cleopatra, as for Desdemona, 
desire is entelechic.  For them, satisfaction (telos) and desire (process) are irreducibly 
bound up with one another.  And so it is with others of Shakespeare’s women.  Juliet’s 
desire strengthens as it ebbs: “boundless as the sea, / My love as deep; The more I give to 
thee, / The more I have, for both are infinite” (2.2.133-35).  In his analysis of metaphors 
of desire in Romeo and Juliet, Edward Snow argues that Juliet’s metaphors are 
“extravagantly metamorphic” and “overflowing;” her experience of desire is 
correspondingly active and in motion.  “Juliet’s images,” Snow writes, “exist in an 
urgently desired future, and are charged with an erotic energy that makes the experience 
they invoke present and actual in her imagination.”
77
  Juliet’s erotic imagination, capable 
of crossing the grammatical boundaries of tense and mood, conjures the future in the 
present.  For Levinas, the future is the temporal equivalent of the Other in its mystery and 
its inability to be assimilated through knowledge.  The erotic relation, according to 
Levinas, is a relation with the future.  He writes, “It is neither a struggle, nor a fusion, nor 
a knowledge. . . .  It is the relationship with alterity, with mystery, that is, with the future, 
with what in the world where there is everything, is never there.”
78
  Juliet’s desire for 
Romeo takes place in what we have seen Burke refer to as “an eternal present” and it, 
too, is entelechic.   
Snow (an unavowed first-wave French feminist) argues that Juliet’s expansive 
metaphors of desire are particular to female ontology in their generative, fluid nature.
79
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Juliet’s “bounty,” Desdemona’s “increase,”
80
 and Cleopatra’s “infinite variety” share 
these generative qualities of movement, flux, pregnancy, entelechy.  This is not to say 
that entelechy is a mode of erotic desire accessible only to female characters, but rather 
that it is made possible by them.  Cleopatra stimulates entelechic desire, according to 
which satisfaction is part and parcel of desiring.  If entelechic desire is most often 
articulated through paradoxical metaphors—satisfaction in hunger, having in giving—it 
is because primary metaphors cannot account for this kind of action.
81
  Entelechy crosses 
logical boundaries, so it is unsurprising to find that its metaphors are often paradoxical, 
betraying the basic physical principles of the domains they elaborate: hunger does not 
succeed satisfaction, at least not within the domain of eating.  Janet Adelman describes 
paradox in Antony and Cleopatra as a poetic form which “demands an act of faith” to 
give it credence.
82
  Such a requirement is especially well-suited to conceptualizations of 
love, which is itself an act of faith. 
Faith and belief are characteristics of entelechic desire, which occurs in the 
subjunctive mood and in the present tense, ever “inclining” towards the future as 
Desdemona and Keats’ lover both do.  Belief implies an acceptance and anticipation of 
the future in the present, and I suggest that it serves as an alternative to knowledge or 
“satisfaction,” the violence of which we see in Othello’s example.  Juliet’s fear that she 
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“should kill [Romeo] with much cherishing” (2.1.227) is her acknowledgment of this 
violence.  To cherish Romeo is to keep him, to possess or assimilate him in Levinas’s 
terms, that is, to force him into Sameness rather than to preserve his Otherness.  While 
Juliet seems to resist pursuing this knowledge of her lover, other characters fixate on this 
knowledge.  The women of Galatea, for example, spend the majority of the play 
hampered by the epistemological problems of desire.  They desperately seek knowledge 
of themselves through knowledge of each other.  Galatea and Phillida are entangled in the 
realm of Sameness– they spend the play trying to figure out if the other is “as I am” 
(3.2.31, 34), trying to assimilate each other only to uncover their sameness in the end.  
The nymphs, too, are mostly concerned with telling “what I am” (3.1.57) in their 
conversations about desire.  This sharp focus on knowledge as the goal of desire 
(knowledge of the love-object or of oneself) is what separates the acts of desire in 
Galatea from Juliet’s entelechic desire. 
When Juliet tells Romeo that “This bud of love, by summer’s ripening breath, / 
May prove a beauteous flow’r when next we meet” (2.2.121-22), metaphors of growth 
indicate that her desire will flourish even in Romeo’s absence.
83
  Juliet does not even 
need Romeo around to experience desire as process, growth, action.  Unlike the women 
of Galatea, whose solitary experiences of desire entrap them, Juliet’s solitude will 
nurture her love for Romeo.  Where Galatea seems always to be alone, even in the 
company of others, Juliet is never alone.  In her endless anticipation and in her ability to 
experience the full force of her love by herself on her balcony, Juliet’s desire is 
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comprised of both hunger and fulfillment; it contains its telos.  She does not even need 
stage action—language alone is up to the task of expressing desire.  Oftentimes, to 
dramatize desire, as Lyly and Shakespeare do, is to speak its metaphors.  Via metaphors 
of mobility—scope, increase, bounty—the language of erotic desire itself serves as 
dramatic action.  Metaphors of desire draw simultaneously upon multiple domains of 
experience, many of which are apparently incompatible.  Hence for some characters, 
these often incompatible metaphors figure desire as dissonance, as what Othello calls 
“chaos.”  For others, such as Juliet, desire can be an integrating, unifying experience 
which conjures the future in the present, and which evokes the infinite in finite acts. 
Infinity, the term that Levinas assigns to the Other and that exemplifies erotic 
relations, crops up again and again in metaphors of desire.  Troilus’s “will is infinite” 
(3.2.75), Juliet’s bounty and love “both are infinite” (2.2.135), Cleopatra’s “variety” is 
“infinite” (2.3.248).  In The Physics, Aristotle notes that “infinity is not a permanent 
actuality, but consists in a process of coming to be, like time and the number of time.”
84
  
To dramatize such a process is to contend with the tensions between stasis and motion, 
the will and the act, the present and the future, that are fundamental both to the 
experience of erotic desire and to theater.  “At the heart of artistic endeavor,” writes P.A. 
Skantze, “is the preoccupation of creating an aesthetic work that will last forever while 
offering its power and vision again and again, without growing stale.  Like Cleopatra the 
art of representation and crafted language seeks a timeless stability, ‘age cannot wither 
it,’ but neither can it be lifeless in its repeated display, for then might ‘custom stale its 
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infinite variety.’”
85
  That Skantze finds a language for these aesthetic tensions in the 
paradoxical description of Cleopatra’s erotic power reveals the power of this language 
itself to approximate, to activate, and to dramatize the still and moving experiences of 
erotic desire.  
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Chapter 2 
 
“More than all the world” 
Intimacy and the Scene-Agent Ratio 
 
 
Valentine: And why not death rather than living torment? 
To die is to be banished from myself. 
And Silvia is myself; banished from her 
Is self from self, a deadly banishment. 
What light is light, if Silvia be not seen? 
What joy is joy, if Silvia be not by? 
Unless it be to think that she is by 
And feed upon the shadow of perfection. 
Except I be by Silvia in the night, 
There is no music in the nightingale; 
Unless I look on Silvia in the day, 
There is no day for me to look upon. 
She is my essence, and I leave to be, 
If I be not by her fair influence 
Fostered, illumined, cherished, kept alive. 
I fly not death to fly his deadly doom: 
Tarry I here, I but attend on death, 
But fly I hence, I fly away from life. 
(The Two Gentlemen of Verona 3.1.170-87) 
 
Alone onstage, Shakespeare’s Valentine mourns his banishment from Milan, and 
more importantly, from his beloved Silvia.  Forced outside Milan’s city limits, he 
questions the boundaries in his life, those that separate him from Milan, from his lover, 
and even from death.  At first, Valentine draws on the domain of banishment to 
conceptualize death and separation; but not for long.  Apparently, this domain’s clear 
delineation of inside, outside, and the boundary between them is too rigid to 
accommodate Valentine’s relationship to Silvia, who constitutes both his inner self and 
the world outside it.  “Silvia is myself” (172), but she is also Valentine’s scene, the light 
in his world, the “day for me to look upon” (181).  Craving her nearness, he reiterates 
three times in four lines his need to be “by Silvia”; yet somehow she also is his “essence” 
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(182), inextricably part of or inside him.  Although the famous questions in The Two 
Gentlemen of Verona are “Who is Silvia? What is she” (4.2.39; my emphasis), Valentine 
himself turns out to be preoccupied with the question, where is Silvia?  Is she outside or 
is she inside him—is she the scene or the agent or both? 
 This chapter argues that Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s characters experience erotic 
desire as an erosion of the boundary between agents and their scenes.  When characters 
such as Valentine conceptualize their lovers as identical to their scenes, they conform to a 
tendency that Kenneth Burke recognized when he observed that characters can be 
“treated as scenic conditions or ‘environment,’ of one another.”
1
  I begin by considering 
different theories of place (or “scene”) pertinent to the dynamics of desire in Lyly and 
Shakespeare, focusing in particular on Two Gentlemen of Verona.  While at first glance 
this may seem like bloodless cartography, it will become obvious that the stakes of erotic 
desire shift when we open ourselves to the beloved as place.  When our boundaries are so 
fiercely compromised, we risk displacement from our own secure sense of self.  To 
become vulnerable to a lover’s “fair influence” is to contend not just with possibilities for 
betterment but with the frightening, downright ontological prospect that we might “leave 
to be” in his or her absence.  No wonder, then, that the threat of displacement, along with 
the vulnerability that it provokes, is often conceptualized in terms of metaphors of 
permeability.  Permeability, which may leave at least some version of our selves in tact, 
is in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays typically accessed through domains of fluidity, 
melting, disrobing, or, more generally, metamorphosis.  I survey these metaphors in 
Lyly’s Endymion, a play in which erotic intimacy is imagined largely as an interior 
experience, and in Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, in which the lovers make worlds 
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of each other.  Permeability has the capacity to be a more accommodating host to 
conceptualizations of desire than full-blown displacement.  After all, some of its source 
domains highlight the generative properties of erotic desire.  But because fluidity can lead 
to dissolution, it can also turn destructive.  Feeding and nurturing shade into cannibalism. 
Sexual penetration becomes violent.  These and other such conceptual metaphors 
dramatize the unstable frontiers between agents and the scenes of erotic desire. 
 
I. Where is Silvia?: Containment and Permeability  
 Valentine’s struggle to distinguish the agent from the scene illustrates what 
Kenneth Burke calls “the paradox of substance.”  Burke notes that philosophically, 
substance is an ontological word, one which refers to the intrinsic quality of beings.  
Substance is the literal stuff of agents; it is what we are made of and what defines us.  But 
etymologically, as Burke points out, substance is an extrinsic and therefore a scenic 
word:  “Literally a person’s or a thing’s sub-stance would be something that stands 
beneath or supports the thing.”
2
  Since substance refers both to the thing itself and what is 
outside the thing (what it is not), this term presents what Burke calls an “unresolvable 
ambiguity” that illustrates the interdependence of the intrinsic and the extrinsic.
3
  Even 
the most basic distinctions between “scene” and “agent” must contend with this paradox, 
and yet Burke relies on these tenuous categories throughout his study of motives.
4
  His 
scene-agent ratio, which maintains that the nature of agents should be consistent with the 
nature of the scene, both depends on and subverts the distinctions between agents and 
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scenes which make the ratio useful.  So too with Valentine, who is not so much consistent 
with his scene as he is conflated with it.  In the throes of erotic desire, he embodies the 
paradox of substance.  In dramatistic terms, his desire renders him an agent suddenly and 
acutely vulnerable to his scene.   
Although critics such as Stanley Wells have charged Shakespeare’s early play 
with “organic deficiencies” with regard to putatively authentic characterization and 
genuine erotic experience (George Eliot was famously “disgusted” with the ending), it is 
noteworthy that Valentine’s speech often is cited as an exception.
5
  Charles Hallet’s 
critique of the play’s many “reversals” softens when he considers the “touching 
sentiment” of Valentine’s soliloquy.  “Though the process of reversal lacked credibility,” 
he writes, “Shakespeare’s Valentine feels its effects deeply.”
6
  Inga-Stina Ewbank 
proposes that this credibility is a result, somewhat paradoxically, of the formal features of 
Valentine’s speech, “in which verbal patterning is functional and central.”  Familiar 
poetic conventions that take on new meaning for Valentine lead Ewbank to hear “a 
genuine ring of agony as the metaphors in Valentine’s speech stop being conceits and 
become live reality.”
7
  The authenticity that Ewbank identifies is an effect not of an 
overwrought poetic metaphor, but of a conceptual metaphor that emerges from 
Valentine’s lived experience. 
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 Hallet, “Metamorphising Proteus,” 172. 
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Valentine’s confusion about where he ends and the world begins raises the at once 
alluring and frightening probability that lovers inhabit one another and the world at the 
same time.  He wrestles with this prospect when he declares that “She is my essence, and 
I leave to be, / If I be not by her fair influence / Fostered, illumined, cherished, kept 
alive” (182-84).  Valentine equates Silvia with himself (“She is my essence”
8
), only 
immediately to conceptualize her as a source of life and sustenance outside himself, using 
the domains of maternity and astrology.  Because both of these domains elide the 
paradoxical potential of the scene-agent divide, they offer Valentine alternative ways to 
conceptualize Silvia’s place in (or out of) his world.  Verbs such as “fostered,” 
“cherished,” and to a lesser extent, “kept alive,” draw from the domain of maternity, 
allowing Valentine to conceive himself as a part of Silvia but not co-extensive with her.  
Likewise, the words “illumined” and “influence” tap into the domain of astrology, 
specifically the power of the stars to affect beings under their sway.
9
  These source 
domains, like erotic desire itself, threaten Valentine’s integrity as an agent, but they also 
allow him to imagine various relationships with Silvia that range in their degrees of 
interdependence, separateness, and power. 
 When Valentine abandons the domain of banishment in favor of domains that 
obscure, or perforate, the boundary between scene and agent, he raises questions about 
                                                
8
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nd
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9
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how erotic desire changes our relation to the world around us. Where do our lovers exist 
for us?  Valentine admits that Silvia does not even have to be physically present to him in 
order to nourish him.  If she “be not by” (175), he would be satisfied simply “to think that 
she is by / And feed upon the shadow of perfection” (176-77).  In this instance, the 
domain of eating/nourishment tests the borders between agent and scene.
10
  Disquieting 
here is the possibility that Valentine might consume Silvia, or at least, her shadow.
11
  The 
domain of cannibalism extends and perverts the nourishment of a mother’s “foster[ing]” 
care, but however perversely, Valentine activates a primary metaphor when he conceives 
of his lover as a meal to be eaten.  Erotic activity from kissing to nibbling to oral sex 
entails physical ingestion of a part of our lovers.  Claude Rawson notes that the overlap 
between gastronomic and erotic metaphors, exemplified in the Ovidian kiss, signals a 
desire for the “amorous intermerging” of lovers.
12
  But all-consuming, total incorporation 
would prove a “deadly banishment” indeed. 
Of course, permeability makes sense only where there are boundaries.  And, as I 
have noted, Valentine conceptualizes boundary through the domain of banishment: 
And why not death rather than living torment? 
To die is to be banished from myself. 
And Silvia is myself; banished from her 
Is self from self, a deadly banishment. 
      (3.1.170-73) 
 
                                                
10
 Janet Adelman has pointed out the centrality of this metaphor in Coriolanus’s relationship with his scene: 
"The metaphoric process suggests the psychological fact that is, I think, at the center of the play: the taking 
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  85   
Banishment requires a border line, a this side/that side schema.  But Valentine’s fear of 
being “banished from myself” (171) tells us that he conceptualizes himself both as the 
boundary and as the entity which breaks through it—the container and its contents.  
Cognitive linguists argue that the container schema shapes our most basic 
conceptualizations of ourselves and our relationship to the world.
13
  This schema belongs 
to a category of primitive conceptual structures, called image schemas, which emerge 
from our sensorimotor experience and orient us in space.  The container schema allows 
us to conceptualize bounded regions in space via inside, outside, and boundary. 
 Any analysis of the relationship between scenes and agents necessarily draws 
upon the container schema, and this is certainly evident in Burke’s writing on the subject.  
In A Grammar of Motives, the scene-agent ratio is discussed in a chapter titled “Container 
and the Thing Contained,” in which Burke notes that “both act and agent require scenes 
that ‘contain’ them.”
14
  This conception of scene as a kind of vessel or container has a 
rich philosophical history in its own right.  In The Fate of Place: A Philosophical 
History, Edward Casey cites Aristotle’s Physics as the foundational work that connects 
place to containment.  Aristotle defines “place” as the inner surface of a tight-fitting 
container which envelops a being.  For Aristotle, “a material thing fits snugly in its 
proper place, a place that clings to that thing.”
15
  Because Aristotle emphasizes the fixed 
contours of surfaces and the snugness of the fit, his notion of “scene” depends on 
impermeable boundaries.  Aristotelian place is disciplinary: it encloses and it binds.  
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 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 337-90. 
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 Kenneth Burke, GM, 15. 
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 Edward Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997), 58. 
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Were we to imagine lovers as (Aristotelian) scenes, they would contain one another, but 
they would never threaten to break through or shatter each other.   
Such an account of scene is inapplicable to Valentine’s desire not only because 
Silvia penetrates his boundaries, but because his scene is also his own body (hence “to 
die is to be banished from myself”).  Valentine’s articulation of his desire reminds us that 
erotic language is always embodied.  Embodiment, in turn, is fundamental to all spatial 
relations concepts, including the container schema.  According to Lakoff and Johnson, 
Our bodies are containers that take in air and nutrients and emit wastes.  We 
constantly orient our bodies with respect to containers—rooms, beds, buildings.  
We spend an inordinate amount of time putting things in and taking things out of 
containers.  We also project abstract containers onto areas in space, as when we 
understand a swarm of bees as being in the garden.
16
 
 
If the body as a container is abundantly familiar on the primitive level that Lakoff and 
Johnson point out, it has special significance in light of early modern notions of 
embodiment.  The early modern body is a container of humors, but it is permeable 
through the eyes, ears, and mouth.  Gail Kern Paster describes humoral bodies as “earthly 
vessels defined by the quality and quantity of liquids they contain.”
17
  As for their 
permeability, Paster conceives of “the passions and the body that houses them in 
ecological terms—that is, in terms of the body’s reciprocal relation to the world.”
18
  For 
Paster, the study of emotion is the study of how early modern bodies inhabited the 
phenomenal world.  What she calls the ecology of the passions, or the reciprocal relation 
between inner and outer, Burke calls the scene-agent ratio.  Reciprocity, vulnerability, 
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and permeability characterize much of our experience in and of the world.  This is 
especially true for the early modern agent who is “in the throes of strong feeling.”
19
  The 
reciprocity to which Paster calls our attention runs throughout the opening lines of 
Valentine’s soliloquy.  Contemplating his banishment from Milan prompts Valentine to 
place himself in all three slots of the container schema—inside, outside, and the boundary 
itself—rather than just outside the city walls.  Ecologist of desire that he is, Valentine 
collapses the distinctions of the container schema only to reconstruct them with Silvia at 
the center.  If “Silvia is myself” (3.1.172), then she both inhabits him and contains him. 
  Hence Valentine’s conception of Silvia as scenic is after all Aristotelian, but in 
Irigarayan terms.
20
  Whereas Aristotle sees place as an opaque and solid container, 
Irigaray insists on the sort of reciprocity that Paster describes.  For Irigaray, who has 
famously written, “as for woman, she is place,” the porousness and permeability of 
woman-as-scene is made possible by erotic desire.
21
  The female body is always slightly 
open and yet also able to contain and envelop her lover.  Edward Casey compares 
Irigaray’s complicated definition with Aristotle’s: “place as enclosure is affirmed [in 
Irigaray], but only insofar as the elements that make up place inhabit and suffuse the 
universe as a whole, now considered as a gigantic sievelike vessel—which, though 
entirely enveloped, leaks throughout.”
22
  Irigaray’s emphasis on permeability derives 
from her consideration not only of woman-as-place, but also of the role that sexuality 
plays in our relation to the world.  “There are times,” she writes, “when that relation of 
places in the sexual act gives rise to a transgression of the envelope, to a porousness, a 
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perception of the other, a fluidity.”
23
  Sexual permeability, marked physically by the 
exchange of fluids in orgasm, signals an openness to the world, incarnated by the other. 
When Valentine is forced out of the world, he has only language with which to 
conjure the absent Silvia.  For better or for worse, it is not easy for Valentine to “feed 
upon the shadow of perfection” (3.1.177) in his banishment: 
 O thou that dost inhabit in my breast, 
 Leave not the mansion so long tenantless, 
 Lest, growing ruinous, the building fall 
 And leave no memory of what it was. 
 Repair me with thy presence, Silvia. 
 Thou gentle nymph, cherish thy forlorn swain. 
     (5.4.7-12) 
 
Although Valentine identifies Silvia as “thou that dost inhabit in my breast” (7), she is a 
curiously absent tenant.  Where Silvia’s overwhelming presence once permeated 
Valentine’s self and world, her absence now hollows him out.  And with a “mansion so 
long tenantless” (8) in his breast, Valentine fears that the container itself will begin to 
collapse.  Permeability, once an instrument for conceptualizing desire, has become for 
Valentine a vehicle for conceptualizing loss.
24
  The boundary between agent and scene is 
compromised as much by Silvia’s “fair influence” (3.1.183) as it is by her absence.  
Where is Silvia when the walls of the mansion are on the brink of crumbling, “leav[ing] 
no memory of what it was” (10)?  Where is anyone when there are no boundaries (not 
even the memory of a boundary) to distinguish one place from another, or from 
ourselves?  Taken to this extreme, permeability gestures toward both the dream and the 
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nightmare of desire: that Silvia is everywhere, if indeed she is anywhere.  And if Silvia is 
everywhere, then where is Valentine? 
Before he meets Silvia, Valentine appears to know where he is and where he 
wants to be.  The opening words of the play establish his independence of mind: “Cease 
to persuade” (1.1.1), he commands his protean friend before leaving him to strike out on 
his own.  But Valentine’s discovery of Silvia among “the wonders of the world abroad” 
(1.1.6) jeopardizes his own place in that world.  His servant Speed is the first to notice the 
difference in him: “now you are metamorphosed with a mistress, that when I look on you, 
I can hardly think you my master” (2.1.29-31).  And yet, contra Speed, metamorphosis 
does not fully account for Valentine’s particular experience of desire—he isn’t so much 
changed by Silvia as he is lost, cancelled or emptied out by his longing for her.  
Valentine responds in kind when he laments his banishment in the following act, refusing 
even to answer to his own name: 
 Pro:  Valentine? 
 Val: No. 
 Pro:  Who then? His spirit? 
 Val:  Neither. 
 Pro:  What then? 
 Val:  Nothing. 
    (3.1.193-98) 
Where and what is Valentine?  No spirit, no name, not even a thing.  The nightmare of 
desire is that Silvia has so overwhelmed Valentine that even his “spirit” is banished.  And 
this loss in particular cues our sense that he is spent, that he has been reduced to a state of 
post-coital depletion.  Once, Silvia could replenish or even constitute his essence.  If she 
can still do so now, it takes the paradoxical form of filling him with emotions that empty 
him out.  When Valentine and Proteus volley the words “No Valentine” four times in five 
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lines (3.1.210-14), his absence is rendered glaringly, and again paradoxically, present.  
Hence the metaphor of the ruinous, tenantless mansion of Valentine’s breast; barely 
standing and dismally empty, it exists only to bear the mark of a tenant who no longer 
lives there.  This haunting image of the empty container poses a quiet but palpable threat 
to any metaphor of desire as openness, receptivity, or permeability.
25
 
 In the following pages, I investigate metaphors that dramatize the reciprocal 
relation between agents and their scenes, as it is tested and shaped by erotic desire.  John 
Lyly dramatizes Endymion’s unrequited desire through metaphors of painful exposure 
and of utter envelopment.  For Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, the loss of a lover-
as-scene is tantamount to banishment from oneself.  Erotic desire reveals the dependence 
of agents on their scenes to the extent that any separation is a small death.  In both plays, 
metaphors of permeability mark characters who are vulnerable to, hungry for, and 
humbled by, their scenes.  As Gaston Bachelard writes, “On the surface of being, that 
region where being wants to be both visible and hidden, the movements of opening and 
closing are so numerous… that we could conclude on the following formula: man is half-
open being.”
26
 
 
 
II. “A petty world of myself”: Permeability and Desire in Lyly’s Endymion 
 
 At the end of Act 2, John Lyly’s Endymion is bewitched into an onstage slumber 
in which he remains for nearly half of the play.  Among the minor plots that unfold 
around his slumbering body is the comic episode featuring Sir Tophas, the miles 
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gloriosus of Lyly’s play.  Infatuated with a geriatric sorceress, Tophas announces to his 
page, Epiton, that he is no longer a complete “noun substantive” (3.3.16), but instead has 
become “a noun adjective…because I cannot stand without another” (3.3.17-19).
27
 
Although Tophas’s passionate desire for the old hag is ridiculous, his suggestive 
declaration of his reliance upon her resembles Valentine’s line about depending on 
Silvia’s “fair influence” to be “kept alive.”  Epiton, who considers himself impervious to 
love, chides his master’s foolish behavior, calling him “an amorous ass” (3.3.120).  He 
eventually falls out of favor with Tophas, but he tells his fellow pages not to worry, for 
he can be “complete” (4.2.15) even while he is in disgrace with his master: “I am an 
absolute microcosmos, a petty world of myself.  My library is my head, for I have no 
other books but my brains; my wardrobe on my back, for I have no more apparel than is 
on my body; my armoury at my fingers’ ends, for I use no other artillery than my nails; 
my treasure in my purse.  Sic omnia mecum porto” (4.2.40-45).
28
  Epiton describes an 
agent who carries his scene on his back; the absolute microcosmos is sealed up, complete 
and impenetrable.  He needs nothing and desires no one.   
Although this fantasy of self-containment is as unattainable as the moon herself 
(Epiton promptly sets off to appease Tophas and mend their relationship), it is a powerful 
counterpoint to the plight of characters in the play like Endymion and Eumenides, who 
“are in love up to the ears” (1.3.1).  To be an agent who contains his own scene, “a petty 
world of myself,” is to escape the vulnerability consequent upon opening oneself to 
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desire.  Bachelard writes of “half-open” beings; but what does this mean?  Is not even the 
smallest aperture, the slightest perforation, a categorical openness?  Is the only way to 
avoid the threat of displacement to seal oneself within the chaste embrace of Aristotelian 
place?  The improbable fantasy that any of us could be perfectly finished or “complete” 
looms large in a play whose eponymous hero falls hopelessly in love with the moon, 
“whose figure of all is the perfectest” (3.4.165). 
Early in the play, Endymion declares that his love for Cynthia has taken him out 
of the world.  Addressing her in soliloquy, Endymion begs Cynthia to “[r]emember my 
solitary life, almost these seven years.  Whom have I entertained but mine own thoughts 
and thy virtues?  What company have I used but contemplation?” (3.1.15-18).  For 
Endymion, as for so many of Lyly’s protagonists, to fall in love is to sink inside himself, 
to dwell in fantasy, speak in soliloquy, hence choose solitude over sociability.  Unlike 
Shakespeare’s Valentine, who pines for his beloved’s nearness and “influence,” Lyly’s 
Endymion requires a vast distance separating him from the one he loves. 
This unexpected scene-agent ratio is apparent in the play’s first scene, when 
Endymion confesses that he has fallen hopelessly in love with the moon, a “dotage” 
which his friend Eumenides considers “monstrous” (1.1.30).  Certainly Endymion’s 
passionate desire for the moon is bizarre and confusing, if not quite “monstrous”: we 
never do comprehend the precise nature of his beloved.  Whether Cynthia appears in 
Lyly’s play as a queen, as a deity, or as the moon, she is always a powerful but strange 
love-object.  Scholars typically identify Cynthia as a figure for Queen Elizabeth (many 
argue that Endymion is Lyly’s panegyric for the queen) and explain that Cynthia’s 
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unintelligibility “represents the enigma of Elizabeth’s position.”
29
  As Christine Neufeld 
has argued, “the Queen’s power lay in the creative potential of her contradictions, not in 
her concretisation of a stable identity—a condition Lyly seeks to celebrate in Cynthia.”
30
  
Her ability to elide the boundaries of singular identity helped the Queen to emphasize the 
great distance between herself and her admirers.  Lyly’s play explores the erotics of this 
distance by tapping into the “creative potential” of the Queen’s contradictions to 
dramatize a unique form of erotic desire for a beloved who is unknowable and 
unattainable.
31
  What better object for such a desire than the moon itself? 
David Bevington writes that “the Cynthia in Lyly’s play is certainly like the 
moon,” and that Endymion creates “an elaborate conceit comparing his mistress to the 
moon.”
32
  But Endymion makes no such comparison: he avers only that he “love[s] the 
moon” (1.1.20-21), and then praises her “settled course” (40), her “increasing and 
decreasing” (45), and that she “waxeth young again” (59).  His predicament is peculiar 
and yet it is familiar: Endymion dramatizes the simultaneously isolating and unraveling 
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experience of consuming, in this case, unrequited love.  People who do not reciprocate 
love are as distant as the moon.  They confirm the boundary between self and world, 
agent and scene, by reminding us of what we cannot have, of what is always outside our 
grasp.  But unrequited love is also conducive to pleasure.  Endymion may be said to fall 
in love with someone outside his grasp, and so to suffer.  Or we may say that he chooses 
to love someone he can never have, and that he does this because there is something in it 
for him.  His would be a case of desirable pain, a pain he seeks every time he imagines 
Cynthia precisely in her strangest and most distant incarnation.
33
 
Perhaps Endymion puts the whole night sky between them because it is what he 
must do to conceive of Cynthia’s majesty.
 
 Stepping back and elevating her may be the 
only way he can hold all of her in his mind, or in his regard.  Bachelard writes about the 
experience of looking at a village from different vantage points.  From close up, we 
cannot conceive of the entire village—we see it only in small slivers until we pull back 
far enough to capture the whole.  For Endymion, Cynthia is too big to behold unless from 
far away.  He praises her for magnifying the distance by “detract[ing] from thy 
perfections” (1.1.71) and modestly “decreas[ing] thy gleams” (1.1.73) most nights of the 
month.  It would be simply too much to behold all of her “fullness” (1.1.69) all the time.  
But no matter how much space separates Endymion from Cynthia, he is never quite able 
to possess her in the irenic way that Bachelard imagines: “Distance disperses nothing, 
but, on the contrary, composes a miniature of a country in which things become 
reconciled.  They then offer themselves for our ‘possession,’ while denying the distance 
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that created them. We possess from afar, and how peacefully!”
34
  Endymion finds no 
peace in looking up at the sky.  And although he dreams early in the play of “possess[ing] 
the moon” (1.1.18-19), he either cannot or will not deny the distance that separates them.  
Instead he appears to relish the distance, praising Cynthia for her strangeness above all 
else, eroticizing the very things that stand in the way of his dream. 
Such a decisive boundary separating him from Cynthia should crystallize 
Endymion’s sense of self, his agent-ness, but these boundaries have the opposite effect: 
they cloud his identity.
35
  Defending himself from this loss of self, Endymion 
conceptualizes erotic desire through the domain of exposure—as a need to be seen and 
known by Cynthia—even as he submerges himself in his interior life, forsaking the 
company of others.  Endymion’s desire, then, is set in a scene, a “region where being 
wants to be both visible and hidden.”
36
  In his first soliloquy, Endymion describes his 
alienated existence as that of a man “who, divorcing himself from the amiableness of all 
ladies, the bravery of all courts, the company of all men, hath chosen in a solitary cell to 
live only by feeding on thy [Cynthia’s] favour” (2.1.44-47).  Deeply isolated and self-
contained, Endymion nonetheless “feed[s]” on the moon—he is not completely alone.  
Like Valentine, who “feed[s] upon the shadow of perfection,” Endymion reveals his 
permeability to Cynthia even from the confines of his “solitary cell.”  He soliloquizes, but 
he also addresses his words to Cynthia.  This makes for an intimacy with her that is oddly 
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 While the early modern “self” has been a subject for scholarly debate, I find common cause with those 
who argue that at the very least, an embodied self was acknowledged in the early modern period.  On the 
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 Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, 222. 
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predicated on the distance between them, both theatrically (he is speaking in soliloquy) 
and spatially (she is present but distant).
37
 
At the end of his soliloquy, he reveals his wish that Cynthia will recognize his 
isolation as evidence of his love: “Thus mayst thou see every vein, sinew, muscle, and 
artery of my love, in which there is no flattery nor deceit, error nor art” (2.1.48-50).  
Retreat from the world’s gaze is nonetheless tantamount to utter exposure to the object of 
desire, to a wish to be stripped barer than naked, stripped even of his skin.  Lyly could 
have figured Endymion’s exposure as an act of disrobing, shedding clothes rather than 
flesh, baring his naked body instead of his innards.
38
  But he opts for a more disturbing 
level of exposure: Endymion’s desire makes visible that which ought to be hidden from 
Cynthia’s penetrating gaze.  The image that Endymion conjures in his desperate attempt 
to assert his identity does violence to it.  Indeed, Endymion aspires to still greater 
visibility than this.  In conversation with Eumenides, he laments that his “thoughts have 
no veins, and yet, unless they be let blood, I shall perish” (1.1.31-32).
39
  Swollen with 
thoughts of desire, Endymion seeks his remedy in another act of exposure, this time of 
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in Shakespeare, see Michael Mooney, Shakespeare’s Dramatic Transactions (Durham: Duke University 
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permeability that is painful and unnatural. In the scene of Endymion’s waking, he recounts a dream that 
features a cluster of beetles that suck the blood from an eagle’s vein in order to kill it.  Tellus also mentions 
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vein” (5.4.87-88).  Veins are especially well-suited as a source domain for permeability because they are 
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his blood.  The restorative powers of bloodletting call to mind the relief of ejaculation, 
another potential purgation for Endymion’s thoughts of love.
40
  On the one hand, he 
imagines a kind of orgasmic release at knifepoint.  On the other hand, he would expose 
himself by peeling back layer after layer until nothing at all is left. 
Endymion nearly gets his wish at the end of Act 2, when he falls into a slumber so 
deep that it threatens to obliterate him altogether.  His onstage coma, his present absence 
(where is Endymion?), recalls the image of the empty mansion that is the emblem of 
Valentine’s displacement.  Cynthia and Eumenides both refer to Endymion’s slumber as 
a “dead sleep” (3.1.2; 3.4.19) after decades pass without any change in his condition.  But 
it turns out that Endymion’s sleep is quite lively, filled with vivid dreams that are 
dramatized first in dumbshow (2.2) and then narrated by Endymion in the scene of his 
waking (5.1).  Sleep, even a deathly one such as Endymion’s, can be an unusually 
receptive and creative state of being.
41
  In a study of onstage slumber in medieval and 
Renaissance plays, David Bevington argues that Endymion’s prolonged sleep dramatizes 
his inner conflict.  Bevington notes that sleep comes to dramatize defenselessness.  “In 
several late Elizabethan plays,” he writes, “sleep is presented not as slothful or 
inattentive, as in so many medieval dramatizations, but as the innocent rest of those who 
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 Humoral physiology establishes a link between blood and semen through the process of transmutation.  
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41
I am indebted to William Sherman for introducing me to the creative properties of sleep in his paper, 
“Revisiting the House of Sleep” at the Shakespeare Association of America meeting (Washington, DC: 
April 2009). 
  98   
are about to be victimized.”
42
  Right before our very eyes, Endymion’s onstage slumber 
dramatizes vulnerability, openness, and displacement just as profoundly as his metaphors 
do. 
Sleep itself is a permeable state, but the moments just before and after sleep are 
especially so.  These in-between states often foster “hypnagogic” experiences, which 
Andreas Mavromatis defines as “hallucinatory or quasi-hallucinatory events taking place 
in the intermediate state between wakefulness and sleep.”
43
  One of the most common 
features of hypnagogia is a heightened state of receptivity and suggestibility.  According 
to Mavromatis, hypnagogic experiences open the subject to both external suggestion 
(from the experimenter) and internal suggestion (from the subject’s own imagination).
44
 
Endymion’s uncharacteristically long sleep and protracted scene of waking render him 
especially vulnerable to Cynthia, and perhaps more significantly, to his own imaginings 
of her.
45
  If, following Mavromatis, a “loosening of ego boundaries (LEBs),” or 
“egolessness,” lies “at the root of all hypnagogic experiences,” then Endymion’s 
precarious grasp on his own identity before falling asleep in Act 2 and then just after 
waking in Act 5, testifies to his loosened ego boundaries, boundaries which are 
conceptualized in terms of dissolution or melting away.
46
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ed. John A. Alford (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 52-83, 66. 
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 This vulnerability may also extend to the actor who plays the sleeping Endymion; he becomes the object 
of the audience’s gaze without being able to look back. 
46
 Mavromatis, Hypnagogia, 68. 
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At the end of Act 2, Endymion desperately seeks an escape from the inner world 
that preoccupies him, resolving to “beguile myself with sleep; and if no slumber will take 
hold in my eyes, yet will I embrace the golden thoughts in my head and wish to melt by 
musing” (2.3.4-7).  Such sleep may offer Endymion escape, but it also intensifies his 
solitude, at once opening him to the world and removing him from it.  Even his private 
dreams are open to the audience’s gaze, and again later to Cynthia’s inquiry.  When 
Endymion recounts his dreams for Cynthia, we discover that the “golden thoughts” he 
longed to indulge took a darker turn in sleep.  His first dream features a lady “passing fair 
but very mischievous” (5.1.88-89); holding a knife in one hand and a looking glass in the 
other, she threatens to cut his throat.  Although her two attendants try to sway her—one 
in the direction of cruelty, the other towards mercy—the lady finally curbs her violent 
impulse upon seeing her reflection in the mirror.  The dream elicits a conflicted reaction 
from Endymion: “I started in my sleep, feeling my very veins to stretch and my sinews to 
swell with fear, and such a cold sweat bedewed all my body” (5.1.98-101).  The lady’s 
knife—at once penetrative and castrating—arouses both fear and lust in Endymion’s 
sleeping body, apparently in equal measure.
47
 Act 2’s “embrace” is now, in Act 5, first 
threatened by violence and then preempted by a nocturnal self-embrace that reaches 
beyond the dream world of “golden thoughts” into the physical world in which 
Endymion’s “ sinews…swell” and he then “bedew[s]” his body. 
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 The erotic aspects of this dream have not been addressed in Lyly scholarship. Bevington interprets the 
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Endymion’s alarming dream (along with his charged reaction to it) becomes the 
play’s own nightmare to sort out.
48
  What can it mean that the Cynthia figure in 
Endymion’s vision carries a knife in one hand and a looking glass in the other?  Although 
these two implements may seem like strange bedfellows, the image of a powerful woman 
wielding the mirror and knife would have been familiar to early modern audiences—and 
was certainly familiar to Lyly.  The lady in Endymion’s dream evokes Anatomia, “the 
reductive deity of division” who presided over the dissecting room.
49
  Jonathan Sawday 
describes Anatomia as “a mistress of erotic reduction—a fantasy expression of male 
surrender—whose chief attribute was the power to divide.”
50
  While she dissects with her 
knife, Anatomia studies the body with a looking glass, exposing and cataloguing its 
mysterious inner workings.  It comes as little surprise that Endymion conjures this deity 
in his nightmarish fantasy of Cynthia, whom he had implored to “see every vein, sinew, 
muscle, and artery of my love” (2.1.49-50).  This crucial episode in Endymion’s dream 
conjures the terrifying fantasies, or are they realities, that inform his desire to be made 
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visible, knowable, and vulnerable to Cynthia’s piercing gaze.  Vulnerability, from the 
Latin vulnerare—to wound—is recast from an emotional or psychic experience into a 
physical reality in Endymion’s dream.
51
 
Of all the dream material that Endymion recounts, this stands out as the only 
episode that animates his sleeping body.  If Endymion’s slumber indeed represents a kind 
of living death, then his dream truly exemplifies the permeability of this state, poised as it 
is between his real and fantasy worlds, with material effects that extend beyond his 
imagination.  In his dream, Endymion finally gets his wish: at last, the lady sees him.  But 
at what cost?  She threatens to see him as meticulously and comprehensively as he wants 
to be seen—beneath the clothing that covers him and under the flesh that contains him. 
The lady is not the only one who threatens to scrutinize and dissect him.  His dream 
affords Endymion the opportunity to turn the mirror back on himself and see his desire 
reflected there, following his need for exposure all the way through to its terrifying and 
fatal conclusion.  When the lady relents, she re-establishes the distance Endymion praised 
Cynthia for—diminishing her glow and her “fullness” (1.1.69).  From this new latitude, 
her gaze permits him to exist.  By choosing the mirror over the knife, the lady upholds 
the emblem of re-established distance; where the knife promises full disclosure, the 
mirror signifies indirection or mediation.  It offers only reflection and representation.
52
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As it turns out, the lady’s mercy protects Endymion not from her malicious companion 
“who provoked her to execute mischief” (5.1.95), not even from the lady’s own violent 
impulses, but rather, from himself—from his overwhelming and destructive desire for a 
level of exposure that is tantamount to self-effacement. 
It bears remembering that Endymion is not alone in his desire for self-effacement; 
his masochistic urge plagues the other lovelorn characters in the play.
53
  His best friend 
Eumenides, who has fallen hopelessly in love with the recalcitrant Semele, apparently 
desires a similar escape: “Ah, I faint, I die!  Ah, sweet Semele, let me alone, and dissolve 
by weeping into water!” (3.4.79-81).  Eumenides’ wish, first to be “let…alone” and then 
to dissolve by weeping into a well, echoes his friend’s desire for solitude and “to melt by 
musing.”  Although David Bevington glosses Eumenides’ line as a wish for his own 
dissolution (“let me dissolve…”) the subject of the verb is unclear.  Eumenides could 
either desire his own dissolution into water, or he could wish that “sweet Semele” would 
dissolve as a result of his weeping.  This ambiguity reflects—and moreover, enacts—
Eumenides’ desire for dissolution; it also brings him dangerously close to Semele, 
gesturing toward an intimacy unlike any that Endymion can share with Cynthia, one that 
might render Eumenides indistinguishable from his beloved. 
Endymion melts away not only in sleep, but also in the scene of his waking.  He is 
released from the soporific spell that has bound him for decades by a kiss from Cynthia’s 
mouth, which she proclaims “hath been heretofore as untouched as my thoughts” 
(5.1.25).  He receives her kiss while in a state of heightened permeability—in sleep—and 
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the kiss ushers in a hypnagogic suggestibility that opens Endymion to her influence in 
ways that equally threaten and confirm his sense of self.  Although Cynthia’s lips cause 
Endymion “to stir” (5.1.30), he wakes with a feeble grasp on his own identity.  Distraught 
by his friend’s inability (or unwillingness) to speak upon waking, Eumenides asks, “hath 
this long sleep taken away thy memory?” (5.1.36), and again, “Hast thou forgotten 
thyself, Endymion?” (5.1.43).  Although Endymion is uncertain about his own name (his 
first words are, “Endymion? I call to mind such a name” (5.1.42)), he recognizes 
Cynthia’s name as soon as it is uttered.  Only after she names name him properly—“I am 
Cynthia, and thou Endymion” (5.2.52)—does he take possession of himself.  A slumber 
that turned Endymion into an “absolute microcosmos” now leads him to a disorienting 
and overwhelming dependence on his beloved to secure his identity, to will him back into 
existence with her mouth and voice. 
Sleep and hypnagogic waking are both destructive (egoless) and generative.  
Mavromatis writes that creativity is linked to hypnagogia (in his chapter on creativity, he 
has a section on “Openness”), citing examples of artists from Goethe to Keats who 
believed that sleep provided them with a creative spark either in dreams or upon 
waking.
54
  The scene of Endymion’s waking reveals sleep’s destructive and constructive 
properties.  His loss of self creates an opportunity for Cynthia to claim and reconstitute 
him with her voice.  Endymion already anticipated this creativity in an earlier address to 
Cynthia, when he identified himself as “that fish—thy fish, Cynthia, in the floor Araris—
which at thy waxing is as white as the driven snow and at thy waning as black as deepest 
darkness” (2.1.35-37).  This tiny fish, utterly responsive to the changes of the moon, 
evokes the profound intimacy and vast distance between Endymion and Cynthia.  It also 
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confirms Endymion’s egolessness and his receptivity to Cynthia across the ever-widening 
space that separates them.  In Act 5, Cynthia names him and in Act 2, the moon colors 
“thy fish” in her image.  Endymion’s openness to Cynthia correlates with the fish’s 
visibility to the moon, since the fish brightens only when the moon is out.  But the moon 
also is exposed to this fish, which not only has special access to her, but which absorbs 
her light. 
Bachelard discusses the “intimate immensity” of such a relationship.  Endymion’s 
connection to the moon answers to our own private relationship with the immensity of the 
world:  
One might say that immensity is a philosophical category of daydream.  
Daydream… contemplates grandeur.  And this contemplation produces an  
attitude that is so special, an inner state that is so unlike any other, that the 
daydream transports the dreamer outside the immediate world to a world  
that bears the mark of infinity.
55
  
 
Bachelard’s daydreamer must be at once removed from the object of contemplation and 
also vulnerable to the influence of the “immense” scene that surrounds her or him.  To be 
transported in this manner requires both distance and openness, the coincidence of which 
defines Endymion’s relation to Cynthia’s grandeur, especially in his sleep.  Accounts of 
hypnagogia extend the category of contemplation in ways that recall Bachelard’s 
description.  Mavromatis defines contemplation as “an attitude of placing a spatial and/or 
temporal distance between oneself and objects,” and notes that hypnagogia traverses this 
distance through the experiences of “fascination” and “absorption.”
56
  The hypnagogic 
subject’s active absorption in “imaginal activities” results in a kind of reciprocal 
absorption—what Mavromatis calls “a subjectification of the object,” wherein the 
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dreamer “internalizes” the object of fascination.
57
  Like the fish who absorbs the light of 
the moon, the hypnagogic subject absorbs the object of his fascinated attention, even 
across a vast distance that “bears the mark of infinity.” 
 Such absorption in “imaginal activities” risks displacement, but Endymion never 
loses his place in the world or in the play.  Although he comes close to death in his 
slumber and his dream, his prolonged sleep is what captures Cynthia’s attention, making 
him most visible to her after all.  She secures his fragile identity when she names him, 
and he comes as close as he will get to possessing her physically when she kisses him.  
When Endymion awakes to her kiss as an old man, he begs Cynthia to allow him to 
continue in his solitary “sweet contemplation” (5.4.173).  He promises her that he will 
“softly call it love” (171-72) only to himself; he will “name it honour” (173) to anyone 
who can hear.  He longs to continue dreaming of “impossibilities; with imagination of 
which I will spend my spirits” (170-71).  Bevington glosses “spend my spirits” as 
“expend my breath”; but surely Endymion once again suggests masturbation and 
orgasm.
58
  What once seemed like a condemnation—a life of imagining and daydreaming 
with no hope of “possess[ing] the moon”—now sounds like a consummation.  Endymion 
assures Cynthia that this contemplative existence will allow him to “live of all men the 
most content, taking more pleasure in my aged thoughts than ever I did in my youthful 
actions” (5.4.174-76).  As a reward to Endymion for his constant love, Cynthia restores 
his youth.  Just as the fish absorbs and reflects Cynthia’s fullness and color, now 
Endymion waxes young again. 
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Endymion’s situation at the end of the play looks remarkably like it did in the 
very beginning.  Although the other characters have paired off in typical comic fashion, 
Endymion is (again, still) alone with his thoughts.  Lyly acknowledges the generic 
problem of his play: his Prologue notes that “[w]e present neither comedy, nor tragedy, 
nor story, nor anything, but that whatsoever heareth may say this: ‘Why, here is a tale of 
the Man in the Moon’” (Prologue, 9-12).  But what sort of dramatic protagonist ends 
right where he begins?  Not simply a man who falls in love with the moon, Endymion has 
apparently become a microcosm of the moon herself.
59
  Even his solitude recalls the 
moon’s singular place in the sky; Cynthia’s perfection, according to Endymion, “alloweth 
no companion nor comparison” (2.1.29).  But the difference between Endymion’s 
solitude and his youth in Act 1 and in Act 5 is that these qualities have been reconstituted 
as gifts from and reflections of Cynthia.  Thus Endymion finds a way out of his earlier 
nightmare: like the lady in his dream, he chooses the mirror over the knife.  An open 
container receptive to the erotic scene that surrounds and overtakes him, Endymion has 
been renamed and remade by Cynthia, in her image.
60
  He now shares his solitude with 
her. 
Endymion achieves what Valentine cannot sustain during his banishment: an 
ability to feed upon shadows and find nourishment there.  Just as Silvia is both scenic and 
partial agent to Valentine, so Cynthia is Endymion’s consummate scene (the moon is, of 
course, everyone’s scene).  Now she inhabits him as well.  For Valentine, distance erases 
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even the memory of his beloved, but Endymion carries Cynthia’s “unmovable” (1.1.36)
61
 
presence with him always; she never leaves the mansion of Endymion’s breast.  He opens 
himself to Cynthia in the way Bachelard’s dreamer brings the infinite grandeur of the 
world into his consciousness through contemplation.  Bachelard’s description of intimate 
immensity is based on a version of permeability that is both catastrophic and 
constructive: “It would seem, then, that it is through their ‘immensity’ that these two 
kinds of space—the space of intimacy and world space—blend.  When human solitude 
deepens, then the two immensities touch and become identical.”
62
  The mutuality that 
Bachelard describes pertains to Endymion’s regenerated inner life, now no longer purely 
solipsistic or narcissistic.  If, as Paster argues, the relation between self and world is 
reciprocal, it need not be equal or balanced.
63
   If the asymmetry between Endymion and 
Cynthia separates them, it also allows them to participate together in an imaginative 
union. 
When Cynthia rejuvenates Endymion, she praises his constant affections, 
commanding him to “[p]ersevere, Endymion, in loving me, and I account more strength 
in a true heart than in a walled city” (5.4.179-80). Although this is a command, 
Endymion has been primed to receive it as a gift.  “Love me,” he hears her say.  Think 
about me.  Take me into your imagination.  I give myself to your imagination.  What she 
offers him is not possession as Endymion initially conceived of it; rather, by sanctioning 
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his fantasies, Cynthia gives him an imaginative claim on her.  He has her permission to 
make and remake her in his mind, just as she has remade him in fact.  Surely this kind of 
shared authorship is erotic; so to imagine Cynthia is for Endymion to be generative and 
possessive, too.  Endymion’s bond with Cynthia recasts Levinas’s claim that infinity 
cannot be synthesized or assimilated, perhaps because Endymion is first assimilated by 
her.
64
  It is, after all, Endymion’s very egolessness that finally secures his purchase on 
Cynthia.  His receptivity inspires Cynthia’s receptivity to his “true heart” in return. 
Cynthia’s comparison of Endymion’s heart to “a walled city” recalls boundedness 
and self-sufficiency, the “absolute microcosmos” of Epiton’s imagining.  Although I 
began this study by dismissing Epiton’s image as the stuff of dreams, I return to it in 
order to suggest that the fantasy of the absolute microcosmos may be attainable not as an 
escape from desire, but instead as an indulgence of desire.  Endymion’s desire for 
Cynthia seals him off from the rest of the world, but it also binds her to him, keeping her 
within the sturdy walls of his imagination where he can feed on her shadow.  In other 
words, Epiton’s microcosmos is, for Endymion, a form of desire.  One can only love 
perfection from a great distance; intimacy with infinity takes place in the imagination, 
where Endymion can claim Cynthia entirely, where she never loses her glow.  She is 
Other, but she is also his—container and contained, inside and outside, both.  Desire for 
something infinite and immense, for someone perfect and unattainable, can only ever take 
the form of imaginative pleasure.  Lyly’s Endymion insists that this pleasure is also 
profoundly erotic. 
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III. Binding the Void: Erotics of the Scene in Antony and Cleopatra 
 
 Cleopatra’s vision of Antony on his horse is unmistakably erotic: 
Where think'st thou he is now? Stands he, or sits he? 
Or does he walk? Or is he on his horse? 
O happy horse, to bear the weight of Antony! 
Do bravely, horse! For wot'st thou whom thou mov’st? 
The demi-Atlas of this earth, the arm 
And burgonet of men. He's speaking now, 
Or murmuring “Where's my serpent of old Nile?” 
For so he calls me. (1.5.18-26) 
 
As Cleopatra imagines Antony standing, sitting, walking, and then riding, her relation to 
him changes from contemplative and spectatorial to active engagement.  Not content 
simply to observe him mounted on his horse, Cleopatra would herself become this “happy 
horse,” would herself happily “bear the weight of Antony” (20).
65
  Of course, much later 
in the play Cleopatra must cope with the arduous physical reality of overcoming 
Antony’s weight when she and her women hoist his body into her monument.  But here 
in Act 1, she takes pleasure in her fantasy of Antony’s body bearing down on hers, and in 
the reciprocating prospect of supporting his weight from beneath him.  If her fantasy is 
palpably erotic—perhaps sodomitical, or submissive, or bestial, or idolatrous—it is also 
manifestly scenic.  Her longing to bear him up makes her Antony’s scene or (according to 
Burke’s etymological definition of this word) his “sub-stance.”
66
 
 Cleopatra would have it that she can both be Antony’s place and place him, that 
is, fix him in time and space (“Ah, ha! You’re caught!” [2.5.16], she later dreams).  If 
only in her mind, she efficiently accounts for his scene (or substance) and situation (or 
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circumstance).  Indeed, her deictic “now”— Antony is “speaking now”—vivifies her 
fantasy, bringing Antony into her presence, maybe ours, too.  Cleopatra’s playfulness 
competes with her longing; it becomes clear that erotic self-indulgence is in contention 
with a compulsion to locate her lover.  Her “Where think’st thou he is now?” is just one 
among many iterations of what we might call interrogative place deixis.  At her entrance 
in 1.2, she asks, “Saw you my lord?” and “Was he not here?” (1.2.79).  “Where is he?” 
(1.3.1) are her first words in the following scene, then “See where he is” (1.3.2).  Even in 
her dream, Cleopatra imputes to Antony an answering version of her recurring 
compulsion: “Where’s my serpent of old Nile?” (1.5.25; emphasis mine).  So compelling 
is the question of “where” for Cleopatra that she voices it in her fantasy of her lover’s 
private murmurs. 
Of all the murmurings that she could dream into the mouth of her “demi-Atlas” 
(22), Cleopatra’s “where” confirms our readiness to charge love with the daunting task of 
anchoring or placing us in the world.  Often conceptualized through spatial schemas, love 
can create for us a sense of place, but it can also produce a profound anxiety about 
displacement.  We observed this with Valentine, and Cleopatra, too, appears to suffer 
from what Edward Casey calls “place-panic.”
67
  At the very start of the play, Cleopatra is 
already concerned about boundaries.  Antony must specify precisely “how much” 
(1.1.14) and then “how far” (1.1.16) he loves her.  She, in turn, will “set a bourn how far 
to be beloved” (1.1.16).  John Gillies identifies Cleopatra’s desire for a bourn as part of 
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the classical trope of orbic limits, and he comments that “this image of limits is also an 
image of desire.”
68
  To impose limits is to define and therefore enable desire. 
 As we have seen elsewhere in both Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays, erotic desire 
threatens the possibility of contained place more often than it confirms it.  As Janet 
Adelman observes, “the dissolution of personal boundaries is both our greatest fear and 
our highest desire.”
69
  The language of desire in the play stubbornly invokes the container 
schema only immediately to reveal that its limits are inadequate.  Like Endymion’s wish 
for veins to contain but ultimately to purge his thoughts, the boundaries of Antony and 
Cleopatra’s affair seem to exist only to be breached.  Permeability is cued at every turn, 
from the swelling of the Nile (2.7.20) to Antony’s own body, unable “to hold this visible 
shape” (4.14.14).  Even the play’s opening image of Antony’s “dotage… o’erflow[ing] 
the measure” (1.1.1-2) depends upon the container schema and violates its limits.  Given 
Shakespeare’s insistent dramatization of Antony and Cleopatra’s affair as boundary-
breaking, it is reasonable to ask, to where exactly does Antony’s dotage overflow?  What 
exists outside place, beyond “measure”?  Would the “new heaven, new earth” (1.1.17) of 
Antony’s imagining more effectively contain desire?  Or is it uncontainable?  Perhaps it 
is an undifferentiated and unbounded void into which Antony’s “captain’s heart…hath 
burst” (1.1.6,7), and in which Cleopatra will find herself if she fails to heed Charmian’s 
caution to “keep yourself within yourself” (2.5.75).  Casey writes that “the prospect of a 
strict void, of an utter no-place, is felt to be intolerable.  So intolerable, so undermining of 
personal or collective identity is this prospect, that practices of place-fixing and place-
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filling are set in motion right away.”
70
  It is this daunting prospect of empty space that 
prompts Cleopatra’s frequent inquiries into Antony’s whereabouts.  If he is someplace, 
any place, then the “great gap” (1.5.5) of his absence can be contained. 
In this section, I explore the erotics of “measure[d]” Aristotelian place and of 
limitless space in Antony and Cleopatra.  I build on Edward Casey’s philosophical 
history of place and space to consider the erotic implications of these scenes (or anti-
scenes) for characters as well as for audiences.  The snug fit and “bourn” of bounded 
place in Antony and Cleopatra gets its erotic charge from the domain of sexual bondage, 
drawing as it does from the formal and temporal features of masochism.  When Antony 
and Cleopatra emplace one another or become each other’s place, they typically enfetter 
and embrace one another.  The crowds of people who witness their affair, both within the 
fiction of the play and in the theater audience, also take part in this place-making 
exercise, which culminates inside Cleopatra’s monument where death “shackles accidents 
and bolts up change” (5.2.6; emphasis mine).  This language of sexual bondage responds 
to the threat of the infinite and empty space that looms just beyond the bounded places in 
the play.  In the second half of this section, I consider the precise nature of this threat and 
discuss the ways in which Antony and Cleopatra eroticize the void, imposing the sturdy 
boundaries of place onto vacant space.  Binding the void allows the lovers to present this 
vacancy to one another, enabling pleasurable experiences of self-loss and self-forgetting.  
It is, finally, at Cleopatra’s monument in Act 5 that the erotic dynamics of place and 
endless space converge, “find[ing] out” (1.1.17) for the lovers a “new heaven, new earth” 
within its walls. 
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It is perhaps easiest to conceptualize place (as opposed to space) as erotic.  It is 
already erotic in Aristotle’s description of its “snug fit,” but also in Bachelard’s intimate 
nooks and corners, and in Irigaray’s “as for woman, she is place.”  Place, which has 
always been a rich and generative domain, is 
like a boundary in the special signification that Heidegger detects in the  
ancient Greek conception of horismos, ‘horizon,’ itself derived from  
horos (boundary): “that from which something begins its presencing.”   
For a place is indeed an active source of presencing: within its close  
embrace, things get located and begin to happen.
71
 
 
But what we find in Antony and Cleopatra is that “close embrace” can take the form of 
the “Egyptian fetters” that Antony “must break / Or lose myself in the dotage” (1.2.115-
16).  On the one hand, there is disability; on the other, the pleasure that Antony 
anticipates when he commands Cleopatra to “Chain my armed neck” (4.8.14) after he 
triumphs in battle.  Or the pleasure of embrace and the pain of captivity entwine, like “a 
lover’s pinch, / Which hurts, and is desired” (5.2.295-96; emphasis mine).  For the 
infinitely various Cleopatra, there is no contradiction here.  The erotic appeal of 
circumscribed place is augmented even as (or because) it closes in on her.  The strength 
of its hold only confirms our place in the world, staving off what Edward Casey refers to 
as “the existential predicament of place-bereft individuals… depression or terror even at 
the idea, and still more in the experience, of an empty place.”
72
  
 The erotics of place are tellingly captured in Enobarbus’s account of Cleopatra on 
her barge on the Cydnus.  The pleasures of this speech are primarily scenic; that is, we 
are seduced more by the desiring scene than by the desired agent.  Cleopatra is enclosed 
in her pavilion (2.2.209) and her “gentlewomen” (2.2.216) adorn her with their “bends” 
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(2.2.218).  The scene overpictures Cleopatra even as she overpictures Venus—her barge 
“burned” (2.2.202); gold is “beaten” (2.2.202); oars “stroke” (2.2.205) and “beat” 
(2.2.206) the water; and perfume “hits the sense” (2.2.222).  Such aggressive verbs reveal 
the masochistic charge of Cleopatra’s eroticism, which in turn provokes the violent scene 
that Enobarbus describes.  Yet Cleopatra herself is apparently impervious or oblivious to 
the fierce bondage of her surroundings.  She “set[s] a bourn” (1.1.16) by functioning as a 
limit rather than a boundary.  According to Casey, whereas boundaries are imposed from 
outside, and so belong to the container, limits are internal properties of the contained 
agent.  In a commentary on Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, Proclus describes limits in 
terms of the agent: “the limits surrender themselves to the things they limit; they establish 
themselves in them, becoming, as it were, parts of them and being filled with their 
inferior characters.”
73
  It is counter-intuitive but eminently logical that infinitely various 
Cleopatra should be restricted or finite, even a source or seeker of limits.  Her bondage is 
part of a collaborative undertaking; beyond the limit that Cleopatra establishes within 
herself exists the boundary that corrals her from outside, in both Enobarbus’s captivating 
words and our collective imagination.
74
 
Amidst the tumult of beating oars, the surge of lustful water, and the flutter of 
“divers-colored fans” (2.2.213), Cleopatra is exceptionally still.  Like an inanimate 
portrait of Venus, she is a fixed point around which “pretty dimpled boys” (2.2.212) and 
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“gentlewomen” (2.2.216) constellate.
75
  Even when we hear that she “O’erpictur[es] that 
Venus where we see / The fancy outwork nature” (2.2.210-11)—as if Cleopatra’s “own 
person” (2.2.207) breaks through the barge’s aesthetic and Enobarbus’s narrative frame—
we never quite see that “person” as opposed to its ornate, enclosing scene.  Enobarbus 
imbues her scene (or is it his?) with erotic longing, with masochistic pleasure (“the 
oars…made / The water which they beat to follow faster, / As amorous of their strokes” 
[2.2.204-7]) and with phallic arousal (“the silken tackle / Swell with the touches of those 
flower-soft hands” [2.2.219-20]).  What can account for the pleasure that we (along with 
Enobarbus and his onstage audience) take in this imaginative exercise of placing 
Cleopatra if not the pleasures of sexual bondage?  In our collective desire for her—our 
longing to know her, to “word” (5.2.192) her, to “encloud” her in our “thick breaths” 
(5.2.212-13), to pin her down and so fix her in space and time—we too occupy this 
scenic frame, binding Cleopatra in our fantastic embrace.  To bind one’s lover is to 
prolong desire on the part of the binder and the bound, drawing out the moments before 
sexual gratification.
76
  The account of Cleopatra on the Cydnus has a similar effect: it 
removes us from the present scene in Rome and brings us into a state of arrest, engaging 
but stymieing our desire, inciting but not quite appeasing hunger.  This is true not only 
for the audience but also for Antony and for the crowd that gazes on Cleopatra within the 
narrative frame.  Indeed everyone who watches her approach is bound up in the same 
Burkean, lyrical state of prolonged desire.  A collective state of arrest prevails within the 
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theater.  No one is immune.  So it is with sexual bondage, which begins with a clearly 
delineated captor and captive but leads to both participants being absorbed in the 
experience of suspended desire and deferred gratification.  
The slow and deliberate erotic pace of this scene corresponds to the aesthetic and 
temporal rhythms of masochism.  Cleopatra’s lyrical approach on the Cydnus forces her 
audience(s) into the attitudes of waiting and suspense which Gilles Deleuze identifies as 
“essential characteristics of masochistic experience.”
77
  According to Deleuze, “This is 
partly because the masochistic rites of torture and suffering imply actual physical 
suspension (the hero is hung up, crucified or suspended), but also because the woman 
torturer freezes into postures that identify her with a statue, a painting or a photograph.”
78
  
Enobarbus’s description casts Cleopatra in the role of both the captive and the captor: she 
is enfettered by the “silken tackle” (2.2.219) of Enobarbus’s scenic frame, but she is also 
frozen in the posture of Venus, the woman torturer of Deleuze’s description.
79
  It is 
Cleopatra’s “infinite variety” (2.2.246) that seems to allow her to occupy both roles 
within the masochistic relationship throughout the play. From Act 1, when she repeatedly 
inquires into Antony’s whereabouts, through Acts 4 and 5, when she awaits Antony’s 
(and then death’s) arrival in her monument, we are accustomed to seeing Cleopatra in the 
masochist’s posture of waiting.  Waiting is arguably Cleopatra’s main action in the play.  
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Her imaginative engagement with Antony—her ability to conjure him and the pleasure 
she takes from placing him with her mind—depends upon his absence, and upon her 
experience of suspended time.
80
  What is so unique about the barge scene, then, is that 
now she makes Antony wait.  She even makes the air around Antony wait for her, unable 
as it is to leave him and look on her without making “a gap in nature” (2.2.228).  Her 
erotic power threatens to undo nature, and yet here it emerges from her captivity.  Being 
placed so firmly and securely in Enobarbus’s account releases an answering mobility for 
Cleopatra; bondage affords her erotic freedom, a power over time and space that she can 
command from within the scenic frame. 
Although Enobarbus can describe Cleopatra’s scene with painstaking detail, “her 
own person” (2.2.207) is ineffable; it “beggared all description” (2.2.208).  As Jonathan 
Gil Harris has argued, the Egyptian queen is glaringly absent from Enobarbus’s 
account.
81
  She is framed by his words, but the picture inside is blank: “her ‘cloth of gold’ 
thus encloses what is effectively ‘a gap in nature.’  The speech serves as a rhetorical 
counterpart of a rococo mirror, its extraordinarily ornate and copious frame enclosing a 
subtly camouflaged glass in which Enobarbus’s Roman listeners glimpse whatever they 
want to see.”
82
  While Harris contends that Cleopatra’s absence functions as a mirror for 
Roman desire, I believe that her corporeal absence—which, like her statuesque stillness, 
is itself a source of masochistic power—signifies nothing more nor less than empty 
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space, a “gap”—and not a mirror—“in nature” (2.2.228).  Enobarbus encourages us to 
entertain this possibility, to take Cleopatra out of the picture but not to replace her, not 
even with an object of our own imagining (as Harris suggests).  What do we imagine, for 
example, when we hear these words: 
The city cast 
Her people out upon her; and Antony, 
Enthroned i’ th’ marketplace, did sit alone, 
Whistling to the air; which, but for vacancy, 
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too, 
And made a gap in nature. 
(2.2.223-28)   
 
Enobarbus’s description of the city violently displacing her people evokes a deeper and 
more profound void than just an empty place.  To confer agency upon the city is to 
emphasize the scene’s power over the agent.  Drained of air, the marketplace becomes a 
vacuum—an active and aggressive negative space that reinforces the threat of the void 
which dominates a great deal of the play, especially the early scenes.  
For all the bounty, surfeit, fecundity, and overflow that we hear about in Act 1, 
Antony and Cleopatra draw frequently upon the domain of vacancy in those early scenes.  
The cues are multiple: “absence” (1.2.171), “oblivion” (1.3.90), “idleness” (1.3.93-95), 
“vacancy” (1.4.26), and “gap” (1.5.5).  Such gaps—in nature and time—pose a particular 
threat within the context of early modern scientific and religious thought.  Speculations 
by early modern theologians and scientists gave rise to what Edward Casey has called 
“the ascent of infinite space” over localized place in medieval and Renaissance 
philosophy.
83
  The rise of spatiality resulted in part from a list commissioned in 1277 by 
Pope John XXI of 219 condemnations of doctrines that limited the power of God, 
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including God’s ability to move the world to a different location.  Edward Grant 
describes the cosmological ramifications of the 219 condemnations in his study of the 
conceptual history of voids and vacuums: 
After 1277, scholastics at Paris were compelled to concede that God could create
 as many worlds as He pleased and to allow that He could move our entire
 spherical universe rectilinearly even though a vacuum remained in the place it
 vacated… If God did make other worlds, it was assumed that void space would
 intervene between them; and if God moved the world rectilinearly, it was further
 assumed not only that a void space would be left behind but also that the world
 itself moved into and out of other empty spaces that lay beyond.
84
 
 
To defend God’s power, then, was to acknowledge at least the potential—if not the real 
presence—of infinite and endless space. 
 Not surprisingly, the concept of a void or vacuum has proved difficult to accept or 
even to conceive.  The existence of a sheer void—the existence, that is, of empty space 
with no fixed referent at all, no boundaries to mark anything—comes at a high 
ontological and epistemological cost, and thus has been hotly contested from antiquity to 
the present day.  Edward Grant summarizes the debate over the void’s existence, its 
physical features, and its philosophical, religious, and scientific implications: 
The void was from the outset, and almost inevitably, subjected to a double
 entendre.  Was it an unintelligible, total privation incapable of existence—a true
 ‘nothing’?  Or was it a nothing conceived of as a something, a something with
 definite properties that could range from a pure dimensionless emptiness to a
 three-dimensional magnitude, and even be conceived of as God’s infinite and
 omnipresent immensity?
85
 
 
According to Grant, all of these conceptualizations have existed at one time or another, in 
fact, many at the same time.  While Aristotle’s definition of the void as “place bereft of 
body” depends upon the void’s container-like properties (i.e., his void shares some basic 
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features of place), the Stoics imagined a void without bounds, defining the universe as “a 
finite material world surrounded by an infinite extended void space.”
86
  The void was 
debated on the basis of its dimensionality (can it be measured?), its conceivability (can it 
be imagined?), and even its location in the cosmos (are vacuums positioned in between 
bodies within the bounded universe, or are they extracosmic, stretching beyond the 
known horizon?).  Historically, the range of responses to these questions has been as 
broad as the array of questions themselves, and the stakes of the different claims have 
been high. 
We have already seen Antony and Cleopatra invoke multiple definitions of void 
space throughout the play.  They too are exploring dimensions and implications of the 
void that preoccupied the philosophers and scientists who preceded them.  As we might 
expect, the prospect of an utterly boundless and dimensionless void is so daunting for 
Shakespeare’s characters that it is unimaginable in its purest form. Valentine comes close 
when he envisions the walls of the empty mansion in his breast crumbling down “and 
leav[ing] no memory of what it was” (5.4.10).  Without the memory of a boundary, he 
begins to approximate what a pure void might be like—but even here, Valentine places 
this bleak spatiality within his breast.  More often than not, then, vacuity is 
conceptualized via the domain of displacement, specifically the threat of being cast out of 
a place whose boundary (or memory, at least) persists.   
In Antony and Cleopatra, displacement is often couched in hypothetical language, 
marking the void specifically as a threat or a potential. Cleopatra invokes the threat when 
Antony leaves her in Act 1 and she pledges to write him every day, “Or I’ll unpeople 
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Egypt” (1.5.78).  Her image of an “unpeople[d] Egypt” anticipates Enobarbus’s account 
of Cleopatra’s strange ability to provoke a city to cast out its entire people.  The empty 
space, the remainder, is perhaps best described by Francesco Patrizi of Cherso: “When 
[space] is filled with a body, it is locus; without a body, it is a vacuum.”
87
  To “unpeople 
Egypt” is to evacuate its bodies; Cleopatra’s verb reminds us of the people who once 
lived there even as it emphasizes the negative space that remains.  Her verb is also 
noteworthy for its disproportionality, for such wholesale depopulation constitutes a 
displacement that is glaringly incommensurate with the act of writing Antony a letter 
every day.  This imbalance only heightens the void’s status as a threat; clearly Cleopatra 
has no intention of “unpeopl[ing]” her country, so we are only meant to consider the void 
in hypothetical terms, as a kind of present absence.  She raises the same threat in Act 3, 
when Antony accuses her of being “[c]oldhearted toward me” (3.13.158).  If her 
assurance in Act 1 is disproportionate, her response in Act 3 is outrageously so: 
Ah, dear, if I be so, 
From my cold heart let heaven engender hail, 
And poison it in the source; and the first stone 
Drop in my neck: as it determines, so 
Dissolve my life! The next Caesarion smite! 
Till by degrees the memory of my womb, 
Together with my brave Egyptians all, 
By the discandying of this pelleted storm, 
Lie graveless, till the flies and gnats of Nile 
Have buried them for prey! 
 (3.13.158-67) 
 
Again Cleopatra paints a picture of utter desolation, of “graveless” Egyptian sons and 
daughters subject to a power so great that it banishes bodies from their places with 
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tempestuous violence.  Again, her wildly disproportionate response to Antony suggests 
that this bleak vacancy exists as an idea rather than as a reality.  Nonetheless, by 
conjuring it for Antony (and for herself, and for us), Cleopatra insists on its potentiality 
just beyond her “bourn.”  The intensity, detail, and sheer length of her description—ten 
lines in response to Antony’s three-word question—demonstrate the self-indulgence of 
such imaginings.  Like looking out at a threatening storm from the safety of an enclosed 
shelter, the terror of the void reinforces the necessity and the pleasures of being confined 
within the “snug fit” of the place she creates with Antony. 
 Cleopatra speaks of the void in hypothetical, distanced language; but near the end 
of the play, Antony experiences this threat viscerally when his identity is at stake.  He 
conceptualizes his loss of identity as a self-inflicted banishment from the “frail case” 
(4.14.41) of his body or self—a loss, that is, of place.  As Donald Freeman has observed, 
the container schema plays a vital role in Antony’s conceptualizations of this loss.
88
  
From the depths of his sorrow and shame, Antony looks up at the changing shapes of the 
clouds: “That which is now a horse, even with a thought / The rack dislimns and makes it 
indistinct / As water is in water” (4.14.11).
89
  The grammar of the phrase “water…in 
water” gives the illusion of containment in a place, but the image itself—water in 
water—overtakes all the specificity of agent and place, leaving formless space in its 
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wake.
90
  Although Antony experiences his loss of self as banishment from place, he looks 
out into the cosmos for analogs for this emptiness.  Searching beyond the clouds, he 
laments that “my good stars that were my former guides / Have empty left their orbs and 
shot their fires / Into th’ abysm of hell” (3.13.145-47).  Antony’s scene, no longer an 
Aristotelian, circumambient enclosure (“Chain my armed neck”), has become abyssal 
space; the barrenness of “th’ abysm of hell” beneath him rivals the vacant orbs above.  
His empty orbs speak directly to the early modern interest in cosmic space, in vacuums 
and in gaps in nature.
91
 
Antony’s “good stars” orient us along a vertical axis, with the “empty” heavens 
above and “the abysm of hell” below.  According to Francesco Patrizi, the dimension of 
depth distinguishes the void from previous conceptualizations of space.  He dwells on the 
three-dimensionality of void space, adding depth where Aristotle had accounted for only 
breadth and length.  As Patrizi writes, “the vacuum itself is nothing else than three 
dimensional Space.”
92
  The addition of depth (profundum) invests the concept of vacuity 
with an evaluative or hierarchal quality—things have higher value as they move up in 
vertical space and become “baser” (5.2.290) as they move downward.
93
  Antony’s 
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experience of the void’s verticality, then, highlights the bleakness and sense of gloom of 
empty space.  Depth and verticality shape much of the catastrophic language in Antony 
and Cleopatra.  Cleopatra imagines the threat of the void as a downward movement 
when she envisions “half my Egypt…submerged” (2.5.94) and when she later yearns to 
“[s]ink Rome” (3.7.15).  When she dares to envision her reality of the void—death 
itself—she does so along the same vertical axis.  At Antony’s death, she laments that 
“[t]he crown of the earth doth melt” (4.15.64), whereas Cleopatra rises up, becoming 
“fire and air; my other elements / I give to baser life” (5.2.289-90).  Death is often 
conceptualized in terms of this vertical spatial domain because of the associations of 
heaven and hell with height and depth, respectively; bodies are lowered down into the 
ground, and spirits ascend.  Unlike Cleopatra, Antony retreats to the place-setting 
confinement of bondage when he acknowledges that “force entangles / Itself with 
strength” (4.14.48-49), then imagines his death as a “seal” (4.14.49) rather than as a 
dissolution.  This is to seal a document, but it is almost as if Antony imagines himself 
covered in wax.  Unlike Cleopatra, who commands the asp to “untie” “this knot 
intrinsicate / Of life” (5.2.304-5), Antony longs to be blanketed by death, envisioning it 
as “a lover’s bed” that he can “run into” (4.14.100-101). 
Antony’s eroticized image of being “a bridegroom” enveloped “in my death” 
(4.14.100; emphasis mine) is unsurprising in light of the pleasures he takes from bondage 
in life, especially life with Cleopatra.  The place that Cleopatra offers him as his “sub-
stance” does not neutralize the threat of the void, but instead contains it and thus permits 
them both to explore its erotic appeal.  Binding the void imposes limits on its length and 
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breadth but preserves its depth, allowing Antony to lose himself within the place 
Cleopatra makes for him.
94
  In Antony and Cleopatra, the experience of self-loss is 
imagined in two ways.  The first is a kind of displacement, where people are “cast… out” 
(2.2.223-24) of cities and even out of their bodies; these agents without a scene leave 
only an empty frame (“frail case” [4.14.41]) or “gap” (1.5.5) in their wake.  Because 
displacement forces the lovers to contend with the daunting prospect of empty and 
unbounded space, this experience is rarely imagined as a source for eros.  The second 
type of loss in the play is distinctly erotic, conceptualized as a bounded void.  Bounded 
loss still draws from the features of space—depth, vacuity, verticality—but it allows the 
agent to remain in her scene.  Rather than being cast out, Antony and Cleopatra are lost 
within the scenes they make for one another—overwhelmed, even, by their scenes.  This 
type of loss depends upon the domain of verticality (depth is what enables experiences of 
“loss within” or being overwhelmed), but unlike displacement, bounded loss plumbs the 
erotic potential of depth.  We have already noted Cleopatra’s fantasy of being Antony’s 
“sub-stance”; there is also her fantasy of drawing him up on her fishing line.   
Even in their first meeting, Cleopatra is imagined as a deep but bounded place in 
which Antony can reside: “When she first met Mark Antony, she pursed up his heart” 
(2.2.196-97).  Somehow Cleopatra is able to capture and contain Antony’s famously 
swollen heart, itself so big that it “hath burst / The buckles on his breast” (1.1.6-8).  If to 
“purse up” his heart is to envelop it, then here, at least, Cleopatra’s erotic power eclipses 
Antony in an enclosed place wherein his heart can disappear.  A still more telling account 
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of her erotic power over Antony’s heart emerges from his own fantasy, in Act 4, just after 
he has defeated Caesar in battle: 
  O thou day o’ th’ world, 
Chain mine armed neck; leap thou, attire and all, 
Through proof of harness to my heart, and there 
Ride on the pants triumphing! 
    (4.8.13-16) 
 
Where Antony once lamented Cleopatra’s “strong Egyptian fetters” (1.2.115), he now 
entreats her to “chain my armed neck” (4.8.15) in celebration.  His identity as a soldier 
and a Roman newly reaffirmed, Antony takes pleasure in placing himself within 
Cleopatra’s chain-like embrace, casting her as his erotic scene: “thou day o’ th’ world” 
(4.8.13).  The armor around his neck is apparently not binding enough for Antony; his 
demand that she “chain” his already “armed neck” conjures another (apparently 
pleasurable) heavy restraint.  Such an image recalls Antony’s instructions to his soldiers 
from a few lines earlier, to “clip [hug] your wives” (4.8.8).  With their roles as victors 
secure for the time being, Antony’s place-affirming talk of “clip[ping]” and “chain[ing]” 
seems apt.
95
   
 This time around, Antony—or his heart, at least—is the horse and Cleopatra is the 
imagined encompassing rider.  But what exactly does it mean to “leap thou, attire and all, 
/ Through proof of harness to my heart, and there / Ride on the pants triumphing” 
(4.8.14-16)?  How does one “ride on the pants,” and why “attire and all”?  Unlike 
Cleopatra’s whimsical dream of being his horse, Antony describes a startling fantasy of a 
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completely clothed Cleopatra riding his naked panting heart as though it were a steed.  At 
the outset, they are both attired (he in harness, she in what?), but in due course, he 
becomes vulnerable, exposed, and stripped down to his beating heart, while she, 
appareled, mounts what would have to be a grossly oversized heart if it is to bear her 
weight.
96
  This fantasy draws from the placiality of Cleopatra’s happy horse but it 
introduces a degree of vulnerability nowhere present in her daydream.  In what is 
arguably his unique moment of triumph in the play, Antony submits his heart to 
Cleopatra’s enveloping thighs. 
 Why would Antony choose this particular moment—the afterglow of an identity-
affirming, place-fixing, heroic battle—to indulge in a fantasy of submission and 
envelopment, his heart receding into Cleopatra’s embrace?  Has this latest conquest 
offered him enough security and stability to stave off place-panic?  Is this what provokes 
his fantasy of displacement without any fear of the destructive reality behind the dream?  
Or is there something else about having one’s outward identity confirmed that inspires a 
longing for erotic dissolution?  In his 1591 tract titled De vinculis in genere (On Bonding 
in General), Giordano Bruno contends that the desire to remain intact comes from the 
same source as the desire “to be completely transported into the loved one.”
97
  According 
to Bruno, who writes about intimacy in terms of bonds and bondage, the principal effect 
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of Cupid’s bond is a wish to be placed—for lovers to “remain firm…in themselves” 
(emphasis mine)—and to be displaced—“unrestrained, opened up and thrown wide 
open”—at the same time: “Thus it happens that the bond by which things wish to be 
where they are and not to lose what they have also causes them to wish to be everywhere 
and to have what they do not possess.”
98
  For Bruno, the desires to be placed and to be 
lost are compatible rather than competing.  Moreover, he identifies permeability as a 
primary feature of the erotic bond, which is strongest when part of the object “is in the 
bonding agent, or when the bonding agent controls it by one of its parts.”
99
  In Antony’s 
fantasy, his heart is once again “pursed up,” but here it comes into contact with the most 
intimate parts of Cleopatra’s body.  His heart is not so much displaced as it is replaced 
between her spread legs.  Each lover creates an erotic scene in which the other can live: 
as the steed beneath Cleopatra, Antony’s heart is the “sub-stance” which bears her up, 
and Cleopatra’s body provides a scene for him as well, offering him the feminine body-
as-place that Irigaray describes.
100
  Cleopatra’s body enables a mitigated type of erotic 
loss for Antony—his heart is exposed (for neither the first nor the last time in the play), 
but rather than being displaced from his body with no destination, it is relocated between 
her legs.  Antony is only lost insofar as he is given over to her pleasure.
101
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Early in the play, we learn that Cleopatra’s body-as-place has inspired pleasurable 
loss in previous lovers.  When she recounts her affair with Gnaeus Pompey, Cleopatra 
portrays herself as a container in which he would lose himself: 
     …great Pompey 
 Would stand and make his eyes grow in my brow, 
 There would he anchor his aspect, and die 
 With looking on his life.  
(1.5.31-34) 
 
Cleopatra describes a kind of self-loss that is made possible within a bounded but deep 
place.  Pompey can indulge in the obliterating erotic pleasures of what Jonathan Gil 
Harris calls “narcissistic self-contemplation” only after she has given him a locus wherein 
he can “anchor his aspect.”
102
  She draws from the container schema when she recalls 
Pompey’s eyes growing “in my brow.”  The loss that Cleopatra inspires is imagined as a 
disappearance into a bounded but deep body that is capacious enough to “purse up” her 
Roman lovers’ ever-expanding bodily organs, from Antony’s “burst[ing]” heart to 
Pompey’s “grow[ing]” eyes.  Hers is the same body that can bear up and even give birth 
to idleness itself: “Tis sweating labor / To bear such idleness” (1.3.93-94, emphasis 
mine).  Pregnant with idleness, her body contains the languor and hollowness it 
engenders. 
Less corporeal but no less coveted is the place Antony provides as a scene for 
Cleopatra’s self-loss.  The motives for Cleopatra’s urge to forget herself differ from 
Antony’s: where he is only able to access bounded loss once he has confirmed his martial 
identity, Cleopatra longs for this experience precisely when she perceives that her place 
in Antony’s world is threatened.  When Antony leaves her, or when her life is at stake—
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that is, when Cleopatra is faced with the prospect of empty space—she seeks out the 
anesthetic pleasures of a bounded place into which she can disappear: 
  Courteous lord, one word. 
Sir, you and I must part, but that’s not it; 
Sir, you and I have loved, but there’s not it: 
That you know well.  Something it is I would— 
O, my oblivion is a very Antony, 
And I am all forgotten.  
(1.3.86-91) 
 
Although it sounds like she is saying that she has forgotten what she was about to say, it 
is apparently herself that she cannot remember, or be mindful of.  “I am all forgotten,” 
she announces, and yet she names her oblivion “a very Antony.”  Such particularity 
reflects her own need to impose limits on the void of oblivion.  To remake her oblivion in 
the shape of Antony—to make, as it were, a place out of empty space—is to forget 
herself in her lover rather than in the endlessness of oblivion.
103
  It is not difficult to see 
the appeal of binding the void, of shaping it as one’s home or one’s lover.  The erotic 
pleasures of bondage and discipline—the pleasures of setting and reinforcing limits—
paradoxically liberate Cleopatra, enabling her experience of self-loss.  In his research on 
masochistic practices such as bondage and pain, Roy Baumeister suggests that 
“masochism may be a means of escaping from high-level awareness of self as a 
symbolically mediated, temporally extended identity.”
104
  Bondage slows time and 
restricts even the vastness of “oblivion” within its confines.  In effect, binding the void is 
what allows Cleopatra to inhabit it.  From within its “bourn,” she can forget herself by 
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“sleep[ing] out this great gap of time / My Antony is away” (1.5.5-6).  To call Antony’s 
absence a “gap” is to settle it within boundaries, to postulate a starting and an ending 
point. 
Of course, the play’s most extraordinary contained setting is the monument, its 
final scene of bounded loss for both Antony and Cleopatra.  The monument’s sturdy 
walls (Plutarch describes “gates that were very thick and strong, and surely barred”),
105
 
along with its height and depth, figure this scene as the ultimate circumscribed void, a 
scene of both forgetting and remembering, a place for death and a space for poetic birth.  
Although theater historians debate the location and appearance of the monument (did 
Cleopatra appear in the gallery above the platform stage, or was a free-stranding structure 
brought onto the stage?), it seems clear that its height and boundedness were among its 
prominent features.
106
  One particularly rich dramaturgical source for this monument is 
the locus of the early modern stage (also known as the domus or sedes), which Robert 
Weimann describes as an enclosed, illusionistic playing space separated from the 
audience, often by a raised scaffold.
 107
  Unlike the generalized, undifferentiated platea 
which is level with the audience, the upstage locus is a delimited and identifiable place 
such as a home or palace.  In Antony and Cleopatra, the monument is locus-like in its 
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specificity, its distinctiveness, and of course, its placiality.  Raised up high, the seat of a 
queen (sedes) and wife (domus), the monument provides the bourn Cleopatra desires and 
it offers Antony a “visible shape” (4.14.14) at last.  For Cleopatra, the monument is more 
hospitable than death “on Nilus’ mud,” where she would lie “stark nak’d” while “water 
flies / Blow me into abhorring!” (5.2.58-60).
108
  Moreover, the monument’s secure walls 
will save her from loathsome “sweet dependency” (5.2.26) on Caesar.
109
  For Antony, the 
monument provides a refuge from the empty “abysm of hell” (3.13.147) that Stanley 
Cavell has described as the retreat of the world.
110
  When Cleopatra hoists Antony up to 
her, she provides him with a place in which to die, in which to bind the void. 
 Over the course of the play’s final scenes, the monument gains enormous psychic 
and representational force.  Marriage bed and deathbed, throne (“put on my crown” 
[5.2.280]) and grave, fortress (“I am safe” [4.15.27]) and prison, the monument has 
multiple spatial, placial, and erotic meanings.  It is where Cleopatra experiences 
“immortal longings” (5.2.281) and her ever-foolish wishes (4.15.38); it is built to 
withstand the relentless pressure of Roman temporality; and ultimately, it must become 
the “new heaven, new earth” (1.1.17) of which the lovers dream, and for which they die.  
But before Cleopatra reconceives of the monument as an intimate erotic place in which to 
“quicken” (4.15.40) her “husband” (5.2.287), she must first cope with its stubborn 
materiality, and with the way it initially keeps eros out rather than encloses it within.   
Whatever was the size of the monument, Cleopatra’s language suggests that she 
takes solace from the fact that it binds and restricts her.  Caesar may implore her to 
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out “dependency” calls to mind the image of the “absolute microcosmos” from Endymion. 
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 Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 28. 
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“make not your thoughts your prisons” (5.2.186), but Cleopatra sees herself as a 
voluntary captive.  Her sense of confinement is most evident when twice in two lines she 
says she “dare[s] not” (4.15.22 and 23) leave the monument’s compass to kiss Antony.  
But to take refuge in the monument’s cold embrace is also, masochistically, to defer eros.  
For Antony’s part, eros is not so much deferred as it is denied when he first approaches 
Cleopatra’s monument.  If, as I have been suggesting, placiality is the primary source for 
eros in Antony and Cleopatra, and if the monument represents the play’s most contained 
and defined place, then Antony’s struggle to enter its bounds reflects his inability to 
access the erotics of bounded loss.  Although there is little doubt that Antony has 
experienced a sense of loss when we see him in 4.15, this loss is felt as a displacement 
rather than a loss within a place, which can evoke pleasurable self-forgetting.  His heart, 
once imagined as an erotic organ that Cleopatra could ride, now occasions his 
displacement.  He imagines himself dying, not from a broken heart, but when his strong 
and intact heart is displaced from the container of his body: “O, cleave, my sides! / Heart, 
once be stronger than thy continent, / Crack thy frail case” (4.14.39-41).  In 4.15, it is not 
his heart that is responsible for his displacement so much as it is his weight and the 
daunting height of the monument up to which he is heaved.  The dimension of depth 
enables pleasurable self-loss, but initially, the monument’s verticality is what keeps 
Antony from reuniting with Cleopatra, and thus stands in the way of his pleasure.
111
 
 The lovers’ struggle to overcome the monument’s height recasts Cleopatra’s 
fantasy of drawing Antony up with her “bended hook” (2.5.12) in an entirely different 
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 The domain of verticality now poses a specific and serious threat for Cleopatra, one that is utterly 
devoid of eros.  Antony first alerts her to the possibility that Caesar will “hoist thee up to the shouting 
plebeians” (4.12.34), and she recurs to this image twice from within the monument: “Shall they hoist me 
up” (5.2.55); “Mechanic slaves… shall / Uplift us to the view” (5.2.210-12).  The shame that Caesar plans 
to inflict on her will be experienced along the same vertical axis that once spelled pleasure. 
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register.  Now, the best on offer is clumsily to hoist his bloodied, dying body up into her 
monument.  This awkward, even comic, staging of Antony’s suspended body bound in 
ropes and chains spectacularly travesties the play’s earlier ecstatic images of sexual 
bondage.  However we imagine the performance of the play’s stage direction, “They 
heave Antony aloft to Cleopatra” (4.15.38), it is likely that some type of apparatus would 
have been necessary to bind Antony and then hoist his body up to Cleopatra’s level.
112
  
Have the “silken tackle” from Enobarbus’s account of Cleopatra’s barge rematerialized at 
her monument, now less erotic and even more functional?  Certainly his heart, now 
panting simply to keep him alive, is no longer a horse or chariot that she can mount.  
Theodore Leinwand writes that Antony’s wounded body in 4.15 is utterly impassive, 
indifferent to meaning or any signification at all—“more lump than human, more brute 
than affect-laden.”
113
  Oblivious to the monument’s verticality and to its layers of 
meaning and significance, Antony’s impassive body is more closely associated with 
horizontal breadth than with vertical depth.  And at his death, Cleopatra imagines Antony 
along the same horizontal axis: 
The crown o’ th’ earth doth melt…  
O, withered is the garland of the war; 
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 The types of apparatus vary.  Theodore Leinwand refers to David Garrick’s production in which 
“Cleopatra, and her Women, throw out certain Tackle” (see Richard Madelaine, ed., Antony and Cleopatra, 
Shakespeare in Production [Cambridge University Press, 1998]). Other possibilities include chains, ropes, 
pulleys, and strips of fabric.  North’s translation of Plutarch’s The Life of Marcus Antonius mentions 
“certain chains and ropes, in the which Antonius was trussed” (quoted in Leinwand, “The Shakespearean 
Perverse”). 
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 In “The Shakespearean Perverse,” Theodore Leinwand also draws upon Gilles Deleuze’s account of 
perverse structure to describe the superficiality of Antony’s body in 4.15.  In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze 
defines perversion as “the autonomy of the surface, independent of, and against depth and height” (Gilles 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, [New York: Columbia University Press, 1990], 
132).  Deleuze conceptualizes different philosophical schools in terms of space: “As we ask, ‘what is it to 
be oriented in thought?’, it appears that thought itself presupposes axes and orientations according to which 
it develops, that it has a geography before having a history, and that it traces dimensions before 
constructing systems” (127).  According to Deleuze, height (conversion) is the orientation of the Platonic 
philosophy of Ideals, depth (subversion) is correlated with the pre-Socratic philosophy of the cave, and 
surface (perversion) is associated with the Stoic philosophy of the event. 
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The soldier’s pole is fallen.  Young boys and girls  
Are level now with men. 
    (4.15.64-67; emphasis mine) 
This gives the lie to Cleopatra’s fantasy of an erect and towering Antony who “stands… 
or walk[s]” (1.5.18-19) at her bidding.  His collapse ratifies her rueful acknowledgment 
that “wishers were ever fools” (4.15.38). 
Cleopatra’s assertion in 5.2 that her “desolation does begin to make / A better 
life” (5.2.1-2) marks a shift in the monument’s significance, particularly in its ability to 
host Cleopatra’s final and ultimate experience of bounded loss.  The monument’s 
physical characteristics—its boundedness and specificity—enable Cleopatra to lose 
herself within the expansive scene she dreams for Antony.  The association of the early 
modern locus with the domus, or domestic sphere, illuminates the monument’s placial 
significance to the couple.  Cleopatra offers herself as Antony’s wife (“Husband, I come” 
[5.2.287]), making for him a home and marriage bed within the monument.  “The 
invention of marriage,” writes Cavell, “is the (is Cleopatra’s, whoever that is) response to 
Antony’s abandonment; it is a return of the world through the gift of herself, by 
becoming, presenting herself as, whatever constitutes the world.”
114
  According to Cavell, 
Cleopatra produces her own theater in this act of emplacement: “the return of the world 
after its abandonment of Antony (the ‘solution’ to the skeptical state) has required the 
theatricalization of the world.  It has to be presented to him.”
115
  In order to present the 
world, Cleopatra must reframe its borders (make a new heaven and earth) and make a 
present of it as a bounded place, a discrete entity that can be given and received.  And yet 
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 Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 28.  Cavell argues that Antony’s skeptical crisis is scenic in nature: “The 
recession of the world is this play’s interpretation of what I have called the truth of skepticism, that the 
human habitation of the world is not assured in what philosophy calls knowledge” (25). 
115
 Ibid., 31. 
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there is something perversely selfish in Cleopatra’s gift to Antony, since she ends the 
play without him, alone as the giver and the recipient of the world she dreams and 
presents for him.  Placing Antony is another act of erotic self-indulgence, creating a scene 
in which she can pleasurably lose herself. 
 This type of pleasurable bounded loss is most poignantly evident in Cleopatra’s 
dream of Antony, an imagining that draws from the domains of both place and space.  
She begins with an image of Antony as container: inside the confines of his face “stuck / 
A sun and moon” (5.2.80-81).  Rather than imagining a scene that contains him, like 
Enobarbus’s earlier speech about her, Cleopatra remakes Antony himself as the 
cosmos—his body forms every placial boundary she envisions.  As her integrating anti-
blazon progresses, building him vertically from top to bottom, her images become more 
capacious.
116
  And yet each scene she creates in her dream is bound by his flesh, his 
limbs, his voice, even his “livery” (5.2.91).  Antony’s “legs bestrid[ing] the ocean” 
(5.2.83) call to mind Antony’s earlier fantasy of Cleopatra straddling his panting heart.  
Here his legs form an oversized (and, again, eroticized) frame, binding the vast scene of 
the ocean.  Antony’s enormous limbs seem to defy gravity; the indifferent mass of flesh 
she struggled to lift is transubstantiated.  The immensity of Antony’s body compels 
Cleopatra to broaden her ever-widening imaginative scope, and yet it also acts as a 
limit—each time his limbs stretch outward, they punctuate and cap the scene she dreams 
for him (“his reared arm / Crested the world” [5.2.83-84; emphasis mine]).
117
  The 
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 Lisa Starks writes of Cleopatra’s anti-blazon, “the degeneration of Antony is followed by his 
regeneration as a Colossus through Cleopatra’s poetic imagination, making the severed flesh whole again 
through the word” (Starks, “Immortal Longings,” 249).  This image of a woman rebuilding a man piece by 
piece stands in stark contrast to the figure of Anatomia who threatened Endymion in his dream.  It also 
recalls Isis’s reassembly of Osiris. 
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 John-Paul Sartre writes of the lover: “I must be the one whose function is to make trees and water exist, 
to make cities and fields and other men exist, in order to give them to the Other who arranges them into a 
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pleasures she takes from placing Antony are doubled because her imagination binds an 
Antony who, in turn, binds the world.  As Cleopatra reinvests Antony’s body with erotic 
and affective significance piece by piece, she finally arrives at Antony’s “delights,” 
which “[w]ere dolphinlike, they showed his back / Above the element they lived in” 
(5.2.89-91). “Above” his “element” and “past the size of dreaming” (5.2.98), Antony at 
last belies her lament that “wishers were ever fools” (4.15.38), and reveals the capacity of 
Cleopatra’s imagination to bind and place even the most colossal of men. 
Cleopatra’s dream ushers in a final scene of bounded loss in the play—her suicide 
by the asp, a death she envisions as “a lover’s pinch, / Which hurts, and is desired” 
(5.2.295-96).  To imagine “the stroke of death” as a “lover’s pinch” (5.2.295) is, once 
again, to conceptualize suicide shaped by a masochistic erotics of bondage.  Early in this 
final scene, Cleopatra imagines her death in the monument as a placial limit, a “thing that 
ends all other deeds, / Which shackles accidents and bolts up change” (5.2.5-6).  Her 
conceptualization of death draws from the monument’s physical features—its 
boundedness and rigidity—which she ultimately takes on herself: “My resolution’s 
placed… I am marble-constant” (5.2.239 and 241; emphasis mine).  The domain of 
bondage structures the words and images we are left with during Cleopatra’s final 
moments of the play—she invokes the bonds of marriage (“Husband”), of orgasmic 
reunion (“I come”) and even of maternity (“see my baby at my breast, / That sucks the 
nurse asleep”).
118
  Within this context, the visual spectacle of asps slithering on her body 
                                                
world… In one sense if I am to be loved, I am the object through whose procuration the world will exist for 
the Other; in another sense I am the world, I am the ground-as-object on which the world detaches itself.  
Thus I am reassured” (John-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 
trans. Hazel E. Barnes [New York: Citadel Press, 1969], 369). 
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 There is some debate about when the word “come” was first used to connote sexual orgasm; the OED 
places its explicitly sexual definition several decades after Shakespeare’s death.  Entry seventeen, which 
defines “come” as “to experience sexual orgasm,” gives 1650 for the first usage in this context.  (See 
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recalls either her barge’s  “silken tackle” or her own “strong toil of grace.”  Cleopatra’s 
language suggests that death’s firm “pinch” and painful sting can lead to pleasurable self-
loss.  She implores the asp to “[b]e angry” (5.2.306), but the pain of its “sharp teeth” 
(5.2.304) gives way to the soothing mildness of self-loss, “as sweet as balm, as soft as air, 
as gentle—” (5.2.312).  Only after Cleopatra’s place-affirming dream of Antony from 
within the monument’s bourn, and only with her destination in the afterlife resolutely 
fixed (“Methinks I hear / Antony call” [5.2.284]), does Cleopatra imagine her life 
unraveling, the bonds loosening at last, imploring the asp “this knot intrinsicate / Of life 
at once untie” (5.2.304-5). 
 Does Cleopatra “return” the world to Antony, as Cavell suggests, or does she 
create a “new heaven, new earth” (1.1.17) for them to dwell in?  What world could they 
inhabit if he keeps growing “by reaping” (5.2.89)?  The erotics of the scene she imagines 
derive from the scene she occupies in 5.2—the monument’s boundedness, much like 
Antony’s place-affirming battle with Caesar in 4.8, inspires Cleopatra’s erotic dissolution 
and self-loss at the end of the play.  The generative properties of the monument recall 
Giordano Bruno’s account of infinite space, which is endless because it is always 
potentially filled.
119
  Bruno, along with Nicholas of Cusa and others, wrestled with the 
powerful and puzzling claim that the universe has its center “everywhere” (ubique) and 
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 ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press, 17 June 
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119
 In Casey’s analysis of creation myths across cultures (e.g., Judeo-Christian, ancient Greek, tribal), he 
notes that the void is often conceptualized as a scene of potentiality or “emergence” (Casey, The Fate of 
Place, 20; Cf. footnote 103). 
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its circumference “nowhere” (nullibi).
120
  Bruno expands on this claim by flipping the 
two terms, considering the possibility both “that the centre of the universe is everywhere 
and the circumference is nowhere” and “that the circumference is everywhere, but the 
center is nowhere.”
121
  He imagines a universe in which we are always on the edge of 
things, creating new centers of perspectival viewing from each new position we inhabit 
on the periphery.  Center and circumference collide, according to Casey: “the freedom of 
reaching out from successive centers is thereby counterpoised with the inhibition of being 
hemmed in by a series of circumferences.”
122
  Every time we stretch out, we extend the 
circumference to accommodate our reach, a process that is infinitely repeatable and 
thereby leads to a conceptualization of infinite space. 
Bruno’s notion of space pertains to Antony and Cleopatra’s experiences of 
bounded loss because although it is infinite and endless, it still has “circumference… 
everywhere.”  Like Cleopatra’s dream of Antony, Bruno’s cosmic vision is infinite 
without being vacuous.
123
  The erotics of circumference are best captured in Cleopatra’s 
expansive image of Antony’s “delights” as “dolphinlike” (5.2.89 and 90).  She dreams of 
an Antony whose pleasures extend beyond the reach of his scene—“above the element he 
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 This complex and famous assertion (as Theodore Leinwand has reminded me, cf. Hamlet’s placing of 
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shame” (3.11.44). See Giordano Bruno, On the Infinite Universe and Worlds (1584) in Giordano Bruno: 
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lived in”—but who contains his own limit, creating a new placial boundary out of his 
capacity for erotic pleasure.  The very image of Antony’s dolphinlike back emerging 
from the water, its curvature and upward reach, calls to mind Bruno’s sprawling but 
steady circumference.  That Cleopatra summons this image to describe Antony’s capacity 
for sexual pleasure in particular reveals the play’s investment in the erotics of binding, 
even (and perhaps most importantly) in Cleopatra’s famously immense dream.  Binding 
and then presenting the immensity of infinite space—to Antony, to herself, and to us—is 
what makes it erotic.  
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Chapter 3 
 
“Love’s use” 
Agency and Purpose of Erotic Desire 
 
 
I. Subject, Object, Instrument 
 
Near the start of Act 2 of John Lyly’s Campaspe, Diogenes tells his servant “non 
egeo tui vel te” (2.1.44).  Preserving the Latin grammar, his line translates as “I have no 
need of you, nor do I need you.”  Diogenes’ grammar joke derives from William Lilly’s 
Grammar, where it models verbs that can take objects in both the genitive and the 
accusative cases.
1
  The subject (“I”) and the object (“you”) are grammatically linked in a 
part-to-whole relationship, and yet they are also marked as two separate entities.  
Diogenes’ egere (“to need”) belongs to a special class of Latin verbs of “filling” or 
“lacking.”  When egere takes an object in the genitive case, it indicates incompleteness or 
a missing part.  Thus Diogenes’ haughty attempt to declare his independence from his 
servant loses some of its steam.  
John Lyly’s more profound grammar lesson about love in Campaspe raises the 
question, what is the relationship between the subject and the object of need?  Is the 
object separate from the subject, or, by virtue of a felt need, is the subject part of the 
object?  Need, or desire, challenges our intactness, our separateness from the outside 
world, because there is something “out there” that we want to take into ourselves.  That 
Latin verbs of needing and wanting take objects in the genitive case is a testament to 
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 Most Latin verbs take an object in the accusative case, whereas the genitive case is typically used to pair 
nouns together in a possessive relationship, often translated into English by using the preposition “of.” 
Most likely, the sentence invokes the partitive use of the genitive case, in which the genitive marks a part-
to-whole relationship (e.g., pars civitatis, “part of the state”).  For other instances of this type of genitive, 
see Bridgette L.M. Bauer, “The definite article in Indo-European: Emergence of a new grammatical 
category?” in Nominal Determination: Typology, Context, Constraints, and Historical Emergence, ed. 
Elizabeth Stark et al. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2007),103-40. 
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these objects’ power over subjects; in Diogenes’ locution, “I have no need of you” is 
contradicted by its own grammar, which reveals that “you” possess “me.”
2
  The part-to-
whole relationship that grammatically marks the object implies an intrinsic 
interdependence.  The object of need can be part of the self and part of the world.  At the 
same time that the accusative indicates a clear break between subject and object, the 
genitive highlights their shared genus (“I” am “of you”).  Even at the most basic level of 
grammar, then, need undermines the separateness and integrity of the desiring subject and 
desired object.  In an erotic relation, this means that space opens up for a third term, 
which often proves to be a mediating noun—a filter, a buffer, or an instrument—between 
ourselves and our beloveds. 
Kenneth Burke comments on this instrument in his section on Agency in A 
Grammar of Motives.  He cites an anecdote from Victor Lenzen’s Procedures of 
Empirical Science to illustrate the fluid relationship of subject, object, and instrument: 
If one taps an object with a stick held firmly in the hand, “the stick is an apparatus 
that may be viewed as part of the observer.” (Note the term “part of,” which here 
gives us merger.)  But if the stick is held loosely, the stick itself becomes the 
perceived object, “and the partition is between stick and hand.”  (The stick here is 
“apart from” the observer.)
3
 
 
When I hold it tightly, the stick is a part of my body; it serves as a prosthesis, an 
instrument that enables my engagement with objects in the world.  When I hold it 
loosely, the stick is a part of that outside world.  A slack grip allows me to feel its 
apartness from my body: I sense it in my hand, its temperature, its weight, and its 
firmness.  But the moment I tighten my grip in order to do something with the stick (i.e., 
to use it on an object, to push aside a curtain, to nudge a horse), it becomes a part of me 
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 G.K. Hunter’s gloss provides the following translation of Diogenes’ line: “… I don’t need you or [by 
another construction] you” (Hunter, 75). 
3
 Burke, GM, 415. 
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again.  A slight difference in my grip radically changes the stick’s ontology.  The 
capacity of the instrument to shift back and forth, and my own power to bring about that 
shift by subtly changing my deportment, confirm the instrument’s instability and 
mutability. 
Between subject and object, then, Burke places an instrument, the means by 
which we affect, or engage with, the world.  What does Burke’s example tell us about the 
role of an instrument in an erotic subject/object relation?  We might imagine an erotic 
instrument to be merely the means by which a desiring subject pursues a beloved object, 
such as an instrument of seduction or courtship (say, flowers or gifts).  Considered in this 
narrow way, the instrument is categorically distinct from the subject and the object.  It is 
incidental to the experience of desire because of its separateness, and because it is a 
means of pursuit rather than part and parcel of desiring itself.  Gifts or flowers are 
deployed as a way of obtaining a beloved, not a means of desiring her.  Burke’s anecdote, 
by contrast, emphasizes the instrument’s categorical connection, its potential fusion, with 
the desiring subject who deploys it.  The prosthetic stick in Burke’s example functions as 
an intimate part of the desiring subject; in an erotic relationship, it closes the gap that 
separates would-be lovers and can itself be said to be responsible for their relation, their 
relatedness.  Such an erotic instrument might take the form of a shared language (verbal, 
gestural, physical), a shared set of rituals (lovemaking, bondage or submission), or a 
shared imaginary (mutual fantasies, beliefs or even lies).  Such instruments are not left 
behind; rather, absorbed into the relationship, they enable it.  They become a medium 
both shared by and coextensive with the desiring subject and object.  Instrumentality, 
  144   
then, becomes the very way we access and express not only our own erotic capacities but 
those of our lovers. 
The erotic relation adds a layer of complexity to Burke’s instrument, because 
unlike the example of a stick opening a curtain, the object of erotic desire is no mere 
inanimate thing—our desires are directed at other desiring subjects.  A vital part of a 
dynamic relation, an erotic instrument necessarily partakes of its vitality.  To consider 
instrumentality, then, is to consider the ways in which desire itself is a creative act—we 
make desire just as we say we make love.  Take for example the erotic instrument of a 
shared fantasy: anything but a static object, it is what lovers craft, reshape, and refine as 
their very means of desiring.  Such fantasies both create desire and prove themselves to 
be the evolving creative products of desire.  As is the case with a shared language, a 
mutual fantasy makes the lovers just as it is made by them: “Therefore I lie with her and 
she with me / And in our faults by lies we flattered be” (Shakespeare, Sonnet 138.13-14). 
In this chapter, I explore the role of the erotic instrument as a medium of mutual 
creation and love-making.  Although instruments are first used to initiate erotic relations, 
thereafter they are absorbed into those relations.  They exercise a creative power over the 
lovers who find themselves transformed by this dynamic process.  When they undergo or 
enact such processes, Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s characters release a capacity inside 
themselves and one another that amounts to a virtuosity, a sense of divinity, even.  My 
account of the erotics of making stands in opposition to traditional accounts of the 
sonneteer or artist who narcissistically falls in love with his own creative work.  I reveal a 
surprisingly anti-narcissistic process that constantly reminds us that to need, egere, is to 
make ourselves “a part of,” tui, a process that reminds us that we cannot, and do not, go it 
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alone.  The other gives herself (I refer to the beloved as “her” with Lyly’s characters in 
mind) to the creator’s brush, pen, voice, or imagination and, as would a muse, she 
releases the artistic skill that is within him.  Whereas Chapter One was built on Burke’s 
term Act, and Chapter Two on his Scene-Agent Ratio, this chapter’s analysis of erotic 
desire is guided by his terms Agency (how do we desire?) and Purpose (why do we 
desire?).  For a character like Lyly’s Apelles, the means and the ends are conjoined—the 
instrument is a part of the object.  Apelles falls in love not quite with himself as he has 
known himself but with that newly discovered part of himself which is enabled by, 
inflamed by, even created by the act of erotic desiring. 
This chapter considers the erotic instruments in Lyly’s Campaspe and 
Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew.  In both plays, the process of erotic creation begins 
when lovers activate a dormant artistic capacity in one other.  The process of painting 
instrumentalizes Apelles’ erotic relation with Campaspe, and the process of storytelling 
(making fiction, twisting language, telling lies) instrumentalizes Petruchio’s erotic 
interactions with Kate.  Campaspe and Kate are shaped by these creative processes, but 
they become co-creators as well: Campaspe as a model who willingly submits to the 
artistic process and Kate as an interlocutor whose words verify the pair’s mutual lies.  As 
long as the lovers continue to create together, their erotic relationships flourish, 
exceeding the sum of their parts.  Painting and storytelling—the instruments that they 
employ—are absorbed into their relationships, shaping their interactions according to 
particular artistic features (pigment and canvas, verb tense and mood), more generally, by 
defining eros as a dynamic and creative process.  In time, however, a finished product—a 
completed portrait or a fully realized story now untethered to the lovers’ imaginations—
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emerges.  No longer their intimate instruments, no longer a part of their shared 
imaginary, these finished products become objects in their own right, objects defined first 
and foremost by their apartness, their remove from the lovers and from the processes of 
creation.  Once Alexander, as patron and king, acquires Campaspe’s portrait, and once 
Kate and Petruchio’s fictional language is turned into propaganda for marital propriety, 
the “supernal effects” (Campaspe 1.3.32) of erotic creation dull and diminish.  The best 
the lovers can do is try to defer this melancholic outcome—Apelles will add blemishes to 
Campaspe’s portrait in order to prolong the artistic process; Kate and Petruchio will enlist 
their fictions to beguile time by denying or suspending the present tense and indicative 
mood.  The effort and energy given over to the dilation of the creative process testify to 
its transformative power over the lovers, to its ability to awaken and elevate their creative 
capacities, and so to the significance of instrumentality to erotic relations. 
 
II. The Means and Ends of Erotic Desire in Lyly’s Campaspe 
 
 Like many of Lyly’s plays, Campaspe is at once replete with eroticism and devoid 
of physical consummation.  Apelles and Campaspe fall in love almost instantly, and yet 
they spend their scenes with a paintbrush and canvas lodged firmly between them, not to 
mention all of the words that fill the gaps that remain.  What is Lyly showing us about the 
nature of erotic experience (Apelles’ and Campaspe’s in particular) on a divided stage 
such as this?  To begin, he dramatizes what we already know: that erotic experience 
comprises much more than just physical contact or sexual intercourse.  Lyly confirms this 
by scrutinizing the roles that instruments—easel and canvas, pigments and words—play 
in Apelles’ and Campaspe’s erotic relation.  While anything that stands between two 
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lovers may be an obstacle to the fulfillment of their erotic desire, it may also prove an 
instrument of desire.  An object placed between two bodies in some kind of dynamic 
relation invariably increases the friction between them.  It creates drag—it obstructs—but 
it also generates heat, a potential source of erotic pleasure.  As Lyly demonstrates, such 
friction is felt within imaginative, linguistic, and conceptual realms, not just in the 
physical world.  A goodly portion of the play consists of Apelles and Campaspe 
employing artistic and linguistic media that both bring them into relation and keep them 
apart.  The portrait of Campaspe that Apelles paints is more than the sign of their erotic 
relationship, it is its medium.  That which stands between them provides the means by 
which they love one another, by which they reorder their own world and the world 
outside them, imbuing both with the creativity, richness, and nuance that characterize 
Lyly’s own art no less than Apelles’. 
The opening scene between Apelles and Campaspe occurs in and around the 
painter’s workshop, a setting that visually binds their dialogue together with the act of 
artistic creation.
4
  It is perhaps this backdrop that prompts the lovers to recognize each 
other’s creative capacities almost instantly. As early as their first exchange, Apelles and 
Campaspe acknowledge their individual artistic talents and ambitions, but perhaps more 
importantly, their first few lines together establish the artful medium that will distinguish 
all of their dialogues. Theirs is a language of ambiguity and nuance that subtly grafts the 
lovers’ artistic sensibilities onto their erotic relationship.
5
  In their dialogue, they reveal 
that each is wise to the other’s artistry; each is attentive to the instruments, or in 
                                                
4
 Hunter notes that in 3.1, the couple’s first scene together, “there is some likelihood that the Entry involves 
a Discovery.  The opening dialogue suggests that we first see Apelles actually engaged in painting 
Campaspe” (Campaspe, 86). 
5
 The linguistic component of this type of erotic relation is the subject of Section III of this chapter, which 
focuses on Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew. 
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Campaspe’s words, the “device[s]” (3.1.16), that the other employs.
6
  In this scene of 
flirtation, their language is highly crafted and stylized in its form, equivocal and 
sprawling in its meaning, careful and measured in its delivery.  Indeed, Apelles and 
Campaspe talk art even as they talk artfully—their flirtation consists of talk about each 
other’s artfulness.  In a few short lines, Campaspe and Apelles establish art as their erotic 
medium.  Together they arrive at and deploy a metaphor—“Desiring is Creating”—which 
will enable their erotic relationship throughout the play. 
 Apelles begins by confessing his doubt that there could possibly “be any colour so 
fresh that may shadow a countenance so fair” (3.1.1-2).  This sounds like the familiar 
conceit about “fair[ness]” that exceeds the capacities of pigment, brush, and canvas.  
Still, there is something odd about “fresh,” the adjective that Apelles chooses to describe 
the quality that his paint lacks.  What is a “fresh” color, or “fresh” paint?  Is it new, or is 
it vigorous and lively (as the OED would have it)?
7
  Apparently it is Campaspe’s 
aliveness, not only her beauty, which Apelles sets out to capture.  He is in the line of 
Zeuxis (to whom Apelles’ servant alludes), who could paint such lifelike grapes that 
“birds… have been fatted by [them] in winter” (1.2.67-68).  Of course, Campaspe is not a 
painted grape.  And Apelles’ interest in his subject’s “fresh[ness]” is no less erotic than it 
is artistic.  His opening lines make the tight connection between art and eros that 
characterize his subsequent interactions with the lady.  Apelles’ painting also differs from 
                                                
6
 The word “device” itself incorporates the ideas of desire and instrumentality.  According to the OED, its 
complex etymology results from the mingling of two Old French and Middle English 
words, devis and devise.  Entry 3a defines “device” as “will, pleasure, inclination, fancy, desire.”  See 
“device, n,” The Oxford English Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press, June 2012 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/view/Entry/51464>. 
7
 See “fresh, adj.1” (esp. entry 10) in The Oxford English Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford 
University Press, June 2011 < http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/74535>. Apelles will later compare 
Campaspe with Venus and note that the lady’s countenance is “somewhat fresher” (3.5.47) than that of the 
goddess. 
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Zeuxis’ in terms of the type of artistic skill it requires.  Where Zeuxis strives to make 
something artful out of something relatively plain—a mere grape—Apelles’ task is to 
bring out the “fresh” quality that already resides within Campaspe.  He illuminates his 
subject in paint, suffusing her with a vital glow that captures the luminosity that radiates 
from within her.  His talent and his desire later “maketh [her] ears to glow with thoughts” 
(4.2.4).  According to E. H. Gombrich, the historical Apelles was famous for the 
luminosity of his paintings, and for using a thin line of white paint to create the three-
dimensional effect whereby an object appears to glow and protrude outwards.
8
  This 
technique, which Gombrich calls “the line of Apelles,” enables Apelles both to honor his 
subject’s form and to enhance it with an extraordinary luster. 
If Apelles elevates his model, making her into art by prizing her “fresh[ness]” 
above his own artistic capacities, Campaspe reciprocates by diminishing herself.  She 
responds to Apelles’ opening lines by referring to her own features as ill formed: “a hard 
favour, which maketh you to despair of my face” (3.1.6-7).  In order to be remade by 
Apelles, Campaspe fashions herself as “hard” and unattractive (later she worries that her 
“disordered countenance” will result in a “deformed counterfeit” [3.4.71-72]) so that 
Apelles can build her back up and elevate her through the artistic process.  Such self-
fashioning is an artistic talent in its own right.  Although Campaspe herself is not a 
painter, she adopts an active role in the creative process as Apelles’ model.  Wendy 
Steiner’s recent study of the model’s role in the artistic process characterizes “her” 
                                                
8
 See E.H. Gombrich, The Heritage of Apelles: Studies in the art of the Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1976), 4-15. Gombrich cites an anecdote from Pliny’s Natural History in which Apelles 
competes with the famous painter Protogenes, each drawing a thinner line than the other on a panel.  
Gombrich interprets their competition as a parable of the invention of three-dimensional luster in classical 
art: “Apelles returning would have bisected [Protegenes’ line] by an even thinner line that suggested gleam 
or splendour, and to this nothing could be added now without spoiling the appearance of the line, which 
would have begun to stand out from the panel as if by magic” (15). 
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creative power as a particular type of virtuosity: “The model, in short, can play every role 
in aesthetic communication.  She is a polyfunctional virtuoso.”
9
  What roles are available 
to Campaspe as she sits for Apelles’ portrait?  As a participant in the artistic experience, 
Campaspe interprets the artwork and the significance of the creative process itself.  As 
the sitter for the portrait, she contributes artful, stylized, and subtle poses, and thus takes 
on the role of co-author of the work.  By degrading her own physical features, Campaspe 
makes it possible for Apelles to reshape and illuminate her in paint.  She artfully 
diminishes herself and he augments her with his art—they reciprocally if asymmetrically 
contribute to a shared process of artistic creation.
10
 
 Even before Campaspe exposes her virtuosity at what we might call self-
deprecation, she reveals another skill that distinguishes her role in the artistic and erotic 
process: she interprets the lovers’ interactions by employing a language that bridges art 
and eros.  While Apelles is busy crafting her portrait, Campaspe is deftly crafting the 
“Desiring is Artistic Creation” metaphor that will ignite and sustain their erotic 
experience together.  She begins quite simply and subtly by using a parallel and 
euphuistic structure to compare Apelles’ painting and his flirting: “Sir, I had thought you 
had been commanded to paint with your hand, not to gloze with your tongue” (3.1.3-4).  
To paint and to “gloze” are both artful techniques, but Campaspe uses the former verb to 
                                                
9
 See Wendy Steiner, The Real Real Thing: The Model in the Mirror of Art (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 27. 
10
 Lakoff and Johnson identify the metaphor, “Love is a Collaborative Work of Art,” as a “particularly 
forceful” example of metaphors that are creative and imaginative (rather than conventional), and thus “are 
capable of giving us a new understanding of our experience” (Metaphors We Live By, 139).  As with all 
metaphors, “Love is a Collaborative Work of Art” highlights certain aspects of erotic experience while 
obscuring others.  According to Lakoff and Johnson, this metaphor is unique because “the active side of 
love is brought into the foreground through the notion of work… This requires the masking of certain 
aspects of love that are viewed passively.  In fact, the emotional aspects of love are almost never viewed as 
being under the lovers’ active control in our conventional conceptual system” (141).  For a complete list of 
this metaphor’s entailments, see Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 140. 
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describe portrait making and the latter to describe seduction.  Placing these techniques 
side-by-side bridges the gap between them, drawing attention to their shared connotations 
(one can “gloze” with a paintbrush, too), grafting the features of art-making onto their 
experience of love-making.
11
  Such a metaphor recasts desire as something made rather 
than something felt, something that depends upon each lover’s skill.  Hence they fall in 
love with each other’s virtuosity.  It is Apelles’ “device” of flattery that Campaspe finds 
seductive.  Her metaphor also activates an erotic relation that privileges ornament over 
plainness, and complexity over artlessness, indicating her tacit recognition that the first 
technique in each of these antitheses stands the best chance of producing the friction 
responsible for erotic pleasure. 
Campaspe exposes Apelles’ artfulness, but she employs similar techniques of her 
own, and he is quick to detect them.  According to Apelles, Campaspe’s lament about her 
“hard favour” is a display of her skill at diminishing herself even though she “know[s 
her] own perfection” (3.1.10).  He identifies her technique as an affected modesty in 
which “you seem to dispraise that which most men commend” (3.1.10-11).  Apelles’ art 
of “gloz[ing]” and Campaspe’s art of “seem[ing]” are their highly self-conscious 
instruments of love-making.  He identifies the seductive quality of her art: its affected 
modesty “draw[s men] by that mean into an admiration, where feeding themselves, they 
fall into an ecstasy” (3.1.11-13).  Connecting her art to eros (acknowledging its erotic 
power), Apelles merely reinforces the relationship Campaspe has already established 
                                                
11
 “Gloze/gloss” also refers to the artistic activity of adding glaze or sheen.  See “gloss, v.2” in The Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press, June 2012 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/79133?>.  Campaspe deploys a similar technique when she admonishes 
Apelles in the following scene: “If you begin to tip your tongue with cunning, I pray dip your pencil in 
colours” (3.5.53-54).  Here, the parallel arrangement of her euphuistic line binds Apelles’ artistic 
instruments (his pencil dipped in colours) together with his erotic instruments (his tongue tipped in 
cunning).  
  152   
between artistic and erotic creation.  Apelles’ recognition of her artistry should inoculate 
him; that is, it should set him apart from the men who fall into “admiration” and 
“ecstasy” in response to Campaspe’s affected modesty.  But Apelles still falls in love 
with her.  Or he falls in love with her artfulness, with the seeming in her seeming 
modesty, the process of her artistry rather than its product.
12
   
In the remainder of their opening dialogue, the couple plays on various meanings 
of the word “colour”—whether hue, paint, blushing, artifice, rhetoric, or complexion—
culminating with Campaspe’s teasing assertion that Apelles is “so long used to colours 
you can do nothing but colour” (3.1.16-17).  This claim patently reinforces the 
connection between art and eros that has been steadily building to this point.  Apelles’ 
“colours” are of course his paints, but now Campaspe insinuates that his art of 
“colour[ing]” is a seductive “device” which she can “withstand” (16).  And yet, she falls 
in love with him.  Like Apelles, her ability to detect artfulness allows her to withstand its 
effects even as she falls in love with the virtuosity that inspires them.  The lovers’ 
instrumentality is itself a chief source of eros; moreover, their erotic relation requires the 
exposure of this instrumentality.  Instrumentality becomes erotic when its “how” is laid 
bare; seeing each other’s devices or instruments reminds the lovers that they are engaged 
in an evolving process.  The counter-intuitive goal of such exposure is not to disarm 
one’s lover, nor to strip her of her devices, but rather to batten on those devices.  He lies 
with her and she with him.  Such is their love-making.  
At the same time that Apelles and Campaspe collaborate on her portrait, they craft 
a language that transforms artistic into erotic gestures, gestures that have the power to 
                                                
12
 By contrast, Alexander is quite taken with what he perceives to be Campaspe’s “curst yielding modesty” 
(3.4.142), which suggests that the king resembles the other men to whom Apelles refers in this dialogue. 
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transform the lovers themselves.  Often it is Campaspe who initiates this process, such as 
when she taps into a shared language according to which “colours” can mean painting, 
talking, and still more than this.  Apelles’ response to the lady’s play on “colour” adds yet 
another layer of meaning: “Indeed the colours I see, I fear will alter the colour I have” 
(18-19).  Using the same word to describe the object (“the colours I see” in Campaspe’s 
complexion), the instrument (“any colour so fresh,” i.e., paint), and now himself as the 
subject, confirms the overlap among subject, object, and instrument of desire.  Artistic 
process transforms the lady from mere “earthly mettle” (2.2.81) to paint, and it can also 
“alter” the painter’s own “colour.”  But what sort of alteration does Apelles imagine 
here?  Hunter writes that the line can be read as a premonition that Apelles will turn pale 
or blush, but blushing is more apt since Apelles uses the verb “alter” rather than “lose.”
13
  
Apelles fears that his own flesh is susceptible to change; if it reddens with desire—if, that 
is, Campaspe’s beauty stirs his blood so that it rises to the surface—his flesh, like 
Campaspe’s, will be made legible, acquiring its own “fresh[ness]” through the artistic 
process.  Through the inter-animating experiences of painting and desiring, Apelles and 
Campaspe remake themselves. 
Apelles’ excellence in the erotic relation is to illuminate and elevate the potential 
of Campaspe’s artistry.  For her part, Campaspe’s self-deprecating postures paradoxically 
augment her artistry as their erotic interaction progresses.  With each detail Apelles adds 
to the portrait, Campaspe becomes more adept at refining their metaphor: he saturates the 
portrait with “colours” and she saturates their words, gestures, ideas, and images with 
erotic meaning.  In this way, she is truly being made—not only as an erotic object, but 
                                                
13
 Hunter favors pallor over blushing in his gloss of Apelles’ line: “The beautiful colour of your 
complexion will, I fear, so affect me that I will turn pale (or blush)” (Campaspe, 87). 
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also an erotic subject—with each stroke of Apelles’ brush, shaped in the same way he 
sketches the contours of her face and form.
14
  Hence it is not only Campaspe’s language 
but also her role in their erotic relationship that becomes more artful, rich, and stylized.  
In her later scenes with Apelles, Campaspe taps into the full measure of her 
“polyfunctional virtuos[ity]” as a model, subtly shifting her postures from receptive to 
interpretive, from creative to responsive.  Such postures carry more than artistic 
significance—each reveals Campaspe adopting new erotic attitudes that broaden and 
elevate her experience of desire. 
This breadth is evident in their second scene together, when Apelles and 
Campaspe explore new ways to fashion themselves as artists and artificers.  Campaspe’s 
opening line reflects her responsive role as the model in their creative collaboration.  She 
tends not to initiate conversation but to respond to what Apelles says, and she directs her 
erotic responses into portrait making, collapsing artistic process into erotic posturing:  
 Apelles. I shall never draw your eyes well, because they blind mine. 
 Campaspe. Why then, paint me without eyes, for I am blind. (3.3.1-2) 
 
Campaspe’s eyes have blinded Apelles; but what is the source of her purported 
blindness?  Hunter remarks that “It is not clear what Campaspe means by this.”
15
  She 
apparently absorbs and reflects his sensory experience in her own body, which now 
functions as a portrait of Apelles, or at least, of Apelles’ erotic experience, registered here 
as blindness.  Again the roles of subject, object, and instrument are conflated in their 
erotic relation, and again, Campaspe directs Apelles to capture this relation on the canvas 
                                                
14
 When Alexander asks Apelles, “Where do you first begin, when you draw any picture?” (3.4.81-82), 
Apelles replies that he starts with the outer contours (“the proportion of the face, in just compass” [83]) and 
adds subtle details and adornments only after establishing this initial shape. 
15
 “It is not clear what Campaspe means by this, unless it is ‘I too am blinded by love’; but such a remark 
would seem insufficiently modest for Campaspe.  David Bevington suggests an oblique reference to the 
traditional blindness of Cupid” (Campaspe, 91). 
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when she implores him to “paint me without eyes.”  Campaspe’s virtuosity as a model 
has been to convert self-deprecation into art.  Now she turns an even more destructive 
force—mutual- and self-blinding—into an aspect of creation.
16
 
In the rest of this scene, Campaspe assumes the role of aesthetic and erotic 
interpreter, reflecting Apelles’ art back to him as she does in their opening exchange, and 
continuing to develop the relationship between art and eros that the lovers have initiated 
together.  Campaspe’s power to make art by interpretation is not hers alone; the theater 
audience shares in this erotic and creative potential as interpreters of Lyly’s play.  The 
play’s prologue invites the audience to use their imaginations to co-create the visual 
experience of Campaspe: “Whatsoever we present we wish it may be thought the dancing 
of Agrippa his shadows, who in the moment they were seen were of any shape one could 
conceive” (The Prologue at the Court 13-15).  Chloe Porter has recently identified 
similarities between the “discourses of making” in the prologues in Campaspe and in 
Shakespeare’s Henry V.  Of Campaspe’s prologue, Porter writes, “the royal audience is 
encouraged to engage with the play as a representation of unfixed meaning which may be 
reshaped according to individual spectator perspective.”
17
  In a play that dramatizes the 
erotics of creating art from the multiple perspectives of the painter, the model, and the 
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 Campaspe later confesses her desire to be diminished even further, to be rendered invisible in paint: 
“would you could so now shadow me that I might not be perceived of any” (3.3.5-6). 
17
 Chloe Porter, “Idolatry, Iconoclasm, and Visual Experience in Works by Shakespeare and Lyly,” 
Literature and History 18, no. 1 (2009): 1-15, 2.  Porter is primarily interested in the agency that Lyly 
ascribes to his audience within the context of post-Reformation visual culture: “Lyly’s treatment of visual 
experience seems to fit perfectly into a context in which a suspicion of images combines with a state-
endorsed worship of royal imagery and an interest in individual constructive engagements with visual 
items” (7).  Although Porter’s focus is on the subversive and iconoclastic effects of the audience’s 
engagement in the creation of visual experience, her observations also speak to their erotic potential.  The 
theater audience takes on a role similar to that of Campaspe—along with her, they are invited to interpret 
(or, to invoke the visual metaphor, they are invited to see) the lovers’ artistic process as a means of making 
love. 
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interpreter, the theater audience is presented with a unique opportunity to participate in 
the lovers’ collaborative process, sharing in the erotics of making throughout the play.   
Campaspe’s role as interpreter and critic becomes more pronounced as Apelles 
points out classical scenes depicted in portraits in his studio, nearly all of which feature 
Jupiter ravishing an unsuspecting woman (Leda, Alcmena, Danaë, Europa), and 
Campaspe sustains the couple’s reciprocal mode of speech.  Their dialogue follows the 
call and response pattern of their slant rhyme couplet about blindness; however now, each 
time that Apelles introduces an erotic episode from a painting, Campaspe proffers 
commentary.  Rather than address the quality of the artwork, Campaspe consistently 
refers to the episode of ravishment itself, moralizing on the impropriety of the gods.  
Once again, they instrumentalize art in the service of seduction; the paintings become 
Campaspe’s means of flirtation.  Nor does it escape our notice that, as was the case with 
Apelles in the previous scene, so here it is Jupiter who changes shape.  The artificer who 
ravishes is himself ravished, palpably “alter[ed]” by erotic desire. 
Of course, whereas Jupiter hides his artifice from the objects of his desire, Apelles 
and Campaspe display their artifice to one another.  They even anatomize it.  Campaspe 
queries the broader implications of each scene, asking Apelles if “all gods [were] like 
Jupiter” (3.3.24), and wondering about love and lust as they pertain to “men on earth” 
(3.3.26).  Then they not quite chiastically generalize about falsity: 
Campaspe:  Were women never so fair, men would be false. 
Apelles:  Were women never so false, men would be fond. 
        (3.3.30-31) 
 
Such generalizations about human falseness seem to degrade their own erotic medium.  
But the lovers’ earlier acknowledgement of their own artifice distinguishes them from the 
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men and women to whom they refer.  This is not to say that they are somehow more 
genuine than the others, only that they are better at artifice and undeceived by its effects. 
Campaspe’s virtuosity lies in her ability subtly to guide their artistic process, 
playing the various roles of art object, interpreter, and artist all at once.  At the end of 
their dialogue, she figures herself as an art object by representing herself once again in 
terms of lack, this time in response to Apelles’ question, “But were you never in love?” 
(3.3.45).  Campaspe replies that she has never been in love “nor love in me” (3.3.46).  
Again, the lady portrays herself as diminished.  On the one hand, Campaspe presents 
Apelles with a freshness and vitality that he struggles to capture; on the other hand, with 
no love “in” her, she is vacant inside, resembling a piece of art more than a person.  
Steiner shrewdly describes the “life model [who] typically constructs herself as an image, 
however much the artist may feel he is the one posing her and determining what aspects 
of her will be represented.  Many models… fashion themselves as the image to be 
rendered.”
18
  Campaspe is both that which is interpreted and that which interprets.  She is 
void of love so that Apelles can fill her and she hollows herself in a gesture of shared 
artistic (and erotic) making.  Apelles responds by praising Campaspe’s aptitude, her 
capacity to experience love: “It is not possible that a face so fair and a wit so sharp, both 
without comparison, should not be apt to love” (3.3.51-52).  “Apt to love” tells us that 
she is predisposed or inclined both to love (as subject) and to be loved (as object).
19
  Her 
agency—as co-creator, as artist in her own right—derives from her beauty and wit.  
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Steiner, The Real Real Thing, 22. 
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 For “apt,” OED  2.b and 4.c read “fit, prepared, ready” and “customarily disposed, given, inclined, 
prone,” respectively.  (See The Oxford English Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University 
Press, June 2011 < http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9969>.)  If love is something one can be “apt to” then 
it is as much a skill or talent as it is an emotion or state of mind.  To align love with aptitude is to 
emphasize the “how” of desire.  Apelles’ gift of painting, his ability to create Campaspe in pigment, makes 
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 In their later scenes, Apelles and Campaspe enhance each other’s ability to 
employ and interpret artifice together when they refine her portrait, their “Desiring is 
Artistic Creation” metaphor, and their erotic relationship all at once.  Campaspe 
continues to expose Apelles’ techniques of artifice: “you…commend…for fashion sake” 
and “call them beautiful whom you know black” (4.2.29-31).  Apelles responds that men 
“dissemble… / Not in love, but their love” (4.2.37-38).  Hunter glosses this as Apelles’ 
assertion “that he does not wish men to tell lies to those they love, but would like the 
power to conceal that he is in love (since his suit to Campaspe is bound to be 
hopeless).”
20
  Apelles may also be saying that dissembling is a way, or means, of loving; 
according to the grammar of his sentence, dissembling is the action that is performed on 
love.  That Apelles distinguishes this artifice from the techniques employed by men like 
Jupiter who dissemble “in love” confirms the difference he sees between his own creative 
enterprise with Campaspe and the “common thing” (4.2.29) men do when they lie to 
women.   
Campaspe enacts this same distinction in her style of speech: Even as she 
confesses her mistrust of men who do not “speak as they think” (4.2.34), she employs 
artful and equivocal language.  It is Apelles, not Campaspe, who breaks off from their 
measured and stylized mode of dialogue to ask his beloved plainly to “give me leave to 
ask you a question” (4.2.38-39) and then proceeds to inquire, simply and directly, 
“Whom do you love best in the world?” (4.2.42).  Carefully, subtly, and with distinctive 
art, Campaspe replies,  “He that made me last in the world” (4.2.43).  Her response 
confers upon Apelles the creative power of the artist, but it also laconically, even 
gnomically, connects their artistic process to their erotic relation.  By answering Apelles’ 
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 Hunter, Campaspe, 113. 
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question about love with a statement about art, she reconfirms her role alongside his in 
the erotic and artistic enterprise they have undertaken together.  Of greater ontological 
import is her contention that it is not her portrait but rather she herself who has been 
“made” by Apelles.  Campaspe imagines things differently from Roland Barthes, who 
“experience[s] a micro version of death” when photographed, at which time he becomes a  
“subject who feels he is becoming an object.”
21
  For her part, Campaspe asserts that her 
portraiture gestures toward the kind of afterlife that Harry Berger describes in his 
response to Barthes: “what happens after . . . is that sitters begin to rouse themselves, to 
shake off this death, and to help painters represent them as living subjects by seeming to 
either try for, or to resist, the effect of objectivity.”
22
  Giving herself up to the “effect of 
objectivity,” Campaspe participates not in her death but her rebirth.  She has enabled “he 
that made me last in the world.” 
Campaspe speaks this pointed but poignant line in their penultimate scene 
together.  The metaphor they have created is finally equipped to bear this rich and 
powerful expression of erotic longing and belonging.  Campaspe’s language is still artful 
and stylized, but rather than employing euphuistic, parallel structure to connect art and 
eros in a sentence all of her own, she puts Apelles’ line to this use.  Campaspe’s assertion 
gestures toward climax, a consummation of their scenes of verbal chafing—what Stephen 
Greenblatt identifies as a “system of foreplay” in Shakespeare’s comedies.
23
  Utterly 
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 Berger, Fictions of the Pose, 226. 
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 Greenblatt writes, “Shakespeare realised that if sexual chafing could not be presented literally onstage, it 
could be represented figuratively: friction could be fictionalised, chafing chastened and hence made fit for 
the stage, by transforming it into the witty, erotically charged sparring that is the heart of the lovers’ 
experience” (Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in 
Renaissance England [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988], 63-93, 89).  This analysis of Shakespeare’s 
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receptive to his “Whom do you love best in the world,” Campaspe’s “he that made me 
last in the world” typifies the artful balance we have come to expect of their language.  
But in this instance, Campaspe tenderly if not quite undemonstratively completes his line.  
She employs both the form and content of his line only to replace his “love” with her 
“making.”  Her acknowledgment of her love and of her own made-ness are for this 
moment, at least, inseparable.  To love Apelles is to have been remade by him, but only 
she can confirm this and only by way of a metaphor that credits instrumentality (mutual 
making) in their relationship.  It turns out that they are both and equally lovers and 
makers. 
Apelles continues to reflect on the transformative power of his and Campaspe’s 
artistic process even after it has ended.  Alone with the finished portrait, he employs and 
extends the metaphor that Campaspe developed.  Apelles identifies the act of painting as 
the instrument of his desire for Campaspe in the opening lines of his soliloquy: “Has thou 
by drawing her beauty brought to pass that thou canst scarce draw thine own breath?” 
(3.5.14-15; emphasis mine).
24
  Like the word “colour” in the couple’s earlier dialogue, 
“drawing” and “draw” here blur the distinction between the lovers.
25
  Polysemy weaves 
the language of art into the experience of desire.  Metaphor enables the lovers to access 
eros through art.  And the balance and measure of Lyly’s euphuistic structure, as in 
                                                
erotic dialogues can be extended to Lyly’s language as well.  Both playwrights invest their drama with 
what Greenblatt calls “sexual energy” (87) without staging bodies in physical contact, and both employ 
verbal chafing and friction to generate erotic heat onstage.  This is especially true for Campaspe, where the 
lovers’ creative media intensify the friction between them.   
24
 The preposition “by” (in Latin, this is denoted via the ablative case, specifically the ablative of means) is 
the grammatical marking of instrumentality, allowing Apelles to identify specific causes for the “supernal 
effects” of his desire. 
25
 The polysemy of “draw” also suggests that Campaspe’s gain is Apelles’ loss: breathing life into her 
image obstructs the painter’s own ability to breathe.  Once again, the metaphor uncovers the imbricated 
artistic processes of creation and depletion, of elevation and diminishment, which constitute Apelles and 
Campaspe’s erotic relation. 
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Apelles’ next line, further bridges the gap between art and eros: “by so much more hast 
thou increased thy care by how much more thou has showed thy cunning” (3.5.16-17).  
So Apelles’ “increased . . . care” stems not just from Campaspe’s beauty but from his 
own “cunning,” too.  She has contributed her “apt[ness]” and he meets it with his 
“cunning”; their erotic relation depends on both.  Moreover, Apelles’ acknowledgment of 
his skill (his cunning) once again reminds us that not just art, but eros is something made, 
something responsive to aptitude.  Apelles’ emphasis on his own cunning may at first 
suggest that he is more interested in himself, attracted more to his own artistic skill and to 
his process of artistic creation, than he is attracted to the object of his desire, to 
Campaspe.  If this is so, then why has he not fallen in love with the Venus he has been 
painting, or with any of his other portraits for that matter?  Apelles may give us 
something of an answer when he tells us that he “showed [his] cunning” (17).  While 
cunning is inherent, painting Campaspe, and apparently only Campaspe, has rendered it 
visible.  Visible to Apelles and visible to Campaspe, too.  At the core of their erotic 
relation is their mutual exposure of their cunning and artfulness.  This is what keeps 
Apelles’ erotic desire from aligning with the familiar narrative of the narcissistic artist 
who falls in love with his own skill.  Yes, his cunning has been shown in the portrait, but 
once it is revealed to Campaspe, she sees, matches, and inspires his creative potential 
with her own.  Her self-deprecation, her freshness and color, her beauty and wit, her 
aptness to love, her discovery of a language that binds artistic to erotic creation, all of  
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these gifts activate and release Apelles’ “cunning,” thereby distinguishing this act of  
artistic reproduction from any other. 
************************ 
But what happens once the painting is complete?  What happens, that is, when the 
product succeeds the process?  No longer a part of the lovers’ erotic relation, the finished 
painting stands apart from the lovers.  Like the stick in Lenzen’s anecdote, the lovers’ 
loosened grip on the instrument turns it into an object; whereas the process of painting 
bridged the gap between the lovers, the completed painting becomes an obstacle between 
them.  Apelles begins to explore the stakes of this shift when he compares himself to 
Pygmalion, another artist who fell in love with his creation.  Of course, what makes 
Apelles different from Pygmalion (as Hunter points out in his gloss) is that Pygmalion 
did not work from a model.
26
  Hunter writes that Apelles’ reference to Pygmalion is a 
flawed comparison: “The analogy with Pygmalion is defective unless we suppose that 
Apelles, despairing of the living Campaspe because she belongs to Alexander, wishes to 
have his painting turned into a second Campaspe.”
27
  If Hunter is correct, then Apelles’ 
flawed comparison reveals that the object of his desire is no longer just Campaspe; he 
now longs for the creative process itself, a once mutual but now solitary act.  
                                                
26
 Victor Stoichita notes that Pygmalion’s story differs from other narratives of artists whose works came to 
life.  Pygmalion’s statue constitutes a simulacrum rather than an image copied from nature: “Pygmalion’s 
statue is the fruit of his imagination and of his ‘art,’ and the woman whom the gods gave him for a spouse 
is a strange creature, an artifact endowed with a soul and a body, but nevertheless a fantasy.  A simulacrum, 
precisely.” See Victor I. Stoichita, The Pygmalion Effect: From Ovid to Hitchcock, trans. Alison Anderson 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3. 
27
 Hunter, Campaspe, 102.  The desire for Apelles to create a second Campaspe is also voiced by 
Alexander, who exclaims earlier in the play, “Would he could colour the life with the feature!” (3.4.73).  
Like Apelles’ allusion to Pygmalion, Alexander’s desire for another Campaspe is puzzling: why should 
Alexander want another version of the lady if she is already his?  Perhaps Alexander is fascinated more by 
the instrument of artistic creation than by the object of his desire, Campaspe herself. 
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The completion of the portrait, then, poses a double threat to Apelles and 
Campaspe’s erotic relation—it enforces Apelles’ solitude, since his model is no longer 
present, and it signals stasis, the end of the creative process.
28
  By comparing himself to 
Pygmalion, Apelles reminds us what happens to fantasies and rituals that grow static—
they risk becoming artifacts rather than instruments of erotic desire.  He desires 
Pygmalion’s ability to animate a lifeless work of art because he wants to resuscitate the 
erotic instrument that has enabled his love for Campaspe.  But in his determination to 
continue creating Campaspe, now that she is no longer present to do the same for him, 
Apelles is prepared to sidestep the shared artistic process that has instrumentalized their 
erotic experience.
29
  It is fitting, then, that Apelles begins to test the limits of his creative 
power in soliloquy, a solitary speech act.  His longing to animate Campaspe’s portrait 
reveals Apelles’ desire for an artistic capacity beyond his means, and in his solitude, he 
also stretches the bounds of the language that the lovers have forged together.  At this 
point, the generative power of the lovers’ shared metaphor of painting gives way to a 
language of sculpture that turns out to be destructive; now Apelles, not Campaspe, 
undergoes a loss of self. 
 Apelles contrasts his situation and Pygmalion’s, not, as one might expect, in terms 
of the differing objects of their desires, but instead in terms of means—he contrasts his 
own artistic medium of painting with Pygmalion’s choice of sculpture.  Apelles wonders 
if painting is “so far inferior to carving, or dost thou, Venus, more delight to be hewed 
with chisels than shadowed with colours?” (3.5.24-26).  Although sculpture is the 
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 In the scene just before Apelles delivers his soliloquy, the painter insists that he will “never finish” 
(3.4.93) the portrait, because Campaspe’s beauty exceeds the bounds of art. 
29
 Apelles seems to recognize the transgressive potential of his divine aspirations when he asks himself, 
“Was it not sufficient to behold the fire and warm thee but with Satyrus thou must kiss the fire and burn 
thee?” (3.5.18-20).  
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medium that produces a live woman for Pygmalion, Apelles reminds us here that it is 
ultimately a destructive art.  The sculptor hews and chisels; the painter applies pigment to 
canvas.
30
  Curiously, once Apelles introduces the example of carving, it recurs again and 
again in his soliloquy.  This shift from adding “shadows” to chipping away at 
“substance” illustrates the predicament Apelles faces now that his painting is finished.  
The metaphorical entailments of sculpturing answer best to the destructive turn that 
Apelles’ desire takes when he tries to use the portrait as an instrument of divine 
conjuration, disturbing the balance of the heretofore shared artistic process by seeking to 
create Campaspe all by himself. 
Apelles’ turn to sculpture corresponds with a shift in the sensory domains that he 
uses to conceptualize his interactions with Campaspe.  A painter, Apelles begins by 
considering their interactions in terms of vision.  Apelles gazes on his model in order to 
paint her, and of course, he gazes on her beauty—“the colours I see” (3.1.18)—in 
admiration and desire.  But as his soliloquy goes on, he begins to think in terms of tactile 
erotic activity: optics (“behold” [3.5.18]) give way to haptics (“kiss…and burn” [3.5.19]).  
The historical Apelles is cited in Pliny and Vasari as an examplar of artistic and erotic 
decorum, largely because the artistic medium of paint keeps him within the safe zone of 
“behold[ing]” rather than caressing.  Recently, Victor Stoichita has contrasted Apelles 
with Pygmalion, the sculptor who transgresses the bounds of art:  
[Apelles] creates a fairly sharp distinction between the erotic attraction of the 
model and the phantasm with which the painting is imbued—which is why Vasari 
tacitly accepts it.… In the context of the paragone, pictorial creation and the two 
dimensional projection of desire do not prevent the artist from making a 
distinction between his model and his phantasm-representation, whereas 
                                                
30
 Apelles’ question about Venus’s “delight”—does she derive more pleasure from being “hewed” than 
from being “shadowed?”—is suggestive of a violent sexual act, one that entails destruction and creation all 
at once.  His desire to stimulate Venus’s “delight” suggests that to do so might stimulate the hewer as well. 
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sculptural creation, three-dimensional and palpable, is an invitation to confuse the 
limits and, hence, to transgress.
31
   
 
For Lyly’s Apelles, the shift from optic to haptic language signifies his departure from 
conventionality and correctness; he transgresses the limits of his art when he conjures 
substance from shadows and caresses from “colours.”
32
 
Apelles’ desire to bring Campaspe to life by animating her portrait reflects the 
early modern belief in the power of eros to conjure an image of a beloved’s soul, known 
as a phantasm.  According to the early modern psychology of erotic desire, a separate 
conceptual apparatus mediates between the sensory and non-sensory realms.
33
  This 
apparatus belongs to a third ontological category that can translate between the corporeal 
and the incorporeal worlds, and it is composed of the same spirit (pneuma) that comprises 
the stars.  In order to mediate between body and soul, the spirit translates sensory images 
into “phantasms,” pneumatic images that can be understood by the soul.  Ioan Couliano 
has argued that this third category is fundamental to the early modern psychology of eros, 
in which desire is defined as “the pursuit of a phantasm” rather than the pursuit of a love 
object who exists apart from the desiring subject.
34
  Apelles’ desire to animate the portrait 
reveals that Campaspe’s phantasm has replaced Campaspe as the object of his creative 
enterprise. 
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 Stoichita, The Pygmalion Effect, 56. 
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 In his final soliloquy of the play, Apelles comments on his shift from visual to tactile erotic activity, 
admitting that he has betrayed his own art in his desire for the lady: “O Campaspe, I have painted thee in 
my heart—painted? nay, contrary to mine art, imprinted; and that in such deep characters that nothing can 
raze it out unless it rub thy heart out” (5.2.16-19). 
33
 This psychology, largely Aristotelian, attempts to bridge the division between body and soul that was 
decisive for Plato.  The apparatus that Aristotle identifies in De Anima has conceptual and linguistic 
properties. 
34
 See Ioan P. Couliano, Eros and Magic in the Renaissance, trans. Margaret Cook (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 38-39.  Couliano repeatedly notes that the object of desire is the phantasm, rather 
than the beloved herself: “the love object plays a secondary role in the process of establishing the 
phantasm: it is only a pretext, not a real presence… We do not love another object, a stranger to 
ourselves… We are enamored of an unconscious image” (31). 
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Perhaps it is his unnatural creative ambitions that prompt Apelles to compare his 
love for Campaspe to a series of seemingly unnatural attractions: “Thou mayst swim 
against the stream with the crab, and feed against the wind with the deer, and peck 
against the steel with the cockatrice” (3.5.39-41).  The parallel structure suggests that 
Apelles’ comparisons are all fundamentally alike; but the final example in his series is 
nothing of the sort.  While the crab and deer movements resist the natural order prevalent 
in their respective habitats, the cockatrice’s pecking is more closely aligned with art than 
with nature, and it is decidedly violent.  Of course, the cockatrice—a deadly combination 
of cock and serpent—is itself an artifice.  Hunter notes that Alexander was said to have 
killed a cockatrice by placing a mirror (“steel”) before it, prompting it to “peck against” 
its own image and ultimately die from its own reflected lethal gaze.  The mirror produces 
a new image and at the same time causes the demise of the cockatrice.  Unlike what 
transpires when Venus is hewn, it is now Apelles—the artist rather than the model—who 
risks destruction in the course of artistic creation that once again collapses the distance 
between the artist and his object.
35
  In his earlier premonition that Campaspe “will alter 
the colour I have” (3.1.18-19), Apelles hints at this destruction.  The change that both 
lovers undergo necessarily entails a kind of self-loss, but now that Campaspe is gone, 
“alter[ation]” gives way to destruction.  
It is fitting that Apelles compares the cockatrice’s self-destructive behavior—its 
assault on a reflected image, and its sculptural mode of attack—with his own just when 
he begins to pursue Campaspe’s phantasm.  As it happens, early modern writings about 
the erotic phantasm also employ the metaphor of sculpture.  In his empirical philosophy, 
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 Apelles conceptualizes the pain of his desire through the language of carving, specifically as a 
penetrating wound and canker.  The symptoms of his “affections” include “deep and hollow sighs,” as well 
as “wounds and slaughters of conceits” (3.5.51-53). 
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Marsilio Ficino conceptualizes the phantasm as being carved or engraved on the lover’s 
soul: “the lover carves [sculpit] into his soul the model of the beloved,” and the phantasm 
takes up a residence there, monopolizing it and ultimately exiling the lover from his own 
soul.
36
  Couliano describes the consequences of this erotic transaction as dire: “the 
subject, bereft of his soul, is no longer a subject: the phantasmic vampire has devoured it 
internally.”
37
  Ideally, the beloved will undergo the same process, making room for the 
lover’s phantasm within her soul so that the subject and object effectively switch places, 
each continuing to exist within the other’s soul.  However, in reality, one can never be 
sure that the beloved will accept one’s phantasm, making the experience of erotic desire 
inherently risky.  Like the process of artistic creation, creating a phantasm of the beloved 
requires the lover to hazard his own subjectivity.  And as with the artistic process, it is the 
loss or lack of mutuality (in the case of phantasmic creation, it is the lack of reciprocal 
exchange) that poses the greatest threat to the desiring subject. 
With his subjectivity at stake, it is unsurprising that Apelles’ desires turn inward.  
His transformation, from artist to lover and finally to conjurer or magician, correlates 
with a comparable shift in the nature of the objects he plans to paint.  Now that he has 
finished the portraits of Campaspe and Venus, Apelles discloses the artistic achievements 
that await him:  
Blush, Venus, for I am ashamed to end thee.  Now must I paint things unpossible
 for mine art but agreeable with my affections: deep and hollow sighs, sad and
 melancholy thoughts, wounds and slaughters of conceits, a life posting to death, a
 death galloping from life, a wavering constancy, an unsettled resolution, and what
 not, Apelles?  And what but, Apelles?  (3.5.49-56) 
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 Amans amati suo figuram sculpit in animo (Marsilio Ficino, Amore, II, 8, quoted in Couliano, Eros and 
Magic, 31).  
37
 Ibid., 31. 
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To paint sighs, thoughts, conceits, life, death, constancy, and resolution will require 
Apelles to engage in an activity aligned more with magical conjuration than with artistic 
invention.  Apelles ascribes to his art a Pygmalion-like generative and life-giving power; 
to paint “life” itself is to bring to life.  Moreover, painting “things unpossible for mine art 
but agreeable with my affections” marks a decisive shift in the nature of the painting’s 
subject matter.  Heretofore, his portraits have depicted objects of desire: a striking 
goddess and a captive woman.  Apelles’ new, self-imposed mandate to paint sighs, 
conceits, and thoughts suggests that the sighs and thoughts that Campaspe has drawn out 
of him have themselves become the objects of his affections.  Absent Campaspe, Apelles 
feels compelled to paint the markers of her absence, redirecting his erotic and creative 
attentions toward his own longing.  Thus Apelles begins to desire his own conceits and 
thoughts—things that typically constitute the means by which a person desires—and so to 
fall in love with the “how” of his own erotic desire.  That Apelles has begun to desire 
himself is unsurprising in light of the self-loss he risks in his pursuit of Campaspe’s 
phantasm.  What Campaspe once elicited from him, he will now formalize in paint.  
 Apelles’ list of new painting subjects concludes with a puzzling pair of questions 
that reflect this inward turn: “and what not, Apelles? And what but, Apelles?”  In his first 
question, the painter acknowledges the staggeringly vast scope of subjects he will need to 
cover if he is to paint things “agreeable with my affections.”  And yet, his second 
question distills the range of possibilities to a single subject: himself.  The comma after 
“but” is Hunter’s emendation.  He explains that he has “altered the punctuation and the 
sense from Q1’s ‘what but Apelles’.  I take the meaning to be, ‘And what but sighs, 
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thoughts, conceits etc. will I be able to depict?’”
38
  This is plausible, but the Quarto 
punctuation is much more suggestive.  When Apelles asks himself the question, “and 
what but Apelles?” his shift from painting women to painting thoughts takes another 
sharp turn:  The final object of his erotic desire is himself.  Apelles is not so much 
dismissing his desire for Campaspe as he is acknowledging the effects of their artistic 
process on his sense of self.  His role as Campaspe’s maker has “alter[ed]” Apelles to 
such an extent that he, too, has been remade by the artistic process.  To create Campaspe 
(or, to create sighs, conceits, life, resolution) is to recreate himself: “what but Apelles?”  
To desire Campaspe is to desire the version of himself that she unlocks when she inspires 
him to create.  His lines about painting “unpossible things,” and about eventually painting 
himself, reveal Apelles’ desire not only to become more intimate with the artistry 
Campaspe has aroused in him, but also to recover the part of himself that he hazards 
when he tries to conjure the lady’s soul by way of her portrait. 
If, as it turns out, Apelles is never quite able to use the portrait for this purpose, 
then it must be because his artwork is the result of a collaborative process that resists 
independent instrumentalization like Pygmalion’s.  That the painter spends the remainder 
of the play searching for a means—in prayer, in sculpture, in song—by which to conjure 
Campaspe is evidence of the importance of such creative instruments to their erotic 
relation.  Yet all of Apelles’ attempts result in weak substitutions for what he achieves 
when he collaborates with Campaspe. 
The importance of mutuality is especially evident when Apelles finally succeeds 
in summoning Campaspe’s phantasm in the song he sings at the end of his soliloquy.  He 
conjures her simply by imagining her, by animating her in his mind.  But the phantasm he 
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creates is almost a negative image of Campaspe herself, and thus proves to be a poor 
replacement for the lady.  Apelles’ song is about a game of cards between Cupid and 
Campaspe in which Cupid stakes everything he has, and loses it all to the lady.  In the 
beginning of the song, Cupid wagers his familiar accoutrements (“his quiver, bow and 
arrows” [3.5.73]), but once he loses these, the stakes become more severe: 
  then down he throws 
 The coral of his lip; the rose 
 Growing on’s cheek (but none knows how), 
 With these the crystal of his brow, 
 And then the dimple of his chin; 
 All these did my Campaspe win 
 At last he set her both his eyes; 
 She won, and Cupid blind did rise. 
   (3.5.75-82) 
 
Minus his coral lip and his blushing cheeks, Cupid is effectively de-blazoned and un-
painted.  This Campaspe really does have the power to “alter . . . colour” (3.1.18)—but 
where the lady once summoned blushes, her phantasm now suppresses them.  Couliano 
writes, “When Eros is at work, the phantasm of the loved object leads its own existence, 
all the more disquieting because it exerts a kind of vampirism on the subject’s other 
phantasms and thoughts.”
39
  The imagery in Apelles’ song suggests that Campaspe’s 
phantasm poses this vampiric threat; she is literally appalling.  Effectively preying on 
Love, Campaspe’s phantasm now decimates the very erotic relation that the lady had 
been so instrumental in co-creating with Apelles. 
 Although Apelles’ song conjures a woman who wields considerable power over 
Eros, that is where the similarities end between the phantasm and lady he has fallen in 
love with.  The phantasm exerts a much more destructive power as it creates, a power 
signaled by the language of carving.  Once Cupid is deprived of his “coral” cheek and 
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“rose” lip, his face is subjected to carving and chiseling.  Cupid keeps raising the stakes, 
wagering his brow, then the dimple on his chin, and finally his eyes, but he loses it all to 
Campaspe’s winning hand.  Having initially risked only his “freshness” and vitality, 
Cupid now suffers a loss of his identifying facial features.  And yet, as is the case with 
the other examples of destruction in Apelles’ soliloquy, the scene between Campaspe and 
Cupid proves generative as well.  Campaspe’s phantasm effectively makes Cupid what he 
is best known for by taking from him, until at last “Cupid blind did rise” (3.5.82).  In 
conjuring Campaspe’s phantasm, then, Apelles re-imagines the lady’s creative power, but 
with a difference that extends beyond the artistic medium of paint versus sculpture.  
Whereas the lady’s virtuosity lies in her ability artfully to diminish herself, the phantasm 
diminishes Love itself.  She remains perfectly intact in the course of her interaction with 
Eros; Apelles imagines her chipping away at Cupid instead of risking any loss of her 
own. 
Apelles’ soliloquy dramatizes his attempt to recover what is unrecoverable—a 
once-collaborative creative process that enabled the painter’s erotic relation with 
Campaspe.  The completed portrait simply cannot do the work of remaking the lady, nor 
can Apelles’ “cunning”; thus the portrait and his cunning both become objects of his 
erotic desire in the hope that they can lead him back to the lady.  Even Apelles’ apparent 
success in creating Campaspe in song is overshadowed by the phantasm’s profound 
differences from the woman.  The sum total of these differences—in their creative power 
and artistic medium, in their skill and even their temperament—results in the most 
profound distinction of all: the phantasm lacks Campaspe’s “apt[ness] to love.”  The 
phantasm, although triumphant over Cupid, is manifestly unresponsive to the process of 
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erotic creation.  Where Campaspe suffered blindness in response to Apelles’ wounded 
eyes, the phantasm is impassive and invulnerable; in his song, Apelles sees her as an 
agent of Love’s blindness rather than its victim.  Although the phantasm’s aggression 
could signal her active engagement in the gambling match, in truth she does very little in 
the song other than play her cards well.  If anyone is doing anything, it is Cupid: the 
subject of Apelles’ song, Cupid independently and seemingly without prompting hazards 
various aspects of his character.  But even the erotic quality of the card game quickly 
dissipates.  In the opening lines of the song we learn that the game is being played “for 
kisses” (3.5.72), but these stakes are never mentioned again.  And blindness, which had 
been evidence of the erotic love between Apelles and Campaspe, is seemingly sapped of 
its erotic significance in the newly risen blind Cupid.  Unlike kisses given or received, 
Cupid’s blindness is hardly a prize, since the phantasm does not stand to gain anything 
from it.  The phantasm’s erotic detachment reveals the limits of Apelles’ creative power 
now that the lady herself is absent.  Presumably Apelles could have imagined any version 
of his beloved in his song—a yielding Campaspe, a receptive Campaspe, a kissing 
Campaspe—but the indifferent woman he conjures suggests that the phantasm has taken 
on a life of its own.  As Victor Stoichita observes, “the ‘life’ of a masterpiece—already 
implies, albeit still implicitly—…the death of the model.”
40
  The qualitative difference 
between Campaspe and her phantasm suggests that the lady suffers a kind of death as 
Apelles turns his attentions to recreating her in his solitude. 
It makes sense, then, that Apelles is in no rush to move beyond the bounds of his 
art, that he wants to prolong his time painting Campaspe until Alexander at last demands 
the finished product.  Unable to tolerate the prospect of ending their artistic and erotic 
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interaction, Apelles resolves to extend it by adding blemishes to the portrait.  This may be 
a subtle act of homage to Campaspe, whose own intention it was artfully to desecrate 
herself, to create what she calls a “disordered countenance” (3.4.71) conducive to a 
“deformed” painting (3.4.72).  But Apelles’ deformations also reveal the importance of 
process over product in an erotic relation.  That a great painter, famed for his ability to 
create unparalleled works of art, is willing to damage his portrait in order to prolong the 
artistic process testifies to the dangers of imagining any artistic or erotic relationship as 
perfect or complete.  The lovers’ mutual creativity depends on imperfect and incomplete 
portraiture.  It is this that makes Campaspe’s skill at diminishment so vital to their 
relation; her affected modesty stimulates the creativity, betterment, and art that alone are 
the instruments of their love-making.  
When Campaspe returns to Apelles’ studio for a final time, their artistic metaphor 
takes on its deepest erotic significance.  Their need to co-create is nowhere more 
pronounced.  When he puts the final touches on the portrait at the end of Act 4, Apelles 
tells Campaspe that he has “almost made an end.”  Her poignant response is that “You 
told me, Apelles, you would never end” (4.4.1-2).  Their barely veiled language works as 
it often does in plays which feature forbidden love; the painting (both the activity and the 
resulting portrait) communicates their illicit feelings.  Campaspe’s recourse to the 
metaphor they have crafted once again instrumentalizes the process of painting, making it 
a linguistic prosthetic for the things they are unable to say.  And like her earlier rejoinder 
(“he who made me last in the world”), her gentle yet wistful reproach again completes 
Apelles’ line.  Once again, Campaspe imbues his words with the balance and symmetry 
that have constituted their erotic medium, binding together painting and loving as 
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coincident experiences that “never end.”  But Lyly subtly demonstrates that Campaspe’s 
line is an ending—it is her response to and her completion of Apelles’ opening words.  
And this scene is, likewise, an ending.  Apelles may have it in mind to prolong the 
process by entering into an endless loop of blemishing then retouching the portrait.  But 
his aspiration to conjure substance from shadows now far exceeds anything he set out to 
accomplish with Campaspe as his co-creator. 
The simultaneously futile and transgressive nature of Apelles’ ambition comes out 
in his dialogue with Campaspe as they prepare to part from one another at the end of Act 
4.  When she asks him what he will do if Alexander forbids him to see her, Apelles 
replies that he will “gaze continually on thy picture” (4.4.10).  But not for long.  In his 
next line Apelles explains that “the sweet thoughts, the sure hopes, thy protested faith, 
will cause me to embrace thy shadow continually in mine arms, of the which by strong 
imagination I will make a substance” (4.4.12-15).
41
  Apelles’ preposition “by” cues the 
idea of agency, but now the instrument of desire is neither his artistic skill nor his 
cunning—it has become Apelles’ desire itself, his “strong imagination.”  Having divested 
the art of “shadowing” of its erotic instrumentality, Apelles re-imagines the shadow-
portrait, animated by the strength of his own desire, as the means by which he can 
conjure the lady’s substance.  Even though Campaspe stands right beside him, Apelles 
dreams of summoning her phantasm via the portrait.  His erotic attentions are now 
directed at the portrait, “the thing that is likest you” (4.2.47), in Apelles’ words.  Eros 
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 Hunter suggests that “Apelles seems to have in mind the Pygmalion story” (Campaspe, 116). The 
relationship between Apelles and Pygmalion here is doubly significant; not only does Apelles yearn to 
bring his artwork to life, but he also refers here to the medium of sculpture (“substance”) over painting 
(“shadow”).  “Substance” is subject to kisses and “embrace[s]”; shadows are not. 
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was once the telos of their artistic interaction, but now Apelles imagines an erotic 
embrace that will create Campaspe out of her “shadow.” 
In order to explain Apelles’ fixation on the portrait, the king’s counselor 
Hephestion recounts to Alexander the traditional story of the artist’s narcissistic desire: 
“commonly we see it incident in artificers to be enamoured of their own works… poor 
souls, they kiss the colours with their lips, with which before they were loath to taint their 
fingers” (5.4.15-16 and 22-24).  Upon observing Apelles’ “perplexed” (5.4.12) looks and 
his inability to concentrate, Alexander has begun to suspect that “the painter is in love” 
(5.4.14), presumably with a live person.  But apparently Hephestion sees no difference 
(or he pretends that there is no difference) between Apelles’ love for Campaspe and his 
desire for her shadow.
42
  Alexander picks up on this pretense when he devises a love test 
to “find it out” (5.4.25), “it” being Apelles’ desire for the substance or the shadow: 
“Page, go speedily for Apelles.  Will him to come hither, and when you see us earnestly 
in talk, suddenly cry out, ‘Apelles’ shop is on fire!’” (5.4.25-27).  Later in the scene, 
Apelles’ reaction to the charade apparently gives him away as a lover: “Ay me, if the 
picture of Campaspe be burnt I am undone!” (5.4.92-93).  Of all the love tests Alexander 
could devise, why would he chose this particular scenario to expose Apelles’ desire for 
Campaspe?  Why not endanger the lady herself instead of her portrait?  It seems that 
Alexander either views Apelles’ attitude toward the painting as symptomatic of the 
painter’s feelings for Campaspe, or that, like Hephestion, the king sees no difference 
between the lady and the “shadow” at all. 
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 Hephestion is the mouthpiece for conventional (and often misogynistic) beliefs about love; it is no 
surprise that he is the character who most readily refers to the narcissistic, autoerotic activity of “painters… 
playing with their own conceits” (5.4.19). 
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Apelles’ simultaneously dispiriting and decorous response to Alexander is to 
insist that he is in love with his painting rather than the lady who inspired it: “Not love 
her. But your Majesty knows that painters in their last works are said to excel themselves, 
and in this I have so much pleased myself that the shadow as much delighteth me, being 
an artificer, as the substance doth others that are amorous” (5.4.99-103).  Of course the 
king is unconvinced, and Lyly cleverly awards him the play’s final painting metaphor 
when he expresses his doubt: “You lay your colours grossly” (5.4.104), he tells Apelles, 
with a pun on yet another meaning of “colours,” as rhetorical flourishes.  It would appear 
that Alexander completely rejects the play’s conviction that artifice can serve as the 
instrument of erotic experience.  In commonsensical Alexander’s mind, art and eros are 
fundamentally different.  The most that he will concede is that Apelles has used the 
former to hide the latter.  
When Alexander resolves to join Apelles and Campaspe together in love at the 
end of the play, he employs the straightforward and unadorned language we have come to 
expect from him, informing the lady, “Campaspe, here is news: Apelles is in love with 
you” (5.4.115-16).  This plain speech is bracing, if for no other reason than that neither 
Apelles nor Campaspe has made any such artless declaration.  Alexander has no choice 
but assertively (and comically) to prompt the conspicuously tongue-tied lovers: “Apelles, 
take Campaspe.  Why move ye not?  Campaspe, take Apelles.  Will it not be?” (5.4.131-
32).  The lovers do eventually acquiesce (admitting their feelings in uncharacteristically 
simple language: “Pardon, my lord, I love Apelles” [5.4.135]), but their reticence cannot 
be explained by their fear of inciting Alexander’s anger.  He has repeatedly consented to 
the match, not to mention encouraged the pair forthrightly to profess their feelings.  
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Evidently it is the lovers themselves who stand in the way of a happy union at the end of 
the play.  Absent the language of painting as the medium through which to conceptualize 
and communicate their desire, they are stymied.  Without their secret language, the lovers 
hardly have any language at all.  
What the lovers do have is Alexander’s plain speech, a language that portends not 
just the loss of artistry, and not just silence, but more ominously, the extinction of eros.  
Because Apelles and Campaspe’s erotic relation is something they have made, it is 
necessarily artificial.  When the lovers replace their own stylized mode of speech with 
Alexander’s plain style, they loosen their grip on the erotic relation they have crafted 
together.  Plainness for them is tantamount to dullness; as Cleopatra says, “there is 
nothing left remarkable” (4.15.68).  Once the lovers stop artfully making their erotic 
relation, they begin, artlessly, to break it.  Because eros is always in process for them, 
there can be no middle ground, no stasis.  Hence even the ending of the play—with its 
fusion of union and reticence—indicates a desire, on Lyly’s part no less than the lovers’, 
to prolong the creative process. 
This correlation between the lovers’ creative process and Lyly’s own dramatic art 
reminds us that Apelles and Campaspe inherit their self-conscious artifice from Lyly.  All 
of what I have been arguing about the erotic instrument—its dual capacity to bring lovers 
into relation and to keep them apart; its self-conscious artificiality and made-ness; its 
responsiveness to process and attenuation upon consummation; its dependence on 
mutuality—is true of Lyly’s dramatic language.
43
  In particular, the features of the erotic 
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 Michael Pincombe has suggested a likeness between Apelles’ portrait and Lyly’s own art: “Lyly, I think, 
uses the device of the defaced portrait as an emblem of the way he felt his own art might be deformed by 
the pressures of writing in a political context such as that of the court, in which, as his own play shows, one 
had to be very careful what one said or wrote.” See Michael Pincombe, The Plays of John Lyly, 46. 
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instrument are hallmarks of Lyly’s euphuistic and antithetical prose style.
44
  
Traditionally, euphuism is defined as an ornamental verbal pattern distinguished by its 
symmetries and antitheses, especially isocolon (clauses of the same length), parison 
(clauses with corresponding grammatical structures), and paramoion (words with similar 
sounds, such as alliteration).
45
  Euphuistic balance, antithesis, and doubling make Lyly’s 
language an especially apt instrument in its own right: these are the media through which 
we encounter Apelles and Campaspe’s erotic experience, and art-making is the medium 
through which they access eros.  The linguistic density and abundance typical of Lyly’s 
style contribute to the rhythms of deferral and delay that are so vital to Apelles and 
Campaspe’s relation.
46
  The tendency of euphuism and antithesis to frustrate closure and 
delay consummation reflects the pace of Apelles and Campaspe’s erotic experience, 
which can only flourish for as long as the lovers can protract their artistic process. 
Perhaps more telling than its resistance to closure is euphuism’s capacity to bring 
distinct conceptual and experiential domains into relation with one another.  Antitheses 
are euphuistic stock in trade, but Lyly also has penchant for conjoining unrelated 
concepts or ideas.
47
  Leah Scragg writes that the balance, symmetry, and ornamental 
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 Jonas Barish claims that Campaspe’s “weak and inconclusive ending” is a result of Lyly’s “peculiar… 
logical style,” endemic to the playwright’s euphuistic prose.  According to Barish, “the force that has 
disjoined character or analyzed feeling to create dramatic tension can do little to fuse or recombine them.”  
See Jonas A. Barish, “The Prose Style of John Lyly,” ELH 23, no. 1 (1956): 14-35, 34. 
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 Barish (14-15) cites traditional definitions of euphuism in Morris William Croll and Henry Clemons’ 
edition of Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit and Euphues and his England (London, 1916). 
46
 Leah Scragg argues that these rhythms emerge from Lyly’s antithetical language, which creates 
ambivalence and thus unsettles meaning:  
The development through a series of antithetical propositions draws the reader not towards an
 irresistible conclusion, but into a series of branching avenues leading progressively further from
 an inevitable goal, frustrating the drive of the narrative towards finality and closure, and
 proliferating the positions from which a judgment might be reached. 
See Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit and Euphues and his England, ed. Leah Scragg (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), 5.   
47 
Such odd and unrelated pairings have often unsettled readers and scholars of Lyly’s work.  Carter 
Daniel’s introduction to his 1988 edition of Lyly’s plays cites various indictments of the “preposterous,” 
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features of euphuism often “yok[e] disparate areas of experience.”
48
  It is unsurprising 
then, that euphuism becomes an instrument of Campaspe’s own creative and interpretive 
process throughout the play, from her use of polysemic language (“colours,” “draw”) to 
the symmetries she finds between Apelles’ flattering words and his artful brushstrokes. 
Jonas Barish argues that Lyly uses the “more general logicality” of euphuism “to express 
the composite nature of experience.”
49
  To Barish’s final phrase, I would add the word 
“erotic”: for Apelles and Campaspe, euphuism formalizes a composite experience of eros 
that artfully draws on the artist’s pigment and words, on the model’s gestures and 
judgments.  This “composite nature” is especially evident in the deployment of 
instruments as a means of accessing eros; the artistic instruments that stand between 
Lyly’s erotic subject and object are also what bring them together.  Euphuism and 
instrumentality both illuminate symmetries and preserve basic divisions between subject 
and object.  The result is a heterogeneous “composite” erotic experience; euphuistic 
terms are always held apart by the structure of the sentence, brought together only to be 
placed on parallel tracks.  Such tension and drag is, of course, a prominent feature of 
instrumentality itself—the greater the adornment, the greater the friction. This is the 
tension which is constitutive of the erotic process Lyly dramatizes—it is what Apelles 
longs to preserve in his attempts to blemish and correct the painting, to keep it firmly in 
place between himself and his beloved.  A play like Campaspe, in which eros is so self-
consciously artful and highly wrought, reveals the unique capacity of Lyly’s dramatic 
style to act as an erotic instrument in its own right. 
                                                
“strained,” and “unnatural” quality of his euphuistic pairings.   Daniel finds in Lyly’s euphuistic language 
evidence of the playwright’s “comic spirit” (See Carter Daniel, introduction to The Plays of John Lyly, ed. 
Carter Daniel [Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1988], 12-13). 
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 Scragg, Euphues, 19. 
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 Barish, “Prose Style,” 27. 
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Beyond Lyly’s own creative project, what can the domain of artistic creation tell 
us about the properties of erotic desire?  Although painting serves many practical 
purposes in Lyly’s play—it is Apelles’ profession, the reason he meets Campaspe in the 
first place, and the activity that accompanies all of their other interactions—it also serves 
a conceptual purpose.  It provides the lovers with more than a vocabulary; it affords them 
a structure, a conceptual system, which gives their experience of erotic desire its shape, 
its medium, and its meaning.  The roles, relationships, and entailments of the domain of 
artistic invention—artist and model, pigment and paintbrush, “aptness” and “cunning,” 
gazing and posing, “gloz[ing]” and “seem[ing],” representation and reflection—highlight 
the creative features of the erotic experience.  The lovers make their desire together by 
means of the metaphor.  And metaphor in turn sustains their erotic experience, just as 
much as the act of painting, as much as the lovers’ newly discovered “cunning” or 
“apt[ness].”  Deprived of their metaphor in the final scene of the play, they have no 
means of knowing or experiencing desire.  Artistic creation is the only way they can 
access eros, which is why Apelles clings so desperately to the creative medium in 
Campaspe’s absence.  But his problematic attempts at conjuring Campaspe’s phantasm, 
by way of the song or the portrait, reveal the importance of collaboration in making an 
erotic relation that remains vital and “fresh” (3.1.1).  No sooner do the lovers relinquish 
their shared metaphor of artistic process than they forfeit eros itself. 
 
 
III. “You lie, in faith”: Making Marriage in The Taming of the Shrew 
 
In the final section of this study, I turn to the instrumental role of language itself 
as a medium of erotic experience.  The “Desiring is Creating” metaphor in The Taming of 
the Shrew depends upon the creative power of words, rather than an artist’s pigments or a 
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model’s gestures, as erotic instruments.  The subject of language is by no means new to 
this chapter; we already have seen Campaspe’s euphuism and polysemy weave the 
lovers’ artistic and erotic experiences together.  But unlike Lyly’s lovers’ instruments, 
Kate and Petruchio’s art is itself an art of language; they creatively recruit words, stories, 
and lies to make a marriage together.  In The Taming of the Shrew, then, erotic language 
is a kind of dramatic action.  Words themselves act in The Taming of the Shrew—for 
Petruchio and Kate, they create—and this dynamic quality makes their language 
something more than solely instrumental.  As Kenneth Burke explains, 
Those who begin with the stress upon tools proceed to define language itself  
as a species of tool.  But though instrumentality is an important aspect of 
language, we could not properly treat it as the essence of language.  To define 
language simply as a species of tool would be like defining metals merely as a 
species of tools.  Or like defining sticks and stones simply as primitive weapons.  
Edward Sapir’s view of language as ‘a collective means of expression’ points  
in a more appropriate direction…. Language is a species of action, symbolic 
action—and its nature is such that it can be used as a tool.
50
 
 
Burke’s close affiliation of “Agency” with “Act” informs this chapter’s study of erotic 
language.  The “Desiring is Creating” metaphor dramatizes the dynamic quality of words: 
erotic language creates, and is thus “a species of action.”  Since language is the 
characters’ medium of creation, it is also their agency. 
As it happens, the “Desiring is Creating” metaphor encompasses more than these 
two terms from Burke’s pentad.  Apelles and Campaspe’s artistic process remakes them 
as agents even as they use instruments (agency) to create their erotic relation; and when 
they discover the importance of dynamic process (act) to their experience of love-
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 Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966), 15. 
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making, they try to prolong it, making process an end in itself (purpose).
51
  When we turn 
to erotic instrumentality in The Taming of the Shrew, we encounter the fifth term of 
Burke’s pentad.  Kate and Petruchio’s marriage-making project requires them to build a 
private world—a scene—through language.  Their language becomes as self-consciously 
artificial as the synthetic scene they create, not only in its often elaborate and even 
hyperbolic style, but also in its content—Petruchio and Kate’s words are artfully styled, 
but they also are false in their substance, belying the truth of the real world. 
Early on in The Taming of the Shrew, it becomes clear that Petruchio is a liar of 
the highest order.  Even before he gets down to the business of taming Kate by 
fabricating flaws with the meat at their dining table, his words have more swagger than 
substance.  Bombarding Baptista with a slew of metaphors before he even meets Kate, 
Petruchio begins the process of creating his and Kate’s relationship through words: “I am 
as peremptory as she proud-minded, / And where two raging fires meet together / They 
do consume the thing that feeds their fury” (2.1.132-34).  Of course, those “two raging 
fires” quickly become Kate’s “little fire” (135) striving against his “extreme gusts” (136), 
then Kate’s “winds” (141) blowing against Petruchio’s “mountains” (141).  The pace and 
fluidity of his metaphors reflect Petruchio’s talent for telling stories, and in particular, for 
lying.  He creates and amends, only to re-revise his relation to Kate by means of 
conflicting metaphors, figures that when taken together, can in no way represent a single 
truth.  Each of his successive metaphors fashions an alternate world—in the first world, 
the lovers meet as one fire and so move together; in the second, he moves more forcefully 
than she, and in the third, he does not move at all (“She moves me not” [1.2.71]).  Such 
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 When the creative process is both an erotic action and its telos, as it is for Lyly’s lovers, it may be 
described as entelechial: “Desiring is Creating” accomplishes its end in process. 
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figuration either dispenses with truth—certainly no one of his metaphors has to be true—
or it confirms that the only truth that matters is the truth of Petruchio’s linguistic 
virtuosity, his talent for making truths.  Like Campaspe and Apelles, Petruchio traffics in 
self-advertising artifice, in a style that aims for flourishes over plainness, fulsomeness 
over brevity.   
It comes as no surprise, then, that Petruchio aims to woo Kate with lies, 
describing her not as she really is but as he would have her be.  His goal is presumably to 
warrant the truth of his assertions—“thou art pleasant, gamesome, passing courteous” 
(2.1.236)—by assertion.
52
  And yet, there is something decidedly off about Petruchio’s 
plan.  To begin with, there is some question as to whether he actually desires these 
qualities in a wife.  When he hears about Kate’s wild behavior with Hortensio—the 
“impatient devilish spirit” (2.1.152) with which “she struck me on the head” (2.1.154)—
Petruchio responds with an eagerness to meet her: “Now, by the world, it is a lusty 
wench. / I love her ten times more than e’er I did. / O how I long to have some chat with 
her!” (2.1.161-63).  Although Petruchio’s words have already been exposed as 
overinflated and equivocal (his “ten times” greater “love” for a woman he still has not 
actually met is dubious), his excitement is palpable.
53
  Petruchio has already declared his 
desire to gaze upon Kate, “to make mine eye the witness / Of that report which I so oft 
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Petruchio intends to speak with declarative illocutionary force—that is, his words are meant to bring about 
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(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 129-65. 
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have heard” (2.1.52-53); but here he reveals that his interest lies in her conversation: her 
“chat” is what he “long[s]” for.  Then, too, it is the “lusty” quality that he finds in her 
aggressive and rebellious behavior and speech that attracts him.  While early modern 
English “lusty” connoted sexual desire or fervor, it also spoke to liveliness and vigor.
54
  
Petruchio’s “long[ing]” for Kate’s vigor—sexual or otherwise—calls into question his so-
called desire for “peace…and quiet life” (5.2.112) in marriage.  “[Q]uiet[ness]” 
apparently makes for as tepid and lackluster an erotic relation in Shakespeare as in Lyly.  
Like Apelles, who is first attracted to the “fresh” quality in Campaspe, Petruchio’s 
response to Kate’s liveliness is to employ it in the service of a mutual and erotic end.  To 
“chat” with her will be to put her vigor to use alongside his own. 
Still, none of this explains why Petruchio woos with false descriptions.  What 
does he hope to accomplish by blatantly lying to Kate about how she is behaving?   Does 
he really believe that his praise of her “mildness” (2.1.192) will magically induce her to 
retract her claws and become mild?  Corinne S. Abate has argued that Petruchio’s “tactics 
of positive reinforcement” create an affective bond with his future wife.  But since 
Petruchio hatches his plan with the expectation that Kate will display no such “positive” 
behaviors to reinforce, Abate’s assessment is probably too generous.
55
  The most 
prominent feature of Petruchio’s seduction scheme is the gap between his words and 
Kate’s actions: by deliberately mislabeling her behavior, Petruchio conspicuously 
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 See “lusty, adj.,” The Oxford English Dictionary, 2
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 ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press, 
June 2011 < http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/111424>. Entries 3 and 4 give “full of desire, desirous” and 
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allow her in turn to create a private space for herself within her marriage” (See Corinne S. Abate, “Neither 
a Tamer Nor a Shrew Be: A Defense of Petruchio and Katherine,” in Privacy, Domesticity, and Women in 
Early Modern England, ed. Corinne S. Abate [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003], 31-44, 31).  Rather than creating 
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introduces the element of artifice into his relation with Kate.  Describing Kate in 
language that stands in such stark contrast to her actions loosens the connection between 
Petruchio’s words and the world they putatively reflect.  The result is that his assertions 
create the possibility of a different world—one that, for all that it is a lie, nonetheless can 
conjure a privately and mutually constituted truth.  Or, it can do this if Kate confirms his 
untruths.   Petruchio may believe that he must “tame” Kate if he is to secure her 
confirmation, but Shakespeare reveals that only their mutual erotic and affective 
experiences enable them to inhabit the shared reality that becomes their marriage.  Love 
and marriage are creative acts for Petruchio and Kate—they make marriage just as we say 
we make love.  Their lies are inseminating; from them germinates an intimate, erotic, 
shared, and ever-so-private imaginary in which “men and women are alone” (2.1.313).  
To inhabit such a world requires of them a mutually constitutive faith in their lies.  
Petruchio’s storytelling power is tested as early as the couple’s first encounter, 
when he realizes that his plan to bring about a series of truths by lying is more difficult to 
execute than he imagines.  Although he intends to woo Kate by responding to her 
language (“Say that she rail . . . ” [2.1.171]), it is Petruchio who speaks first, Petruchio 
who speaks eleven of the first thirteen lines of their exchange.  Once their lines begin to 
split more evenly, he struggles to maintain his fictions.  When he calls her “young and 
light” (2.1.206) and Kate twists his words in reply, Petruchio veers away from his script 
and betrays his frustrations (“Should be? should – buzz!” [2.1.209]).  Rather than praise 
Kate for those qualities he would have her embody, he proves unable to sustain a lie and 
instead responds to her actual behavior: “Come, come, you wasp, i’faith you are too 
angry” (2.1.212), and “you must not look so sour” (2.1.232).  Apparently Petruchio’s 
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fictions only take him so far; Kate’s anger and sourness get the best of him, provoking an 
equally angry and sour response on his part.  When she strikes him, he cannot bring 
himself to praise her gentle touch and instead threatens her with violence in kind: “I 
swear I’ll cuff you if you strike again” (224).  Petruchio’s threat sounds more like “two 
raging fires” than a stoic mountain impervious to Kate’s breeze.  If we listen closely, we 
can hear that his lies fail to make truths precisely when she unsettles him emotionally: 
language fails him when Kate incites an anger in him that matches her own.  When 
speech acts give way to affective experience, Petruchio and Kate, undoubtedly much to 
their dismay, find themselves feeling together. 
A number of scholars have commented on Kate and Petruchio’s shared 
dispositions and linguistic patterns, and such similarities set the tone for a marriage based 
on mutuality.
56
  The likenesses between Petruchio and Kate’s temperaments are anything 
but subtle; at various turns, any number of characters will refer to the pair’s mutual 
“mad[ness]” (3.2.180) and “shrew[ishness]” (“he is more shrew than she,” says Curtis in 
4.1.76).  All of this comports with Petruchio’s image of “two raging fires” (2.1.132).  But 
this metaphor reveals more than mere similarity between the lovers; in it, they become 
undifferentiated, merging when they “meet together” into a single force of nature.
57
  
Moreover, the rage in “raging” points to the way their commonalities constellate around 
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affect, around madness, shrewishness, choler, and passion.  Despite the imbalance of 
power between them, Petruchio’s metaphor suggests that they will eventually share their 
feelings.  But this will take time: before they meet, Petruchio’s and Kate’s dispositions 
and qualities are similar but still separate.  Yes, she and he are both mad, just not mad 
together. 
But when Petruchio threatens to “cuff” (2.2.224) Kate after she strikes him, they 
are mad together.  In that instant, however brief, they feel the same thing at the same 
time.  Their shared affective experience apparently comes from the erotic friction that has 
built during the pair’s verbal sparring match.  Petruchio’s words cannot make Kate into 
an obedient wife, but it turns out that they can bring about a change in the couple’s world.  
His language makes their scene erotic by imposing on their interactions a crude sexuality 
which is sometimes merely misogynistic (“Women are made to bear” [2.1.203]), but 
which at other times, might engender erotic activity itself (“come sit on me” [2.1.201]).  
Of course, the imperative force of Petruchio’s command is nugatory, since Kate intends 
neither to “bear” nor to “sit on” him.  But even without her consent or her affection, 
Petruchio’s lines infuse their interaction with erotic tension and energy. 
Petruchio’s sexual jokes and provocations culminate in his refusal to leave Kate 
“with my tongue in your tail” (2.1.221).  This statement falls in line with their volley of 
double entendres and puns, but now Petruchio asserts that they are engaged in an erotic 
activity in the present tense.  Rewriting their conversation as analingus, Petruchio would 
have it that Kate’s mouth is a “tail” that he is penetrating with his tongue.  Unlike a 
command or solicitation (“come sit on me”) that Kate can refuse, Petruchio’s description 
insists that something sexually explicit is happening now.  No, he cannot enforce the 
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physical act that he describes, but neither is he quite lying.  His tongue is, after all, in her 
“tale” if not her “tail”, hence his language has the curious effect of making their exchange 
erotic merely by asserting that it is.  The proof is that Kate now strikes him and so 
arouses his anger.  It is the erotic charge of Petruchio’s language that prompts their 
shared affective experience of anger.  When he insists that an erotic act is happening in 
the present tense, that it is an aural effect of their verbal exchange, Petruchio 
reconceptualizes everything the pair has been doing together.  The imaginative power of 
his suggestion is enough to elicit a physical response from Kate, enough, too, to create 
the possibility of a private world whose erotic charge can alter the real world they inhabit. 
The invention of a separate and private world that lies at the heart of Petruchio’s 
marriage-making project reflects the period’s changing ideas about the role of privacy 
and domesticity in marriage.
58
  Although the category of privacy was itself unstable in 
early modern England—and very much so with regard to domestic life and marriage—
there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that privacy was beginning to emerge 
as a condition or an aspiration of marriage.
59
  Petruchio participates in this imaginative 
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 Although a number of scholars have argued that the concept of privacy in the West dates to the early 
modern period, there has been some debate about the legibility of this category during Shakespeare’s day.  
Jürgen Habermas finds the origins of the modern distinction between public and private spheres in the 
eighteenth century (See Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger [Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1989).  Other 
scholars find evidence of this distinction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Lena Cowen Orlin 
writes, “public and private did not sort themselves for early moderns in precisely the same way they do for 
us, but this is not to deny that a sorting process was engaged in the period” (See Orlin, Private Matters and 
Public Culture in Post-Reformation England [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994], 89).  The emerging 
divisions between public and private in the early modern period have been of particular interest to scholars 
of early modern women and domesticity.  See S. P. Cerasano and Marion Wynne-Davies, ed., Gloriana’s 
Face: Women, Public and Private in the English Renaissance (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1992), and Corinne S. Abate, ed., Privacy, Domesticity, and Women in Early Modern England (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003). Although there is some disagreement among scholars as to the stability of early modern 
divisions between public and private, it is clear that the concept of privacy is available as a rhetorical, 
metaphorical, and theoretical category during the period.  The material, lived experience of privacy (e.g., in 
the early modern home) is more difficult to access. 
59
 Lena Cowen Orlin has emphasized the important distinctions among lived experience, chronicled or 
recorded history, and imaginative literature in her study of private life in early modern England: “[D]espite 
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project when he uses suggestion and fabrication to conjure a private domestic scene.  
Since he cannot change the public world with words—calling Kate “tame” will not tame 
her—he sets out to create a private world that validates his words.
60
  He begins this 
project in his initial dialogue with Kate, but the lies he tells her father at the end of the 
scene arguably constitute his most important tactic.  Petruchio insists that Kate is 
infatuated with him in private but that they have “bargained ‘twixt us twain, being alone, 
/ That she shall still be curst in company” (2.1.305-06).  “[B]eing alone” itself calls into 
being a distinction between the couple’s private and public behavior.  For Petruchio, this 
is the very work of marriage—the fabrication of a domestic scene or home, along with a 
private language suited to it.  For all that it is utterly false, the private life that he 
describes has become a possibility simply because he speaks it into existence.  Moreover, 
the bargain that he says that he and Kate have struck is not only a fiction in itself, it is 
also a bargain about fiction making.  The two of them are said to have agreed to act one 
way “being alone” and another way “in company.”  He goes on to praise Kate’s loving 
kisses and oaths, boasting how “‘Tis a world to see / How tame, when men and women 
are alone, / A meacock wretch can make the curstest shrew” (2.1.312-14).  Stephen Orgel 
glosses Petruchio’s “world” as “worth a world,” but the phrase “‘Tis a world” also 
stipulates a private realm in which “men and women are alone” (313).  Petruchio has 
                                                
all efforts to codify it, to demystify it, and to find convenient ruling formulas for it, the private life of the 
sixteenth century was the stuff of legend as surely as was any chronicle of state or myth of nationhood.  Of 
course its literature was shaped by culture and mediated by ideology, but this literature nonetheless gives us 
glimpses of interpersonal relations, forbidden pleasures, shared jokes, small tragedies, personal triumphs, 
and private miracles that defied doctrine” (See Orlin, “Chronicles of Private Life,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to English Literature 1500-1600, ed. Arthur Kinney [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000], 241-64, 260.) 
60
 Speech act theory dictates that a successful declarative utterance must have a double direction of fit, from 
the world to the word and word to world: “the world is altered to fit the propositional content by 
representing the world as being so altered” (Searle and Vanderveken, Foundations, 53).  Petruchio’s 
creation of a new world might give his declarative statements enough illocutionary force to make them 
successful. 
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begun to create a modern marriage by making a new world, mysterious and unknowable 
from the outside, inaccessible to anyone but himself and Kate. 
When the couple leaves Padua, then, they bring with them this imagined private 
world, with as many erotic and affective possibilities as there are words to name them.  
To cohabit with him the intimate space that he describes to Baptista, Petruchio 
interpolates a Kate who covers him with “kiss on kiss” (309), bestowing caresses and 
embraces, vows and protests, in abundance.  Taken together with the sodomitical kisses 
he insinuates into their earlier exchange, the erotic potential of this imagined world is 
vast, if not quite mutual.  It is Kate’s kisses (of whatever sort) that Petruchio dwells on in 
his descriptions, not his own.  When the couple finally does arrive at Petruchio’s country 
house in 4.1, he suddenly has to contend with the very real affective experience that the 
marriage he has made out of lies entails.  All at once, he launches a sleep and food 
deprivation program: to keep Kate awake, he plans to “fling” (4.1.191) the bed sheets and 
pillows; “if she chance to nod I’ll rail and brawl / And with the clamor keep her still 
awake” (4.1.196-97).  In the 1980 BBC film, John Cleese’s disheveled Petruchio 
struggles to keep his eyes open during this speech, following up “if she chance to nod” 
with a huge, gaping yawn of his own.
61
  Cleese’s performance reminds us that all of this 
midnight railing and brawling deprives Petruchio of sleep, too; although his taming 
strategies are cruel, he suffers alongside his wife.
62
  Earlier, at the dinner table, he 
declares, “this night we’ll fast in company” (4.1.167; emphasis mine).  Petruchio easily 
could have tormented Kate by gorging on mutton while she looks on with longing, but he 
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 I am grateful to Tobias Gregory for pointing out Cleese’s performance as a sleep-deprived Petruchio in 
the BBC production of the play. 
62
 When Petruchio first hears of Kate in 1.2, he describes his eagerness to meet her in similar terms: “I will 
not sleep, Hortensio, till I see her” (1.2.102). 
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decides to abstain.  His reason: the overcooked mutton “engenders choler, planteth anger, 
/ And better ‘twere that both of us did fast, / Since of ourselves, ourselves are choleric” 
(4.1.162-64).  Rather than emphasize their differences in order to establish dominion over 
Kate, Petruchio focuses on their similar temperaments and creates a shared experience of 
hunger for the couple’s first night together.  In the couple’s mutual experience of 
deprivation, Corinne S. Abate finds evidence for Petruchio’s creation of a private sphere: 
“While Petruchio will not allow Katherine to sit down and eat, he denies himself a meal 
as well, thus continuing to subject them both to the same conditions, an act of denial 
which by extension continues his work of constructing a private space of their own.”
63
 
I have been referring to their shared private space, but every production of the 
play reminds us that Petruchio and Kate are never quite alone at his country house.  In 
fact, the only scene in the play in which just the two of them are on stage together takes 
place before they are married, in 2.1, when Petruchio first broaches the possibility of a 
private world.  The country house provides no such privacy—at least, not if we define 
privacy in terms of physical isolation or solitude.  When Petruchio denies Kate food and 
sleep, he does so with Grumio’s and Hortensio’s help.  Even the couple’s sleepless nights 
are subject to his servants’ scrutiny.  That Curtis delivers a report on Petruchio’s “sermon 
of continency to her” (4.1.173) testifies to the publicity of the pair’s “bridal chamber” 
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 Abate, Privacy, Domesticity, and Women, 35-36.  My argument about Petruchio’s marriage-making 
techniques diverges from Abate’s in degree rather than in kind.  For example, Abate continues, “[a]nything 
Petruchio asks of Katherine, any sacrifice or any perceived maltreatment she may experience, he subjects 
himself to as well” (36; emphasis mine).  I believe that this overstates the degree of reciprocity and balance 
in the couple’s mutual suffering.  Since Petruchio clearly inflicts the suffering upon Kate, it difficult to 
consider her “perceived maltreatment” as equally shared.  As I have suggested elsewhere in this 
dissertation (particularly the discussion of Endymion in Chapter 2), mutual erotic experiences are not 
necessarily equal or symmetrical. 
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(4.1.168).
64
  Curtis’s report also suggests that, among Petruchio’s other deprivations, he 
denies Kate the sexual satisfactions of married life.  And of course, this privation extends 
to Petruchio as well.  Without food, Kate will want.  Without sleep, Kate will want.  And 
as long as Petruchio stays up all night and shuns food all day alongside his new wife, he 
too will want.
65
  In the not-so-private space of the country house, the newlyweds achieve 
a kind of intimacy by way of this privately shared experience—they both go without 
food, sleep, and sex, even among the servants, friends, and peddlers who surround them.  
For now, however, Petruchio can accomplish only so much: deprivation does not enable 
him to create a wife, but he can use it to create desire—a set of mutual desires that he 
alone has the power to enforce.  
Coercion and aggression do, then, play important roles in Petruchio’s private 
world scenario; however, it would be unwise to underestimate the creative efficacy of the 
couple’s preeminent shared affective state—their giddiness.  Giddiness is the lubricant 
that loosens Petruchio and Kate’s ties to the public world around them.  Petruchio tells us 
that his goal is to “curb her mad and headstrong humor” (4.1.199), presumably by 
weakening Kate’s defenses.  That two of the surest ways to incur madness are starvation 
and sleep-deprivation becomes clear when Kate later complains that she is “giddy for 
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 Laurie E. Maguire writes that Petruchio’s domestic life offers glimpses at his private self: “Petruchio will 
distinguish between public and private behaviour in his wife’s life, as he apparently does in his own.  This 
blustering, military boor in public Padua is domestic in his country house, enquiring about his dog and his 
cousin Ferdinand, calling for his slippers, and expressing uncertainty rather than confidence in his private 
moments (‘And ‘tis my hope to end successfully’: IV.i.189; emphasis added)” (Maguire, “Household 
Kates,” 140). 
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 Deprivation is an embodied and an affective experience that the couple shares, but it is also Petruchio’s 
response to Kate’s linguistic withholding.  Having dressed her meat, he asks for “thanks” (41).  She utters 
“not a word” (42), and he responds by removing the  dish from the table.  Although we might expect 
Petruchio to silence Kate as part of his shrew-taming agenda, here he reveals a desire for her speech.  Such 
a desire is not Petruchio’s alone; Kate complains that Bianca’s “silence flouts me” (2.1.29) and even comes 
to blows with her sister as a result of Bianca’s unwillingness to engage in conversation.  For Kate no less 
than for Petruchio, then, an unwillingness to engage in speech (or to say the right things) signals a profound 
refusal of affective, not to mention, social, engagement.  That both Kate and Petruchio crave verbal 
intercourse testifies to their mirroring need for conversation partners who can confirm the truths they assert. 
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lack of sleep” (4.3.9).  Kate apparently enters into an alternative reality within their 
quasi-private space.  Here, she “sits as one new-risen from a dream” (4.1.175).  Having 
severed their ties to reality, the couple begins to inhabit the private world Petruchio 
imagined for his married life with Kate.  John C. Bean describes Kate’s bewilderment as 
being “immersed in chaos, in that irrational world where we lose our bearings and our old 
sense of truth, and [where] she is challenged to respond as Christopher Sly does in the 
Induction by yielding to the confusion, abandoning her old identity in favor of a new 
one.”
66
  If, as I am suggesting, such a world is accessible only through mutually felt 
experience, then Petruchio must be giddy as well.  And so it is that the widow at the 
wedding feast comments, in response to a quip from Petruchio, that “[h]e that is giddy 
thinks the world turns round” (5.2.20).  By releasing them from the entailments of the 
real world, mutual giddiness helps Kate and Petruchio to turn the world on its head.  In 
topsy-turvydom, they may inhabit the private world that Petruchio’s lies have made 
possible. 
 Although the couple officially weds in Act 3 of the play, the final scene of Act 4 
stages their alternate marriage ceremony in their “world turn[ed] round.”  Vows are made 
and tested, blessings are bestowed, and now their lies become the truths of their shared 
imaginary.  On Kate and Petruchio’s journey back to Padua, this new world is revealed to 
be colorful and poetic, not to mention creatively and erotically charged.  The lovers’ 
fictions, which acknowledge the realities before them, also engender a private scene with 
realities of its own.  At last, they make for one another a marriage that is both publicly 
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 See John C. Bean, “Comic Structure and the Humanizing of Kate in The Taming of the Shrew,” in The 
Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare, ed. Carolyn Ruth Swift Lenz, Gayle Greene, and Carol 
Thomas Neely. [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980], 65-78, 72. 
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recognized and privately meaningful, imagined and real.  By distinguishing their truths 
from those of the outside world, they discover a new way to inhabit that world. 
 The exchange between Kate and Petruchio as they make their way back to Padua 
is straightforward enough: Petruchio makes assertions about the outside world that are 
blatant lies (first that the moon is out when the sun plainly shines, and second that an old 
man they pass on the road is actually a young maiden), and Kate slowly begins to 
understand that she must affirm his assertions in spite of what she knows to be true of the 
actual world.  While this much is inarguable, it fails to acknowledge the telling poetic 
flourishes that Kate and Petruchio can add only and precisely because they have agreed to 
their own truth conditions.  Take for example Petruchio’s description of the scene: “Good 
Lord, how bright and goodly shines the moon!” (4.5.2).  Kate counters that it is the 
middle of the day and the sun is shining—“The moon?  The sun.  It is not moonlight 
now” (4.5.3).  Both lovers make a present-tense assertion, but Petruchio tells an 
unvarnished lie and Kate the plain truth.   Plain, too, because where Petruchio 
embellishes (his moon shines “bright and goodly” [4.5.2]), Kate sticks to the plain facts.  
It takes time for her to recognize that he is soliciting her, first to grant his counterfactual 
premise, then to savor his embellishment of it.  It is important that he signal this—a 
signal he sends by means of his fictions, by employing artful language rather than 
commanding her to do so—but it is equally crucial that she come to understand for 
herself that in their world that “turns round,” what matters most is the truthfulness of his 
description of a moon that is nowhere to be seen. 
This exchange launches Kate and Petruchio into a volley of speech acts—
assertions and declarations, vows and oaths—that culminates in a shared poetic which 
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instrumentalizes their erotic relation.  Much of the friction between Kate and Petruchio 
up to this point has resulted from the conflict between false speech and observable 
truths—that is, between saying and knowing.  Petruchio’s project has been to align 
Kate’s speeches with the truths he would have them reflect.  In 4.5, when verbs of saying 
and of knowing abrade one another, the friction creates an erotic spark between the 
lovers.  Petruchio’s lesson to Kate turns linguistic when he tells her, “I say it is the moon 
that shines so bright” (4.5.4).  This is less about whether or not the moon is in the sky 
than that Petruchio says it is.  As we have come to expect, Petruchio is not interested in 
what is real, only in what is spoken.  For Kate, however, the truth of the real world does 
matter—“My tongue will tell the anger of my heart / Or else my heart, concealing it, will 
break” (4.3.77-78)—it being the only thing she still can claim for herself.  Insisting, “I 
know it is the sun that shines so bright” (4.5.5; emphasis mine), she mirrors the structure 
of his line, but she substitutes knowing for saying, thereby writing her truth of the sun 
over his lie of the moon.  To bring her into what he has envisioned as their private world, 
Petruchio must sever Kate’s ties to the truth of the public scene by securing her “faith” 
(2.1.186) in his fictions.  
Kate’s reluctant affirmations of Petruchio’s lies constitute her renewed wedding 
vow in the topsy-turvy world they have created.  After their initial round of stipulations 
about the sun and the moon, their verbs shift from the indicative to the subjunctive mood, 
broadening to include the future tense alongside the present.  Such are the qualities of 
verbs in the marriage ceremony, in which couples make plans and promises.  Even 
Petruchio’s oath, “by my mother’s son, and that’s myself” (4.5.6), calls to mind the 
wedding ceremony’s confirmation of lineage and its deference to the authority of a higher 
  196   
power.  Here, Petruchio as author and deity creates a present and a future reality with his 
“It shall be moon” (4.5.7).  Kate mirrors his language—another feature of the wedding 
ceremony—in a reply that also features the subjunctive mood, and that culminates in a 
promise: “be it moon or sun or what you please. / An if you please to call it a rush candle, 
/ Henceforth I vow it shall be so for me” (13-15; emphasis mine).
67
  Carefully conjoining 
saying and being, Kate weaves the couple’s fictions together with the private realities 
they create: whatever Petruchio “call[s] it… it shall be so for me.”  Co-opting Petruchio’s 
earlier declaration of “it shall be,” but adding the ever-crucial “for me,” Kate comes 
closest to a marriage vow in this line.  She promises her husband a future in which reality 
“for me” can stand apart from that of the observable world. 
Taken together, Kate’s renewed vow, the couple’s mutual giddiness, and the 
fictions that instrumentalize their private world all offer the lovers some creative latitude 
in their experiences together.  When they meet Vincentio in the street, Petruchio’s 
insistence that the old man is actually a “fresh… gentlewoman” (4.5.29) is as effusive 
and rich as ever.  In his familiar style, Petruchio waxes poetic about the rosy cheeks, 
bright eyes, and “heavenly face” (32) of the “fair lovely maid” (33).  Much less expected 
is Kate’s still more effusive response, as fanciful and silly as Petruchio’s characteristic 
bombast, but with marked variations on his established theme.  Petruchio focuses solely 
on the “maid’s” beauty, which comports with his focus on the couple’s earlier 
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 Several scholars have commented on the allegorical significance of the sun and moon as figures for a 
husband and a wife.  Frances E. Dolan describes this ideal relationship as one in which the wife reflects her 
husband like the moon reflects the sun: “Katharine begins to mirror her husband’s moods and perceptions, 
to govern her conduct with an eye to his inclinations, to say as he says.  It is hardly accidental that they 
establish this relationship as person and mirror, source of light and authority versus reflection through a 
debate about the sun and the moon.  In discussing the sun and the moon, they become them” (Dolan, 
Taming, 31).  Laurie E. Maguire, on the other hand, reads the mirroring in the couple’s dialogue as 
evidence for mutuality in the marriage they create together: “Petruchio’s victory is first illustrated in a 
scene which demonstrates the verbal interchangeability of sun and moon, and hence the equivalent status of 
the two bodies” (Maguire, “Household Kates,” 148). 
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conversation about the sun and the moon—Petruchio is mostly interested in making 
observations (typically false ones) and having Kate confirm them as true.  But 
Petruchio’s lies merely build a scene; Kate’s fictions animate that scene by imbuing it 
with plot and setting, invigorating its matter with action.  She assigns the old man a place 
in the world and a reason for being, addressing him as a “Young budding virgin” (36).  
The old man becomes a marriageable maiden, not only a pretty face, but a character with 
a story that Kate protracts when she asks, “Whither away, or where is thy abode?” (37).  
Gathering steam, Kate next draws a web of relationships around their newly-minted 
virgin, asking after the maiden’s parents and “the man whom favorable stars / Allots thee 
for his lovely bedfellow” (39-40).  In a few short lines, Kate has given Petruchio’s pretty 
young creation kin, social status, and an erotic role as well.
68
  Kate may be mocking 
Petruchio’s typically elaborate if empty words, but she has manifestly freed herself (or 
been freed) from the constraints of the world around her, a world she has found largely 
unpleasant and unsatisfying up until this point.  No longer consigned or resigned to 
“tell[ing] the anger of my heart” (4.3.77), Kate now produces new affective states, by 
turns playful, imaginative, and bound only to Petruchio’s fancy.  As John C. Bean puts it, 
“Kate is tamed not by Petruchio’s whip but by the discovery of her own imagination” in 
this scene.
69
 
Corrected by Petruchio as to the proper identity of the old man, Kate continues to 
exercise her newfound mastery of an artful language that animates the world that 
                                                
68
 John C. Bean observes that “Kate herself notes the sexual humor” in the scene (“Comic Structure,” 73). 
69
 Ibid., 72.  Kate’s creative agency in this scene complicates Dolan’s reading of the couple’s “relationship 
as person and mirror” (Taming, 31). 
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Petruchio creates.
70
  Laurie E. Maguire notes “the hyperbole of Kate’s responses to 
Petruchio and the imaginative freedom of her addresses to Vincentio.”
71
  Like Petruchio’s 
fire and wind metaphors in 2.1, Kate’s hyperbole calls attention to the artificiality of the 
lovers’ creative medium.  Their ornate lies recall the ornate language of Lyly’s painter 
and model—artifice is all four lovers’ love-making medium.
72
  Once Kate and Petruchio 
agree on the presence of the moon in the sky or the young girl in the street, they have 
access to “bright” (4.5.2) gleams and rosy “fresh” (4.5.36) beauty.  Their hard won 
“faith” (2.1.186) in their mutual lies enables them to inhabit these fictions, and in so 
doing, they call to mind Curtis’s line from earlier in Act 4, when Grumio hits him rather 
than tell him a story: “This is to feel a tale, not to hear a tale” (4.1.56).  To “feel” a tale is 
to occupy an affective and embodied fiction, turning empty lies into meaningful realities.  
Kate enacts this shift when she tells Vincentio that she mistakenly addressed him as a 
young maiden because her eyes “have been so bedazzled by the sun / That everything I 
look on seemeth green” (45-46).  By cleverly referring back to the couple’s initial debate 
about the presence of the sun in the sky, Kate makes their words meaningful, once again 
animating the world Petruchio has created for them by instrumentalizing the sun, putting 
it to use.
73
  And although Petruchio and Kate have quibbled over what is true and what is 
false, they end up reconfirming everything that is actually true of the scene around them.  
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 Even in Kate’s acknowledgment that Vincentio is in fact an old man, she characterizes him relationally 
and socially, as “a reverend father” (4.5.47), rather than making a simple observation about his physical 
appearance.  Like Campaspe, Kate’s role in her creative partnership with Petruchio is interpretive.  She 
invigorates his creation by giving it meaning. 
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 Maguire, “Household Kates,” 135. 
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 In a 2012 wordless production of the play in Washington, DC, the Synetic Theater Company cast their 
Petruchio as a painter who realizes and explores his desire for Kate by creating her portrait.  In the painting 
scene, Petruchio is surrounded by a group of dancers, each of whom represents a pigment.  The pigments 
dance between him and Kate, using their bodies and hands to block Petruchio’s access to Kate even as they 
present her to him. 
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 Frances E. Dolan also comments on Kate’s embellishments: “Katherine even goes the game one farther, 
elaborating on the identification of the old man as a young woman, and blaming her ‘mistake’ on the sun” 
(Taming, 30).  
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By the end of 4.5, they have agreed that the sun shines above them, and that the traveler 
is indeed an old man.  What has been achieved at the end of the scene is a mutual 
understanding, a promise given, received, and tested, which cues the birth of a creative 
medium for marriage-making that Kate has already begun to explore and refine. 
Kate and Petruchio’s private world aligns much more effortlessly with the sun’s 
beams and the man’s age than it does with the social world that awaits them at Bianca’s 
wedding feast, where uneasy alignment is painfully evident in Kate’s final speech.  In 
4.5, Kate mirrors and answers Petruchio’s lines.  In her final speech in 5.2, Kate must go 
it alone.  In fact, much of what she says in 5.2 appears to be self-authored: Petruchio has 
not complained to Kate of his “painful labor both by sea and land” (5.2.155), nor has he 
made mention of her “soft and weak and smooth” body (5.2.171) as a reason for his 
supremacy.  But like the sun’s beams and the man’s advanced age, Kate’s words do align 
with real world narratives.  Is her fulsome declaration of a wife’s submission another 
poetic flourish, a mere difference in degree from her “mad mistaking” (4.5.48) of the old 
man’s wrinkles as the blush of a young virgin’s cheek?
74
 
What is missing at the end of her forty-four uninterrupted lines of reproach is 
Petruchio’s confirmation, his poetic flourishes that might animate or invigorate the story 
she has told.  He calls her “a wench” (5.2.186), demands a kiss, and gloats about winning 
his bet—but there are no metaphors, puns, or assertions, however truthful, to corroborate 
                                                
74
 Scholars continue to disagree about Kate’s last speech. David Daniell imagines that the couple has 
reached a private understanding: “A special quality of mutuality grew between Katherine and Petruchio as 
the play progressed, something invisible to all the others in the play and sealed for them both by Kate’s last 
speech” (“The Good Marriage of Katherine and Petruchio,” in The Taming of the Shrew Critical Essays, 
ed. Dana Aspinall, [New York: Routledge, 2002], 71-84, 76).  John C. Bean also emphasizes the qualities 
of reciprocity and mutuality in Kate’s final speech, especially when it is compared to its corollary in the 
earlier anonymous play, The Taming of a Shrew (published in 1594).  In contrast to the harsh tone of the 
speech in A Shrew, in which Kate blames women for original sin, Kate’s speech in The Shrew focuses on 
“reciprocity of duties in marriage, based on complementary natures of man and woman” (Bean, “Comic 
Structure,” 68). 
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the world she presents.  All the details (of which there are many) are supplied by Kate, 
rather than co-authored by the pair.  This is not to say that Petruchio explicitly disagrees 
with Kate’s speech, but to suggest that his silence makes it impossible to assess his faith 
in the matrimonial story she tells.  What we are able to assess is the marked difference in 
temperature between the marriage she describes in 5.2 and the one she enters into in 4.5.  
Although Kate scolds the other women at the table for their “frosts” (5.2.145), the picture 
she paints of ideal marriage has little warmth to it.  The only mention of warmth or heat 
is in Kate’s description of the wife who “liest warm at home, secure and safe” (5.2.157) 
while her husband is out toiling in the world.  There is little heat between the couple, 
certainly none of the sparks that Kate and Petruchio generated in their 2.1 encounter, not 
even the warmth of the sun’s beams that they just conjured together. 
In its remoteness and its polish, its separateness and its totality, Kate’s final 
speech resembles Apelles’ finished portrait—it stands at a distance from the lovers.  
When Kate and Petruchio’s words are no longer instrumental to their marriage making, 
they lose their “fresh” quality, their vigor, their friction and so their heat.  Perhaps this is 
why so many productions add their own flourishes to the speech: physical cues from 
either of the lovers, knowing winks or smiles, sounds or gestures of encouragement from 
Petruchio.
75
  Any of these choices speaks to a desire for mutuality, and an 
acknowledgment that such artful flourishes are the erotic instruments that enable 
Petruchio and Kate’s private understanding.  Only when Kate and Petruchio’s words are 
placed in relation do the lovers generate friction and heat.  A shivering Grumio reminds 
                                                
75
 There is a robust theatrical tradition marked by such experimentations with Kate’s final speech.  Citing 
the 1929 Columbia Pictures Taming of the Shrew, where Kate “winks as she advocates a woman’s 
submission to her husband,” Diana Aspinall attributes this tradition to the “feelings of vexation regarding 
Shrew” in the twentieth century (See Aspinall, “The Play and the Critics,” in The Taming of the Shrew 
Critical Essays, ed. Dana Aspinall [New York: Routledge, 2002], 3-38, 30-31). 
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the audience at the start of Act 4 that there is something in the making of heat which is 
itself warming: “But I with blowing the fire shall warm myself” (4.1.8-9).  Grumio draws 
our attention to the means and ends of instrumentality; in his account, the kind of heat 
that comes from blowing the fire is distinct from the heat produced by the fire itself.  The 
former, the heat of labor and creating, is what sustains Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s lovers, 
but only while they make their erotic relations together.    
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Conclusion 
The Success of Failure and Beyond 
 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have explored the capacity of language to create, to 
transform, and to dramatize the erotic experiences of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s 
characters.  I have argued that on the early modern English stage, metaphorical language 
constitutes the inner experience that it reveals.  Characters such as Lyly’s Apelles and 
Campaspe and Shakespeare’s Kate and Petruchio employ their metaphors deliberately, 
even self-consciously, collaboratively making their erotic relations.  Other characters’ 
metaphors are less intentional and so more a product of a fundamental or prior erotic 
orientation.  In Othello’s “stops” (2.1.196) that propel him into frenzied motion, in 
Endymion’s self-effacing exposure, and in Antony and Cleopatra’s erotics of bounded 
loss, we find metaphors that are more cognitive than calculated, more self-making than 
self-made.  Their metaphors create but also constrain their erotic experiences.  Othello’s 
erotic process consists of the collision between the domains of stillness and experience; 
Valentine’s language of banishment gives way to the more flexible domain of 
permeability; and Endymion’s metaphors of exposure produce a form of erotic intimacy 
that paradoxically feeds on solitude and distance.  Erotic language can be extraordinarily 
fruitful—active, dynamic, dramatic—even if it takes the failure of one metaphor to spark 
another. 
Having emphasized the creative potential of erotic language, I will conclude this 
dissertation by reflecting on the consequences of its failures.  Exemplary are the nymphs 
in Galatea, whose inability to express and understand their desire comprises their erotic 
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experience, even defines their very selves.
1
  Still more common is the inability of any 
single metaphor to dramatize eros in all of its complexity.  Lakoff and Johnson note that 
complex concepts often require a combination of two metaphors, “because there is no one 
metaphor that will do the job… Thus we get instances of impermissible mixed metaphors 
resulting from the impossibility of a single clearly delineated metaphor that satisfies both 
purposes at once.”
2
  This helps us to understand why the language of desire is marked by 
inconsistency and change, by a shifting and layering of different conceptual domains that 
make erotic experience both coherent and incoherent.  Metaphors sometimes overlap, 
sometimes contradict one another; they open up new erotic possibilities as quickly as 
they cordon off others.  Each linguistic shift creates erotic friction that is a form of 
dramatic action in its own right.
3
  Some inconsistencies between metaphors are relatively 
subtle, such as Claudio’s shift from the language of scope and restraint to the image of 
the ratsbane in Measure for Measure, but others produce large and decisive breaks 
between domains of experience.  We saw this in Apelles’ sharp turn from metaphors of 
portraiture to those of sculpture.  As the span between metaphors stretches, erotic and 
dramatic tension intensifies: it takes more and more effort to make the world cohere 
across gaps between conceptual domains.  But as if in response, playwrights and 
characters manage these widening gaps with a linguistic augmentation that, in turn, 
creates an even broader erotic scope. 
For Shakespeare’s Angelo, language gets its erotic charge from the powerful 
contrast between his metaphors of “scope” (1.2.126) and “restraint” (1.2.127).  If we 
                                                
1
 At 3.1.57, we read, “Thou hast told what I am in uttering what thyself is” (emphasis mine). 
2
 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 95. 
3
 The shifts between the terms in his dramatistic pentad that Kenneth Burke calls “transformations” result 
from the “inevitable ambiguities and inconsistencies” (GM, xviii) in which lie some of the most potent 
dramatic moments. 
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cannot say which of the two he finds more sexually exciting, it is because his most 
dramatic moments depend on their interplay.  At the end of his first encounter with 
Isabella, Angelo delivers a soliloquy in which he struggles to find his way to a coherent 
erotic experience amidst frustrating inconsistencies among his metaphors and among the 
different terms of Burke’s pentad.  The dazzling scope of one linguistic register contends 
with the paralyzing restraint of another:  
What’s this? What’s this? Is this her fault or mine? 
The tempter or the tempted, who sins most, ha? 
Not she, nor doth she tempt; but it is I 
That, lying by the violet in the sun, 
Do as the carrion does, not as the flower, 
Corrupt with virtuous season. Can it be 
That modesty may more betray our sense 
Than woman’s lightness? Having waste ground enough, 
Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary 
And pitch our evils there? O fie, fie, fie! 
What dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo? 
Dost thou desire her foully for those things 
That make her good? O, let her brother live! 
Thieves for their robbery have authority 
When judges steal themselves. What, do I love her, 
That I desire to hear her speak again, 
And feast upon her eyes? What is’t I dream on? 
O cunning enemy that, to catch a saint, 
With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous 
Is that temptation that doth goad us on 
To sin in loving virtue. Never could the strumpet 
With all her double vigor, art and nature, 
Once stir my temper, but this virtuous maid 
Subdues me quite. Ever till now, 
When men were fond, I smiled and wondered how. 
     (2.2.162-86) 
 
Angelo’s opening “What’s this?” is as broad in scope as it is ambiguous in meaning and 
rich in interpretive potential.  His question gestures toward the innocence of Lyly’s Phao 
or his nymphs when they are pierced by Cupid’s arrows and experience erotic desire for 
the first time (in Lyly, the recurring question is “How now?”).  But it turns out that 
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Angelo’s “What’s this?” is too broad, too accommodating, too generative.  His erotic 
language reaches beyond what he can conceptualize.  No surprise, then, that what follows 
is a major shift in linguistic register, from what Burke calls “scope” to “reduction.”
4
  
This, at least, is what we hear in Angelo’s next, startlingly reductive question: “Is this her 
fault or mine?”  At once, Angelo restricts a range of unlimited possibilities to two—from 
infinity to two (or even just to one: “fault”), from surfeit to fast, from scope to restraint—
thereby indelibly marking both his attenuated erotic attitude and language.  Conceptual 
metaphor theory teaches us that Angelo’s erotic experience is comprised of the very 
shifts that he explores, even indulges in, throughout his soliloquy.  His language 
progresses from the metaphysical “what’s this” to the profoundly physical metaphor of 
the carrion rotting in the sun, from abstract emotional experience (“What, do I love 
her…”) to concrete sensory experience (“…that I desire to hear her speak again, / And 
feast upon her eyes?”). 
Each linguistic scope prompts a new reduction; physical and scenic, sensory and 
specific metaphors aim to fix his erotic desire.  Angelo seemingly compulsively ricochets 
between scope and reduction, all the while betraying the acute inconsistencies in his 
erotic experience.  As hastily as he imagines Isabella as his scene (sunshine, sanctuary), 
he sees her as an agent (the tempter, the violet, a saint).  He reconceptualizes his actions 
(“What dost thou?”) variously as corrupting, razing, stealing, feasting, dreaming, and 
sinning.  His cast of characters is no less variable: sometimes the devil is present (“O 
cunning enemy”), sometimes he is alone; sometimes he and Isabella are both saints, 
sometimes they are diametrically opposed (tempter or tempted, flower or carrion).  His 
                                                
4
 Burke studies acts of linguistic placement in a section of Grammar entitled “Scope and Reduction.”  He 
describes the search “for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality” as the pursuit of a language 
that “has the necessary scope.  In its selectivity, it is a reduction” (GM, 59). 
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metaphorical progress traverses Burke’s dramatistic pentad; but where Burke’s ratios 
hold agents and acts to be consistent with the scenes that contain them, Angelo’s are rife 
with tension.  Within “virtuous” scenes, Angelo’s vices flourish: his carrion flesh rots in 
the sunshine and he “pitches…evils” in the sanctuary.  So, even as we try to keep up with 
his pell-mell cascade of ill-sorted metaphors, we get the impression that the sum not just 
of his metaphors but of his erotic desire is jagged misalignment itself. 
Even, maybe especially, the most disjointed erotic metaphors create dramatic 
action.  Angelo’s speech confirms the capacity of language, in its failures no less than its 
successes, to unleash possibilities that amplify a character’s erotic imagination and create 
erotic scope.  Throughout this study, we have seen how metaphors offer characters a way 
in—access to even the most elusive and ecstatic aspects of erotic experience.  Levinas 
conceptualizes these as alterity, a relation with the future and with mystery.  For 
Bachelard, they signal immensity and grandeur.  Aristotle has recourse to entelechy.  
Most of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s characters are afraid or unable to name this experience 
at all, and those who “dare… describe it” (Galatea 3.1.88) find that only the language of 
infinity is sufficient to the task.  Only our erotic metaphors allow us to grasp something 
like immensity by reframing it as intimacy; they alone locate for us a corner of that vast 
cosmos that we may possess and inhabit.  Such metaphors bind even the inconceivable 
void by bringing it down to earth, into the desiring body, where lovers can share in the 
pleasures of oblivion and make eros out of the terror of nothingness.  Erotic language 
creates suspense even in the most lyrical moments onstage, slowing time with each 
spacious syllable, prolonging anticipation and expectation, dreams and fantasies, and then 
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charging those potential or incipient acts with the kinetic energy of the metaphorical 
domains they employ.   
It is, then, the particularity of language that enables erotic scope.  And only a 
capacious erotic imagination can create and contain an infinite variety of metaphors, 
linguistic registers, modes of speech, and the complex interplay among them.  The 
language of desire can be cosmic in scale and extend infinitely outward, but it also turns 
inward, magnifying a distinct moment in time, plumbing the depths of a single entelechic 
action.  That such wildly expansive, richly textured, and infinitely various erotic 
experiences emerge from basic conceptual domains testifies to the ability of dramatic 
language to animate even the most prosaic metaphors, to exploit their unavoidable 
spatiality and stubborn corporeality.  For all of the conventionality of metaphor—and of 
early modern poetic metaphors in particular, shaped as they are by Petrarchan and 
prescribed conceits—Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s language makes erotic experience 
startlingly new.  The scope of their erotic metaphors makes the ordinary extraordinary: it 
turns a soldier into a colossus, a painter into a god, a queen into the moon.  Behold 
Endymion, falling in love with the moon—the same moon that has sparked centuries 
worth of familiar verse.  Reaching up to the night sky, suddenly he can touch her. 
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Appendix A: Desire Metaphors in Lyly and Shakespeare 
 
CHAPTER 1: DESIRE IS A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE 
!!!!  
           Desirer is Prisoner/Servant !or" Beloved is a Prisoner/Servant 
                         /     \ 
    Desirer is a Master      Beloved is a Master 
          \  or  / 
 Love/Lust/Desire is a Master 
 
             DESIRE IS A MAGNETIC ATTRACTION          DESIRING IS HUNTING          LOVE IS A SIEGE 
      /     \      /         \           / 
Object of Desire is Magnet !or" Desirer is Magnet       /       Looks are Weapons ---------------- Words are Weapons 
/                  /             \          Desire is an Enemy 
Desire is Down (Falling)    Sexual Pleasure is Prey --------------Beloved is Prey 
  
DESIRE IS STASIS        !or"             DESIRE IS MOTION  
 
Love is a Trance        Seduction is Physical Movement 
Desire is Idleness        Desire is Spur 
Lust is an Obstacle         Emotions are Physical Motions     
Lust is an Immobilizing Force     !or"     Chastity is Stasis     !and"  Sexual Promiscuity is Aimless Motion 
True Love is Constancy                 and # 
Desire is Heaviness                           / 
        \          True Love is Directed/Purposive Motion 
  Desire is Down           \  
LOVE IS A JOURNEY 
Lovers are Travelers 
Courtship is a Physical Pursuit 
   Sexual Consummation is a Physical Destination ---------------------Marriage is a Physical Destination  
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CHAPTER 2: DESIRE IS PERMEABILITY 
!!!! 
           Intimacy is Closeness 
       Vulnerability is Openness 
       Emotional Exposure is Physical Visibility 
       Desiring Body is an Open Container 
      /    \ 
                          /         \ 
                      /              \ 
           DESIRE IS A DISEASE             !and"         DESIRE IS A DIGESTIVE PROCESS 
                                                                   
     Sex Act is Depletion   !and"  Sex Act is Remedy  !or"  Sex is Poison               Sexual Desire is Appetite 
                      \         \           Sexual Preference is Taste 
                      Lust is Decay       \           Object of Desire is Food Item 
           \           Sexual Activity is Eating 
             \           Lust is Gluttony 
       End of Desire is Physical Purgation   !and"   End of Desire is Bodily Excretion 
   
   
DESIRING IS BINDING    !or"   DESIRING IS OPENING 
                       \ 
Beloved is Container        !or" Beloved is Bound Object         \ 
Desirer is Contained    Desiring is Embracing       Love is Overflowing 
Object of Desire is Physical Place  Emotional Ties are Physical Ties      Sexual Desire is Swelling      !or"    Desire is Sinking 
                        \           /             Emotion is Fluid              \ 
    \                  /              Lust is Excess              Desire is Down 
  Desire is a Measurable Substance           !or"       True Love is Infinity 
                   Excessive Desire is an Immeasurable Substance 
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CHAPTER 3: DESIRING IS CREATING 
!!!! 
         Desirer is Maker !or" Beloved is Maker 
                         /     \ 
     Desirer is Created     Beloved is Created 
        \             / 
         \         / 
     Lovers are Co-Creators     !and"      Love is a Collaborative Act  
      !!!!     
          Desiring is a Process 
          Love is Work 
          Desiring is Active 
    Love is a Made Object           !and"       Love is a Tangible Product 
            
DESIRE IS ARTISTIC CREATION 
        
Desiring is an Aesthetic Experience 
Object of Desire is Artistic Object 
Seduction/Courtship is Artistic Virtuosity 
Sexual Pleasure is Aesthetic Pleasure 
       Sexual Consummation is Artistic Achievement 
 
DESIRING IS PAINTING                !or"           DESIRING IS SCULPTING   DESIRING IS STORYTELLING 
               
Desirer is Painter                               Desirer is Sculptor     Desirer is Storyteller 
Beloved is Portrait --------------------{Beloved is Model} ----------------- Beloved is Statue        Fantasies are Stories 
Instruments are Pigments/Colors     {Beloved is Interpreter}        Instruments are Chisels   Instruments are Words 
              \                            /      Expressing Desire is Writing 
  \                     / 
 Desiring is Adding On (pigment) !or"      Desiring is Carving Out (stone) 
            Desiring is a Violent Action
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Appendix B 
Erotic Language in Plays by Lyly 
 
Campaspe 
 
Psyllus 
 
“…many have so fed their eyes with their mistress’ picture that they never desired to take 
food, being glutted with the delight in their favours.” (1.2.68-70) 
 
Apelles will “burn his own heart” (3.2.7) 
 
 
Hephestion 
 
is “moderate in affection.” (2.2.18) 
 
Alex: Is love a vice? 
Heph: It is no virtue. (2.2.19-20) 
 
“Is that mind whose greatness the world could not contain drawn within the compass of 
an idle alluring eye?” (2.2.37-39) 
 
“…that soft and yielding mind should not be in him whose hard and unconquered heart 
hath made so many yield.” (2.2.45-47) 
 
Campaspe’s “eyes are framed by art to enamour and… heart was made by nature to 
enchant.” (2.2.50-52) 
 
Alexander is “found in the hands of…a woman” (2.2.63-64) 
 
“There is no surfeit so dangerous as that of honey, nor any poison so deadly as that of 
love…” (2.2.85-87) 
 
Alexander may command “to yield to lust by force; but to consent to love by fear you 
cannot.” (2.2.118-19) 
 
“You love, and therefore think anything.” (3.4.34) 
 
“common we see it incident in artificers to be enamoured of their own works” (5.4.15-16) 
 
“painters, who, playing with their own conceits, now coveting to draw a glancing eye, 
then a rolling, now a winking, still mending it, never ending it till they be caught with it” 
(5.4.18-21) 
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Alex:   …what do you think of love? 
Heph:  …think it better to be seen than touched. 
Alex:    But what do you imagine it to be? 
Heph:  A word, by superstition thought a god, by use turned to an humour, by self-will
 made a flattering madness. 
Alex: You are too hard-hearted to think so of love. (5.4.34-42) 
 
“your heart is on fire” (5.4.94) 
 
“it is a gentleman’s sport to be in love.” (5.4.106) 
 
Apelles “loveth underhand…” (5.4.111) 
 
“I am determined you shall enjoy one another.” (5.4.120) 
 
“Alexander maketh but a toy of love and leadeth affection in fetters, using fancy as a fool 
to make him sport…” (5.4.147-49) 
 
“Alexander is cloyed with looking on that which thou wonderedst at.” (5.4.155-56) 
 
“when all the world is won and every country is thine and mine, either find me out 
another to subdue or, of my word, I will fall in love.” (5.4.172-74) 
 
 
Alexander 
 
“judge… if the agonies of love be dangerous in a subject, whether they be not more 
deadly unto Alexander, whose deep and not-to-be-conceived sighs cleave the heart in 
shivers, whose wounded thoughts can neither be expressed nor endured.” (2.2.99-103) 
 
Alexander’s “affections are not to be measured by reason…” (2.2.107-8) 
 
“Alexander doth love and therefore must obtain.” (2.2.112-13) 
 
“…so far in love with Campaspe…” (3.4.35) 
 
“Alexander can, when he will, throw affections as far from him as he can cowardice.” 
(3.4.49-51) 
 
Campaspe has “a sweet consent in her countenance with a chaste disdain, desire mingled 
with coyness and (I cannot tell how to term it) a curst yielding modesty!” (3.4.139-41) 
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Apelles 
 
“you seem to dispraise that which men most commend, drawing them by that mean into 
an admiration, where, feeding themselves, they fall into an ecstasy, your modesty being 
the cause of one, and of the other, your affections.” (3.1.10-14) 
 
Jupiter “obtained his desire.” (3.4.20) 
 
Venus “hath power to command the very affections of the heart.” (3.4.35-36) 
 
Apelles:      …But were you never in love? 
Campaspe:  No, nor love in me. (3.4.45-46) 
 
“It is not possible that a face so fair and a wit so sharp, both without comparison, should 
not be apt to love.” (3.4.51-52) 
 
“Hast thou by drawing her beauty brought to pass that thou canst scarce draw thine own 
breath?” (3.5.14-15) 
 
“by so much the more hast thou increased thy care by how much the more thou hast 
showed thy cunning.” (3.5.16-17) 
 
“…art must yield to nature, reason to appetite, wisdom to affection.” (3.5.20-21) 
 
“Alexander, the monarch of the earth, hath both her body and affection.” (3.5.31-32) 
 
“stars are to be looked at, not reached at; princes to be yielded unto, not contended with; 
Campaspe to be honoured, not obtained, to be painted, not possessed of thee.” (3.5.41-44) 
 
“the feeding canker of my care, the never-dying worm of my heart, is to be killed by 
counsel, not cries, by applying of remedies, not by replying of reasons.” (3.5.59-62) 
 
“as good it were to utter my love and die with denial as conceal it and live in despair.” 
(3.5.69-70) 
 
Campaspe:  …would you have them [men] dissemble? 
Apelles: Not in love, but their love. (4.2.37-38) 
 
“I dare not venture upon your person.” (4.2.49) 
 
“…it is no treason to love.” (4.4.8) 
 
will “embrace thy shadow continually in mine arms, of the which by strong imagination I 
will make a substance.” (4.4.14-15) 
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“I fear me, Apelles, that thine eyes have blabbed that which thy tongue durst not.” (5.2.1-
2) 
 
“O Love, I never before knew what thou wert, and now hast thou made me that I know 
not what myself am.” (5.2.9-11) 
 
“I must endure intolerable passions for unknown pleasures.” (5.2.11-12) 
 
“Dispute not the cause, wretch, but yield to it; for better it is to melt with desire than to 
wrestle with love. Cast thyself on thy careful bed; be content to live unknown and die 
unfound.” (5.2.12-16) 
 
“O Campaspe, I have painted thee in my heart—painted? nay, contrary to mine art, 
imprinted; and that in such deep characters that nothing can raze it out unless it rub thy 
heart out.” (5.2.16-19) 
 
 
Campaspe 
 
“love was well ratified among men on earth when lust was so full authorised by the gods 
in heaven.” (3.4.25) 
 
“Utter not that in words which maketh thine ears to glow with thoughts.” (4.2.3-4) 
 
“Hath a painter crept further into thy mind than a prince, Apelles than Alexander?” 
(4.2.5-7) 
 
“…affection is a fire which kindleth as well in the bramble as in the oak, and catcheth 
hold where it first lighteth, not where it may best burn.” (4.2.8-11) 
 
“…Apelles, in whom I would there were the like affection.” (4.2.19-20) 
 
Campaspe:  You told me, Apelles, that you would never end. 
Apelles:        Never end my love, for it shall be eternal. 
Campaspe:   That is, neither to have beginning nor ending. (4.4.2-4) 
 
“…if Alexander perceive your love…” (4.4.7) 
 
“O Apelles, thy love cometh from the heart, but Alexander’s from the mouth.” (4.4.21-
23) 
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Parmenio 
 
Alexander, “whose ever-waking eyes, whose never-tired heart, whose body patient of 
labour, whose mind unsatiable of victory, hath always been noted, cannot so soon be 
melted into the weak conceits of love.” (3.4.17-20) 
 
 
Diogenes 
 
“Your filthy lust you colour under a courtly colour of love…” (4.1.39-40) 
 
 
Sappho and Phao 
 
Cupid 
 
Sappho “hath her thoughts in a string, that she conquers affections and sendeth love up 
and down upon errands.” (1.1.45-47) 
 
“The gods are amorous and therefore willing to be pierced.” (1.1.50-51) 
 
“nothing can root out the desires of Phao but a new shaft of inconstancy, nor anything 
turn Sappho’s heart but a new arrow of disdain.” (4.2.37-40) 
 
“This arrow… maketh men passionate in desires, in love constant, and wise in 
conveyance, melting as it were their fancies into faith.” (5.1.16-19) 
 
“Shoot this arrow among the thickest of them, whose bosoms lie open because they 
would be stricken with it.” (5.1.35-37) 
 
 
Pandion 
 
“Mine eye drinketh neither the colour of wine nor women.” (1.2.62-63) 
 
 
Canope 
 
“…ladies, you know how it cutteth a woman to become a wooer.” (1.4.9-10) 
 
 
Mileta 
 
“I laugh at that you all call love, and judge it only a word called love. Methinks liking, a 
curtsy, a smile, a beck, and suchlike are the very quintessence of love.” (1.4.16-18) 
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“the delight of beauty would so bind my senses as I should be quickly rocked into a deep 
rest.” (3.4.9-10) 
 
“thou art passing fair, and able to draw a chaste eye, not only to glance but to gaze on 
thee. Thy young years, thy quick wit, thy staid desires are of force to control those which 
should command.” (3.4.14-17) 
 
“think you me so dull I cannot love, or so spiteful I will not?” (3.4.25-26) 
 
Mileta: …will you have women’s love in their tongues? 
Phao:   Yea, else do I think there is none in their hearts. (3.4.30-31) 
 
“nothing shall assuage your love but marriage…” (4.3.81-82) 
 
“Beware of love, Favilla, for women’s hearts are such stones, which, warmed by 
affection, cannot be cooled by wisdom.” (4.3.98-100) 
 
 
Eugenia 
 
“Yet we, when we swear with our mouths we are not in love, then we sigh from the heart 
and pine in love.” (1.4.46-47) 
 
 
Sibylla 
 
“…hearken to my tale, which I hope shall be as a straight thread to lead you out of those 
crooked conceits and place you in the plain path of love.” (2.1.39-41) 
 
“Love… is to be governed by art…” (2.4.61) 
 
“…fancy, though it cometh by hazard, is ruled by wisdom.” (2.4.62-63) 
 
“It is unpossible for the brittle metal of women to withstand the flattering attempts of 
men.” (2.4.70-72) 
 
“Choose such words as may—as many may—melt her mind…. [F]air words wound 
when they are heard for love.” (2.4.93-96) 
 
“…women strive because they would be overcome. Force they call it, but such a 
welcome force they account it, that continually they study to be enforced.” (2.4.105-8) 
 
“To fair words join sweet kisses…”(2.4.108) 
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Ulysses’ “filed tongue made those enamoured that sought to have him enchanted.” 
(2.4.116-17) 
 
“In thy love be secret.” (2.4.128-29) 
 
 
Phao 
 
“Could you not settle your fancy upon any, or would not destiny suffer it?” (2.1.93-94) 
 
“…to yield to love is the only thing I hate.” (2.1.131-32) 
 
“What unacquainted thoughts are these, Phao, far unfit for thy thoughts.” (2.4.1-2) 
 
“…canst thou not be content to behold the sun, but thou must covet to build thy nest in 
the sun?” (2.4.3-5) 
 
“Doth Sappho bewitch thee, whom all the Ladies in Sicily could not woo?” (2.4.5-6) 
 
“…the more thou seekest to suppress those mounting affections, they soar the loftier, and 
the more thou wrestlest with them, the stronger they wax—not unlike unto a ball which, 
the harder it is thrown against the earth, the higher it boundeth into the air; or our Sicilian 
stone, which groweth hardest by hammering.” (2.4.10-16) 
 
“love, whose deity no conceit can compass, and therefore no authority can constrain, as 
miraculous in working as mighty, and no more to be suppressed than comprehended!” 
(2.4.17-20) 
 
“whither art thou carried…” (2.4.21) 
 
“enjoy thy care in covert…” (2.4.23) 
 
“Let thy love hang at thy heart's bottom, not at the tongue's brim. Things untold are 
undone; there can be no greater comfort than to know much, nor any less labour than to 
say nothing.” (2.4.28-32) 
 
“gentlewomen are so drowsy in their desires that they can scarce hold up their eyes for 
love.” (3.4.7-8) 
 
“Loves are but smokes which vanish in the seeing and yet hurt whilst they are seen.” 
(5.3.13-14) 
 
 
Sappho 
 
Sappho:  Heigh-ho! I know not which way to turn me. Ah, ah, I faint, I die! 
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Mileta:    Madam, I think it good you have more clothes, and sweat it out. 
Sappho:  No, no, the best ease I find is to sigh it out. 
Ismena:   A strange disease, that should breed such a desire. 
Sappho:  A strange desire, that hath brought such a disease. 
Canope: Where, lady, do you feel your most pain? 
Sappho:  Where nobody else can feel it, Canope. 
Canope:  At the heart? 
Sappho:  In the heart.  (3.3.1-11) 
 
“Would I had some local things to dry my brain!” (3.3.21) 
 
“…impatient disease of love…” (3.3.86) 
 
“…may great ladies be plagued with love?” (3.3.88-89) 
 
“I might perish in my flowering years by fancy?” (3.3.96-97) 
 
“Love lodgeth sometimes in caves” (3.3.102) 
 
“Resist it, Sappho, whilst it is yet tender.” (3.3.104-5) 
 
“…glutting myself on the face of Phao, I have made my desire more desperate.” (3.3.109-
10) 
 
“into the heart of so great a lady can any creep but a great lord?” (3.3.111-12) 
 
“…my desires the more they swerve from reason, the more seem they reasonable.” 
(3.3.115-16) 
 
“When Phao cometh, what then: wilt thou open thy love?” (3.3.116-17) 
 
“…though thy love were greater than wisdom could endure, yet thine honor was such as 
love could not violate.” (3.3.120-22) 
 
“Cupid, why didst thou wound me so deep?” (4.1.4-5) 
 
“Methinks I feel an alteration in my mind and as it were a withdrawing in myself of mine 
own affections.” (5.2.3-4) 
 
“I will direct those arrows with better aim and conquer mine own affections with greater 
modesty. Venus’ heart shall flame, and her love be as common as her craft.” (5.2.28-31) 
 
“…sith I am rid of the disease, I will not be ashamed to confess the cause. I loved Phao, 
Mileta—a think unfit for my degree, but forced by my desire.” (5.2.33-35) 
 
“I feel relenting thoughts, and reason not yielding to appetite.” (5.2.39-40) 
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“You are not worthy to be the lady of love, that yield so often to the impressions of love. 
Immodest Venus, that to satisfy the unbridled thoughts of thy heart transgressest so far 
from the stay of thine honour!” (5.2.64-67) 
 
 
Venus 
 
“O fair Phao, and therefore made fair to breed me in a frenzy!” (4.2.7-8) 
 
“…these unacquainted torments.” (4.2.17) 
 
“Venus must both play the lover and the dissembler, and therefore the dissembler because 
the lover.” (4.2.29-30) 
 
“Venus hath young thoughts and fresh affections.” (4.4.15) 
 
“I will love thee again when I have either business or nothing else to do.” (4.4.64-65) 
 
 
Ismena 
 
“you shall fall in love with hearing fair words.” (4.3.36-37) 
 
“nothing can purge your loving humour but death.” (4.3.38) 
 
“…women are scorched sometimes with men’s eyes, though they had rather consume 
than confess.” (4.3.102-4) 
 
“there is as little truth to be used in love as there is reason” (5.1.56-57) 
 
 
Galatea 
 
Cupid 
 
“is there not one [nymph] that followeth, the sweetest thing, sweet love?” (1.2.13-14) 
 
Love is “[a] heat full of coldness, a sweet full of bitterness, a pain full of pleasantness, 
which maketh thoughts have eyes and hearts ears, bred by desire, nursed by delight, 
weaned by jealousy, killed by dissembling, buried by ingratitude.” (1.2 
 
Love is “a pretty thing” (1.2.24) 
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“there is no heart so chaste but thy bow can wound, nor eyes so modest but thy brands 
can kindle, nor thoughts so staid but thy shafts can make wavering, weak, and wanton.” 
(2.2.3-6) 
 
“I will… so confound their loves in their own sex that they shall dote in their desires, 
delight in their affections, and practice only impossibilities.” (2.2.7-10) 
 
“if you see these dainty dames entrapped in love, say softly to yourselves, we may all 
love.” (2.2.15-16) 
 
“If they be true love-knots, ‘tis unpossible to unknit them.” (4.2.23-24) 
 
“Love knots are tied with eyes, and cannot be undone with hands; made fast with 
thoughts, and cannot be unloosed with fingers.” (4.2.26-27) 
 
“I can wound with looking, fly with thinking, burn with hearing, shoot with speaking.” 
(5.3.104-6) 
 
“Venus can make constancy fickleness, courage cowardice, modesty lightness, working 
things impossible in your sex and tempering hardest hearts like softest wool.” (Epilogue, 
2-5) 
 
“Yield, ladies, yield to love, ladies, which lurketh under your eyelids whilst you sleep and 
playeth with your heartstrings whilst you wake; whose sweetness never breedeth satiety, 
labour-weariness, nor grief-bitterness.” (Epilogue, 5-8) 
 
“[L]ove conquereth all things but itself, and ladies all hearts but their own.” (Epilogue, 
12-13) 
 
 
Nymph 
 
Love is “but a foolish thing.” (1.2.23) 
 
Diana’s virgins “are all chaste, delighting in the bow that wounds the swift hart in the 
forest, not fearing the bow that strikes the soft heart in the chamber.” (1.2.26-28) 
 
 
Neptune 
 
Neptune “hast taken sundry shapes to obtain love” (2.2.20-21) 
 
“An idle choice, strange and foolish, for one virgin to dote on another and to imagine a 
constant faith where there can be no cause of affection.” (5.3.139-41) 
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Galatea 
 
“I know not how it cometh to pass, but yonder boy is in mine eye too beautiful.” (2.1.46-
47) 
 
is “a slave to Cupid who liv[es] in [her] fancy” (2.4.5,6). 
 
“Oh, would, when I hunted his eye with my heart, he might have seen my heart with his 
eyes!” (2.4.7-8) 
 
“Admit that… I should with entreaties, prayers, oaths, bribes, and whatever can be 
invented in love, desire your favour, would you not yield?” (3.2.28) 
 
“I…burned in the fire of mine own fancies.” (5.3.127-28) 
 
“I will never love any but Phillida. Her love is engraven in my heart with her eyes.” 
(5.3.135-36) 
 
“I wish… I may enjoy Phillida.” (5.3.158) 
 
 
Phillida 
 
“curse… the untamedness of thy affections” (2.5.1-3) 
 
“Art thou no sooner in the habit of a boy but thou must be enamoured of a boy?  What 
shalt thou do, when what best liketh thee most discontenteth thee?” (2.5.3-4) 
 
“transgress in love a little of thy modesty.” (2.5.7-8) 
 
“pine in thine own peevishness.” (2.5.9) 
 
“I go, resolute either to bewray my love or suffer shame.” (2.5.12-13) 
 
“I should utter my affection with sighs, manifest my sweet love by my salt tears, and 
prove my loyalty unspotted and my griefs intolerable…” (3.2.21-23) 
 
“Come, let us into the grove, and make much of one another…” (3.2.63-64) 
 
“our affection may have some show and seem as it were love” (4.4.16-17) 
 
“I… was inflamed with a sweet desire” (5.3.129-31) 
 
“Galatea[’s]… faith is imprinted in my thoughts by her words” (5.3.137-38) 
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Telusa 
 
“What new conceits, what strange contraries, breed in thy mind?” (3.1.1-2) 
 
“Is thy Diana become a Venus, thy chaste thoughts turned to wanton looks, thy 
conquering modesty to a captive imagination?” (3.1.2-4) 
 
“Beginnest thou… to follow the hot desire of love?” (3.1.4-5, 6-7) 
 
“can there in years so young, in education so precise, in vows so holy, and in a heart so 
chaste, enter either a strong desire, or a wish, or a wavering thought of love?” (3.1.9-11) 
 
“Can Cupid’s brands quench Vesta’s flames, and his feeble shafts headed with feathers 
pierce deeper than Diana’s arrows headed with steel?” (3.1.12-14) 
 
the “vain and only naked name of chastity…is infected by fancy.” (3.1.17-19) 
 
“the game I follow is the thing I fly, my strange disease my chief desire.” (3.1.36-37) 
 
“now that you would have some talk of love, you hit me in the teeth with love.” (3.1.48-
50) 
 
“These are my passions, Eurota, my unbridled passions, my intolerable passions” (3.1.58-
59) 
 
Love first took her b[y the eyes, my wanton eyes which conceived the picture of his face 
and hanged it on the very strings of my heart.” (3.1.62-64) 
 
“love will be idle.” (4.2.63) 
 
“love will be wanton.” (4.2.63-64) 
 
“Diana…conquers affection.” (4.2.91) 
 
 
Eurota 
 
“If thou be in love (for I have heard of such a beast called love) it shall be cured.” 
(3.1.43-44) 
 
“I confess that I am in love, and yet I swear that I know not what it is.” (3.1.51-52) 
 
“I feel my thoughts unknit, mine eyes unstayed, my heart I know not how affected or 
infected, my sleeps broken and full of dreams, my wakeness sad and full of sighs, myself 
in all things unlike myself. If this be love, I would it had never been devised.” (3.1.52-56) 
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“How did it [love] take you first?” (3.1.61) 
 
“[It took me b]y the ears, whose sweet word sunk so deep into my head…” (3.1.66-67) 
 
“so unacquainted are the passions of love that we can neither describe them nor bear 
them.” (3.4.66-67) 
 
 
Ramia 
 
“Can there be no heart so chaste but love can wound? Nor vows so holy but affection can 
violate?” (3.1.74-75) 
 
Virtue and chastity “both are subject to love, of all things most abject.” (3.1.76-77) 
 
Eurota: …what is love?  
Ramia: If myself felt only this infection, I would then take upon me the definition, but 
 being incident to so many I dare not myself describe it. (3.1.85-88) 
 
“Servia…loveth deadly” (3.1.90-91) 
 
“Clymene…stoopeth, yieldeth, and fawneth on the strange boy in the woods. Myself 
(with blushing I speak it) am thrall to that boy” (3.1.93-97) 
 
“…shall virgins begin to wrangle for love and become wanton in their thoughts, in their 
words, in their actions?” (3.1.111-13) 
 
“O divine love, which art therefore called divine because thou overreachest the wisest, 
conquerest the chastest, and dost all things both unlikely and impossible, because thou art 
love! Thou makest the bashful impudent, the wise fond, the chaste wanton, and workest 
contraries to our reach, because thyself is beyond reason.” (3.1.114-18)  
 
“so divine is his [love’s] force that it worketh effects as contrary to that we wish as 
unreasonable against that we ought.” (3.4.63-65) 
 
 
Diana 
 
“her virgins…become unchaste in desires, immoderate in affection, untemperate in love, 
in foolish love, in base love…” (3.4.35-37) 
 
“virgins [lose] all their virtues with their unchaste thoughts. ‘Unchaste’, Diana calleth 
that that hath either any show or suspicion of lightness.” (3.4.40-43) 
 
“loving thoughts stain lovely faces…” (3.4.43-44) 
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“love’s desire corrupteth all other virtues.” (3.4.52) 
 
“you… should now become prentices to idleness” (3.4.54) 
 
“…how is your love placed?” (3.4.55-56) 
 
“…are your holy vows turned to hollow thoughts?” (3.4.60-61) 
 
Cupid “fattest others with hopes” (3.4.87) and “bindest others with golden thoughts.” 
(3.4.88) 
 
Cupid “hast infected [the nymphs] with foolish love” (3.4.92) 
 
Venus has “untamed affections” (5.3.44) 
 
Venus’s “tongue is as unruly as your thoughts, and your thoughts as unstayed as your 
eyes.” (5.3.59-61) 
 
Love is “a thing of all the vainest” (5.3.80-81) 
 
 
Larissa 
 
“Is anyone undone by fire, 
And turned to ashes through desire?” (4.2.13-14) 
 
Cupid:    Is love a punishment? 
Larissa:  It is no pastime. (4.2.69-70) 
 
 
Rafe 
 
“with puffing, blowing, and sweating, he so plied her that he multiplied her.” (5.1.21-22) 
 
 
Hebe 
 
“chastity honoreth affections and commandeth, yieldeth to desire and conquereth.” 
(5.2.40-41) 
 
 
Venus 
 
Diana “hateth sweet delights, envieth loving desires, masketh wanton eyes, stoppeth 
amorous ears, bridleth youthful mouths…” (5.3.31-34) 
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“…if that be not buried which can never die—fancy—or that quenched which must ever 
burn—affection…” (5.3.64-66) 
 
“…never shall it be said that nature or fortune shall overthrow love and faith.” (5.3.144-
45) 
 
“Is your loves unspotted, begun with truth, continued with constancy, and not to be 
altered till death?” (5.3.145-47) 
 
 
Endymion 
 
Endymion 
 
“my affections… are so stayed, and withal so stately, that I can neither satisfy my heart 
with love nor mine eyes with wonder.” (1.1.3-5) 
 
“My love is placed neither under the moon nor above.” (1.1.14-15) 
 
is “settled either to die or possess the moon herself.” (1.1.18-19) 
 
“O Cynthia, if thou shouldst always continue at thy fullness, both gods and men would 
conspire to ravish thee. But thou, to abate the pride of our affections, dost detract from 
thy perfections…” (1.1.68-71) 
 
“Why troublest thou me, having neither head to conceive the cause of my love or a heart 
to receive the impressions?” (1.1.82-84) 
 
“Sweet Cynthia, how wouldst thou be pleased, how possessed? Will labours, patient of 
all extremities, obtain thy love?” (2.1.5-7) 
 
“Desirest thou the passions of love, the sad and melancholy moods of perplexed minds, 
the not-to-be-expressed torments of racked thoughts?” (2.1.9-12) 
 
“What company have I used but contemplation? Whom have I wondered at but thee?” 
(2.1.17-19) 
 
“Have I not spent my golden years in hopes, waxing old with wishing, yet wishing 
nothing but thy love?” (2.1.23-25) 
 
I “hath chosen in a solitary cell to live only by feeding on thy favor…” (2.1.46-47) 
 
“Thus mayest thou see every vein, sinew, muscle, and artery of my love, in which there is 
no flattery nor deceit, error nor art.” (2.1.48-51) 
 
  226   
“will I embrace the golden thoughts in my head and wish to melt by musing, that as 
ebony, which no fire can scorch, is yet consumed with sweet savors, so my heart, which 
cannot be bent by the hardness of fortune, may be bruised by amorous desires.” (2.3.6-
10) 
 
“I was ravished with the sight above measure, and wished that I might have enjoyed the 
sight without end.” (5.1.107-9) 
 
“How prospereth your love?” (5.1.172) 
 
“My unspotted thoughts, my languishing body, my discontented life, let them obtain by 
princely favor that which to challenge they must not presume, only wishing of 
impossibilities; with imagination of which I will spend my spirits, and to myself, that no 
creature may hear, softly call it love.” (5.4.166-72) 
 
“From this sweet contemplation if I be not driven, I shall live of all men the most content, 
taking more pleasure in mine aged thoughts than ever I did in my youthful actions.” 
(5.4.173-76) 
 
 
Eumenides 
 
“If you be enamored of anything above the moon, your thoughts are ridiculous, for that 
things immortal are not subject to affections; if allured or enchanted with these transitory 
things…” (1.1.8-11) 
 
“I hope you be not sotted upon the Man in the Moon.” (1.1.15-16) 
 
“impossible it is to make love fit to her [the moon’s] humour…” (1.1.25) 
 
“That melancholy blood must be purged which draweth you to a dotage no less miserable 
than monstrous.” (1.1.28-30) 
 
“Endymion is bewitched.” (1.1.88) 
 
“this fancy of the moon…” (1.1.91) 
 
“Ah Eumenides, how art thou perplexed! Call to mind the beauty of thy sweet mistress 
and the depth of thy never-dying affections.” (3.4.50-52) 
 
“Semele, the possessing of whose person is a pleasure that cannot come within the 
compass of comparison…” (3.4.95-97) 
 
“…when I shall first meet with fair Semele, dash my delight with some light disgrace, 
lest, embracing sweetness beyond measure, I take surfeit without a recure.” (3.4.101-4) 
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“Virtue shall subdue affections, wisdom, lust, friendship beauty.” (3.4.152-53) 
 
“…now are my sparks grown to flames, and my fancies almost to frenzies” (5.1.177-78) 
 
 
Floscula 
 
Tellus would “rather wonder than rage at the greatness of his mind, being affected with a 
thing more than mortal.” (1.2.18-19) 
 
“Suffer then Endymion to follow his affections, thought to obtain her be impossible, and 
let him flatter himself in his own imaginations, because they are immortal.” (1.2.35-37) 
 
“…shall he dote forever in this delight?” (1.2.69) 
 
“Affection that is bred by enchantment is like a flower that is wrought in silk: in color 
and form most like, but nothing at all in substance or savour.” (1.2.76-78) 
 
“there cannot be a thing more monstrous than to force affection by sorcery, neither do I 
imagine anything more impossible.” (1.4.6-8) 
 
 
Tellus 
 
“I will entangle him in such a sweet net that he shall neither find the to come out, nor 
desire it. All allurements of pleasure will I cast before his eyes, insomuch that he shall 
slake that love which he now voweth to Cynthia, and burn in mine, of which he seemeth 
careless.” (1.2.44-49) 
 
“In this languishing between my amorous devices and his own loose desires, there shall 
such dissolute thoughts take root in his head, and over his heart grow so thick a skin…” 
(1.2.49-52) 
 
She is “a woman deluded in love.” (1.2.58) 
 
“The prime of his youth and pride of his time shall be spent in melancholy passions, 
careless behaviour, untamed thoughts, and unbridled affections.” (1.2.65-67) 
 
“…she that is so oppressed with love that she is neither able with beauty nor wit to obtain 
her friend will rather use unlawful means than try untolerable pains.” (1.2.84-88) 
 
“Is it possible by herbs, stones, spells, incantation, enchantment, exorcisms, fire, metals, 
planets, or any practice, to plant affection where it is not and to supplant it where it is?” 
(1.4.16-19) 
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“Unhappy Tellus, whose desires are so desperate that they are neither to be conceived of 
any creature nor to be cured by any art!” (1.4.32-34) 
 
“Endymion…hath my heart” (1.4.38) 
 
Cynthia “is the lady that he delights in, and dotes on every day, and dies for ten thousand 
times a day.” (1.4.40-41) 
 
“I cannot obtain the depth of his love…” (2.1.54-55) 
 
Her “affections” are “kindled… afresh, insomuch that I find scorching flames for dead 
embers, and cruel encounters of war in my thoughts instead of sweet parleys.” (4.1.11-
14) 
 
Endymion “so ravished my heart with love that to obtain my desires I could not find 
means, nor to resist them reason.” (5.4.69-70) 
 
“what metal was she made of, be she mortal, that is not affected with the spice, nay 
infected with the poison of that not-to-be-expressed yet always to be felt love, which 
breaketh the brains and never bruiseth the brow, consumeth the heart and never toucheth 
the skin, and maketh a deep wound to be felt before any scar at all be seen?” (5.4.73-78) 
 
“My heart, too tender to withstand such a divine fury, yielded to love—madam, I not 
without blushing confess, yielded to love.” (5.4.78-80) 
 
“Feeling a continual burning in all my bowels and a bursting almost in every vein, I could 
not smother the inward fire but it must needs be perceived by the outward smoke; and by 
the flying abroad of divers sparks, divers judged of my scalding flames.” (5.4.87-91) 
 
“he saw the depth of my affections” (5.4.97) 
 
“Finding continual increase of my tormenting thoughts, and that the enjoying of my love 
made deeper wounds than the entering into it, I could find no means to ease my grief but 
to follow Endymion, and continually to have him in the object of mine eyes, who had me 
slave and subject to his love.” (5.4.110-15) 
 
I “fried myself most in mine affections” (5.4.116) 
 
“I could not have an imagination to withdraw him; and finding mine own affections 
unquenchable, I could not carry the mind that any else should possess what I had 
pursued.” (5.4.135-38) 
 
 
Dares 
 
“our masters are in love up to the ears…” (1.3.1) 
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“is not love a lurcher, that taketh men's stomachs away that they cannot eat, their spleen 
that they cannot laugh, their hearts that they cannot fight, their eyes that they cannot 
sleep; and leaveth nothing but livers to make nothing but lovers?” (2.2.9-13) 
 
“Why, it is impossible that into so noble and unconquered a courage, love should creep, 
having first a head as hard to pierce as steel, then to pass to a heart armed with a shirt of 
mail.” (3.3.149-52) 
 
 
Tophas 
 
“I brook not this idle humour of love. It tickleth not my liver, from whence the love-
mongers in former age seemed to infer they should proceed.” (1.3.8-9) 
 
“I cannot stand without another.” 
 
“love hath…milked my thoughts and drained from my heart the very substance of my 
accustomed courage. It worketh in my head like new wine…”(3.3.23-25) 
 
“…even as a dish melteth by the fire, so doth my wit increase by love.” (3.3.66-67) 
 
“Sleep is a binding of the senses, love a loosing.” (3.3.138-39) 
 
“I have but slept over my love.” (3.3.148) 
 
“The beggar Love that knows not where to lodge, 
At last within my heart when I slept, 
   He crept. 
I waked, and so my fancies began to fodge.” (4.2.26-29) 
 
“…love hath jostled my liberty from the wall and taken the upper hand of my reason.” 
(5.2.1-2) 
 
“…love is a lord of misrule, and keepeth Christmas in my corpse.” (5.2.5-6) 
 
“Doth Dipsas stoop? Will she yield? Will she bend?” (5.2.57-58) 
 
“Go to the sexton and tell him Desire is dead, and will him to dig his grave.” (5.2.93-94) 
 
“I will by piecemeal curtail my affections towards Dipsas and walk my swelling thoughts 
till they be cold.” (5.2.108-10) 
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Epiton 
 
“Love… may lie in your lungs…” (1.3.10) 
 
“…my master yawning one day in the sun, love crept into his mouth before he could 
close it, and there kept such a tumbling in his body that he was glad to untruss the points 
of his heart and entertain Love as a stranger.” (3.3.153-57) 
 
“Let me… trip up the heels of your affection” (5.2.3) 
 
 
Dipsas 
 
“were it in my power to place affection by appointment, I would make such evil 
appetites, such inordinate lusts, such cursed desires as all the world should be filled both 
with superstitious heats and extreme love.” (1.4.27-31) 
 
“I can…breed slackness in love though never root it out.” (1.4.35-36) 
 
“thou placed thy heart…low in love” (2.3.29-30) 
 
 
Samias 
 
“…are not our masters too far in love?” (2.2.5) 
 
 
Scintilla 
 
“Their tongues haply are dipped to the root in amorous words and sweet discourses, but I 
think their hearts are scarce tipped on the side with constant desires.” (2.2.6-8) 
 
 
Favilla 
 
“love [is] in thy mouth” (2.2.15) 
 
 
Corsites 
 
“Can you then feed on fancy, and subdue the malice of envy by the sweetness of 
imagination?” (3.2.9-10) 
 
“Tellus doteth upon me…” (4.3.2) 
 
“I might not perceive her love…” (4.3.2-3) 
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“Have my weak thoughts made brawnfallen my strong arms? Or is it the nature of love or 
the quintessence of the mind to breed numbness, or litherness, or I know not what 
languishing in my joints and sinews, being but the base strings of my body? Or doth the 
remembrance of Tellus so refine my spirits into a matter so subtle and divine that the 
other fleshy parts cannot work whilst they muse?” (4.3.19-26) 
 
“…it is no offense to be in love” (4.3.100) 
 
Tellus’ “beauty… took my heart captive” (4.3.103-4) 
 
“I found such combats in my thoughts between love and duty, reverence and affection, 
that I could neither endure the conflict nor hope for the conquest.” (4.3.105-8) 
 
“I unfolded to Tellus the depth of my affections and framed my tongue to utter a sweet 
tale of love…” (4.3.113-15) 
 
“Tellus’ beauty never wrought such love in my mind as now her deceit hath despite; and 
yet to be revenged of a woman were a thing than love itself more womanish.” (4.3.134-
36) 
 
“her fairness hath pinched my heat more deeply” (5.4.260-61) 
 
 
Geron 
 
“Love is but an eye-worm, which only tickleth the head with hopes and wishes; 
friendship the image of eternity, in which there is nothing movable, nothing 
mischievous.” (3.4.130-33) 
 
“Love is a chameleon, which draweth nothing into the mouth but air and nourisheth 
nothing in the body but lungs.” (3.4.136-38) 
 
“desire dies in the same moment that beauty sickens…” (3.4.138-39) 
 
 
Cynthia 
 
“…let Tellus, who is made all of love, melt herself in her own looseness” (4.3.130-32) 
 
“…taking delight in uttering thy love…” (5.4.107-8) 
 
“Persevere, Endymion, in loving me, and I account more strength in a true heart than in a 
walled city.” (5.4.179-80) 
 
 
  232   
Midas 
 
Eristus 
 
“Were I a king, I would wish to possess my mistress, for what sweetness can there be 
found in life but love? … And who knoweth not that the possessing of that must be the 
most precious, the pursuing whereof is so pleasing?” (1.1.25-26, 28-30) 
 
“…of gold there is satiety; of love there cannot.” (2.1.1-2) 
 
Eristus:  …in love there is variety. 
Celia:    Indeed, men may vary in their love.  
Eristus:  They vary their love, yet change it not.   
Celia:     Love and change are at variance; therefore if they vary, they must change.  
Eristus:   Men change the manner of their love, not the humour, the means how to obtain, 
    not the mistress they honor. So did Jupiter, that could not entreat Danae by 
    golden words, possess his love by a golden shower, not altering his affection, 
         but using art.  (2.1.8-17) 
 
“My tears, which have made furrows in my cheeks and in mine eyes fountains; my sighs, 
which have made of my heart a furnace and kindled in my head flames; my body, that 
melteth by piecemeal; and my mind, that pineth at an instant, may witness that my love is 
both unspotted and unspeakable.” (2.1.33-38) 
 
“To be free from love is strange, but to think scorn to be beloved, monstrous.” (2.1.130-
31) 
 
 
Martius 
 
“Love is a pastime for children, breeding nothing but folly and nourishing nothing but 
idleness.” (1.1.31-32) 
 
“thy effeminate mind, Eristus, whose eyes are stitched on Celia’s face and thoughts 
gyved to her beauty, hath bred in all the court such a tender wantonness that nothing is 
thought of but love, a passion proceeding of beastly lust and coloured with a courtly 
name of love. (2.1.66-71) 
 
The “untemperate humour of lust crept into the king’s court” (2.1.73) 
 
 
Mellacrities 
 
“Is it not gold that maketh the chastest to yield to lust, the honestest to lewdness…” 
(1.1.45-47) 
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Midas 
 
“I will command both the affections of men and the fortunes.  Chastity will grow cheap 
where gold is not thought dear. Celia, chaste Celia, shall yield… Thus shall Midas 
be…the commander of love.” (1.2.127-29, 131-32) 
 
“…my affection hath been unnatural.” (5.3.68-69) 
 
 
Sophronia 
 
“they honor lust for a god” (2.1.112) 
 
“thy tongue doth itch to talk of love, and my ears tingle to hear it.” (2.1.132-33) 
 
“there are other things to keep one from idleness besides love; nay, that there is nothing 
to make idleness but love.” (3.3.25-27) 
 
“how like you Suavia in her loving vein?” (3.3.75) 
 
 
Celia 
 
“I am free from love, and unfortunate to be beloved.” (2.1.128-29) 
 
 
Amerula 
 
“Dote he did without measure, and die he must without her love.” (3.3.41-42) 
 
She “felt the passions of love eating into her heart, though she dissembled them with her 
eyes.” (3.3.44-45) 
 
 
Suavia 
 
“Dancing is love sauce; therefore I dare be so saucy as, if you love to dance, to say you 
dance for love.” (3.3.62-64) 
 
 
Pan 
 
“is there any instrument so sweet to play on as one’s mistress?” (4.1.13) 
 
“Pan feels the passions of love deeply engraven in his heart…” (4.1.34-35) 
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“…better than Pan none can describe love…” (4.1.36-37) 
 
“Here is flat faith, amo, amas, where you [Apollo] cry, o utinam amarent vel non 
amassem.” (4.1.58-60)  
 
 
Apollo 
 
“Doth Pan talk of the passions of love, of the passions of divine love?” (4.1.18-19) 
 
“Let not love enter into those savage lips…” (4.1.28) 
 
 
Petulus 
 
“…my heart is like a hearth where Cupid is making a fire, for Sophronia shall be my 
wife. Methinks Venus and Nature stand with each of them a pair of bellows, the one 
cooling my low birth, the other kindling my lofty affections.” (5.2.85-89) 
 
 
Mother Bombie 
 
Stellio 
 
Stellio: …how shall I compass a match between my girl and his boy?  
Risio: Why, with a pair of compasses. And bring them both into the circle, I’ll warrant
 they’ll match themselves. (1.2.33-36) 
 
 
Prisius 
 
“It is unneighbourly done to suffer your sun, since he came from school, to spend his 
time in love…” (1.3.1-2) 
 
“I think this hot love hath provided but cold cheer.” (1.3.177) 
 
“you…must be fed with love upon sops…” (1.3.218-19) 
 
“I have tied up the loving worm, my daughter, and will see whether fancy can worm 
fancy out of her head.” (2.2.16-18) 
 
“My daughter is seduced!” (5.3.157) 
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Sperantus 
 
“Yet by no means, either by blessing or cursing, can I win my son to be a wooer…” 
(1.3.37-39) 
 
“…he is able to make a lady’s mouth water” (1.3.42-43) 
 
“…I’ll keep him to his books, and study shall make him leave to love.” (1.3.62-63) 
 
“…in love is no lack.” (1.3.178) 
 
“You have made love a book case, and spent your time well at school, learning to love by 
art and hate against nature.” (1.3.179-81) 
 
“A hungry meal, a ragged coat, and a dry cudgel have put him quite besides his love…” 
(2.2.24-25) 
 
 
Livia 
 
“I will measure my love by mine own judgement…” (1.3.121-22) 
 
Livia:     Is there art in love? 
Candius:  A short art, and a certain. (1.3.149-50) 
 
 
Candius 
 
The “art of love” is, “First, one must find out a mistress, whom before all others he 
voweth to serve. Secondly, that he use all the means that he may to obtain her. And the 
last, with deserts, faith, and secrecy, to study to keep her.” (1.3.157-61) 
 
“A fiend, that seeks to place affection by appointment, and to force love by compulsion!” 
(2.3.1-3) 
 
“I’ll teach him one school-trick in love.” (2.3.6) 
 
“…if thou begin to slip at beauty on a sudden, thou wilt surfeit with carousing it at the 
last.” (2.3.10-12) 
 
“You see how, unacquainted, I am bold to board you.” (2.3.33-34) 
 
Candius:  Here I do plight my faith, taking thee for the staff of my age, and of my youth 
    my solace. 
Livia:     And I vow to thee affection which nothing can dissolve, neither the length of 
    time, nor malice of fortune, nor distance of place. (4.1.51-55) 
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Maestius 
 
“I find in myself passions more than brotherly.” (3.1.2) 
 
“Yet this is our comfort, that these unnatural heats have stretched themselves no further 
than thoughts. Unhappy me, that they should stretch so!” (3.1.14-17) 
 
“between strangers, custom hath bred love exquisite.” (3.1.25) 
 
 
Serena 
 
“I…find my thoughts entangled with affections beyond nature, which so flame into my 
distempered head that I can neither without danger smother the fire, nor without modesty 
disclose my fury.” (3.1.3-7) 
 
“to combat against our own intemperate desires” (3.1.9-10) 
 
“This is our comfort: to bewray our passions, since we cannot enjoy our love.” (3.1.58-
60) 
 
 
Halfpenny 
 
“He loves thee well that would run after.” (3.4.13) 
 
 
Rixula 
 
“foul water will quench hot fire as soon as fair.” (3.4.25-26) 
 
 
Dromio 
 
“…a woman’s heart is thrust through with a feather.” (4.1.35) 
 
 
Accius 
 
“I am taken with a fit of love.” (4.2.40) 
 
“I shall give her the humble bee’s kiss.” (5.3.294) 
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Synis, Beduneus, & Nasutus (Song) 
 
“Like ivy he her fast does hold, 
And clips her, 
And lips her, 
And flips her too. 
Then let them alone, they know what they do.” (5.3.67-71) 
 
“This night, 
In delight, 
Does thump away sorrow. 
Of billing 
Take your filling, 
So good morrow, good morrow!” (5.3.79-84) 
 
 
Vicinia 
 
The children were “too forward in affection…” (5.3.312-13) 
 
“They increased in their loving humours… their loose demeanours.” (5.3.314-16) 
 
 
Love’s Metamorphosis 
 
Ramis 
 
“in the world there is so little love.” (1.1.3) 
 
“I [love] one that hates love.” (1.1.28) 
 
is “constant in love” (3.1.4) 
 
“Lust followeth not my love as shadows do bodies, but truth is woven into my love as 
veins into bodies… my love is endless” (3.1.5-7) 
 
“[l]ove is a consuming of the heart and restoring, a bitter death in a sweet life.” (3.1.23-
24) 
 
“this bleeding heart, in which yet sticks the head of the golden shaft, is the lively picture 
of inward torments.” (4.1.9-11) 
 
“we may possess at last the depth of their affections.” (5.3.9-10) 
 
“Nothing can alter our affections, which increase while the means decrease, and wax 
stronger in being weakened.” (5.4.36-38) 
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“the extremity of love is madness…” (5.4.125) 
 
 
Silvestris 
 
“I do not think Love hath any spark of divinity in him, since the end of his being is 
earthly.  In the blood is he begot by the frail fires of the eyes, and quenched by the frailer 
shadows of thought.” (1.1.10-13) 
 
“I [love] one that thinks herself above love.” (1.1.29) 
 
“a lady’s heart, though it harbour many fancies, should embrace but one love” (3.1.126-
27) 
 
“This heart, neither bleeding nor bloodless, but swollen with sighs, I offer to thy godhead, 
protesting that all my thoughts are, as my words, without lust, and all my love, as my 
fortune, without sweetness” (4.1.25-29) 
 
 
Niobe 
 
“in my affections shall there be no stayedness but in unstayedness.” (1.2.6-7) 
 
“Give them leave to love, since we have liberty to choose, for as great sport do I take in 
coursing their tame hearts, as they do pains in hunting their wild harts.” (1.2.27-29) 
 
“must I confess that oftentimes I have had sweet thoughts, sometimes hard conceits; 
betwixt both a kind of yielding, I know not what.  But certainly I think it is not love.  
Sigh I can, and find ease in melancholy; smile I do, and take pleasure in imagination.  I 
feel in myself a pleasing pain, a chill heat, a delicate bitterness; how to term it I know 
not.  Without doubt it may be love; sure I am it is not hate.” (2.1.75-82) 
 
 
Celia 
 
“how ill love sounds in their lips, who, telling a long tale of hunting, think they have 
bewrayed a sad passion of love!” (1.2.24-26) 
 
“your affection is but pinned to your tongue” (1.2.30) 
 
 “into her heart never entered any motion of love.” (1.2.64) 
 
“Yield to love I cannot; or if I do, to thy love I will not.” (3.1.44-45) 
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“more good cometh of the rose than can by love. When it is fresh, it hath a sweet savour; 
love, a sour taste. The rose, when it is old, loseth not his virtue; love, when it is stale, 
waxeth loathsome. The rose, distilled with fire, yieldeth sweet water; love, in extremeties, 
kindles jealousies. In the rose, however it be, there is sweetness; in love, nothing but 
bitterness.” (5.4.86-93) 
 
 
Erisichthon  
 
“your enticing eyes… drew iron like adamants” (1.2.74-75) 
 
“foolish love would dote on [your beauty]” (1.2.92-93) 
 
 
Fidelia  
 
Virgins’ “chaste… bodies are followed in the world with lust” (1.2.127-28) 
 
 
Ceres 
 
“where such continual war is between love and virtue, there must be some parleys and 
continual perils.  Cupid was never conquered, and therefore must be flattered; virginity 
hath, and therefore must be humble.” (2.1.50-54) 
 
Diana’s nymphs “all yielded to love… I say they are yielded to love.” (2.1.90, 91-92) 
 
Ceres:  Why didst thou so cruelly torment all Diana’s nymphs with love? 
Cupid:  Because they thought it impossible to love. 
Ceres:  What is the substance of love? 
Cupid   Constancy and secrecy. 
Ceres:  What the signs? 
Cupid:  Sighs and tears. 
Ceres:  What the causes? 
Cupid:  Wit and idleness. 
Ceres:  What the means? 
Cupid:  Opportunity and importunity. 
Ceres:  What the end? 
Cupid:  Happiness without end. (2.1.117-29) 
 
“my nymphs…shall neither be so stately as not to stoop to love nor so light as presently 
to yield.” (5.4.178-80) 
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Nisa 
 
“Into my heart, madam, there did never enter any motion of love.” (2.1.55-56) 
 
“love [will] make me confess that Nisa is a fool” (3.1.16-17) 
 
“[l]ove is a consuming of wit and restoring of folly, a staring blindness and a blind 
gazing.” (3.1.25-27) 
 
Men’s “open flatteries make way to their secret lusts…” (5.4.75-76) 
 
“when his love was hottest…” (5.4.123) 
 
 
Cupid 
 
“Why, Ceres, do you think that lust followeth love? Ceres, lovers are chaste! For what is 
love, divine love, but the quintessence of chastity, and affections binding by heavenly 
motions, that cannot be undone by earthly means, and must not be controlled by any 
man?” (2.1.138-42)  
 
“What have you used in love?” (4.1.67) 
 
“Diana hath felt some motions of love; Vesta doth; Ceres shall.” (5.1.21-22) 
 
“I will make such unspotted loves among you...” (5.4.174-75) 
 
“resist not love, which worketh wonders” (5.4.177) 
 
 
Montanus 
 
“thou hast overtaken me in love.” (3.1.40) 
 
“yield to love, to sweet love!” (3.1.41-42) 
 
“To be amiable and not to love is, like a painted lady, to have colours and no life.” 
(3.1.60-61) 
 
“…brook my love” (3.1.71) 
 
“disdain increaseth desire” (3.1.82) 
 
“I present not a bleeding but a bloodless heart, dried only with sorrow and worn with 
faithful service” (4.1.18-19) 
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“This picture I offer, carved with no other instrument than love” (4.1.19-20) 
 
“I did ever imagine that true love would end with sweet joys, though it was begun with 
deep sighs.” (5.3.4-5) 
 
“nothing will turn her heart” (5.4.99-100) 
 
 
Protea 
 
Neptune’s “godhead conquered my maidenhead.” (3.2.27-28) 
 
“hearts of men, stiffer than steel, have by love been made softer than wool.” (5.2.12-13) 
 
 
Petulius 
 
“My heart is ravished with such tickling thoughts, and mine eyes stayed with such a 
bewitching beauty, that I can neither find the means to remove my affection nor to turn 
aside my looks.” (4.2.53-56) 
 
“Vouchsafe I may honour thee, and live by the imagination I have of thy words and 
worthiness.” (4.2.67-68) 
 
“hard iron, falling into fire, waxeth soft; and then the tender heart of a virgin, being in 
love, must needs melt.” (5.2.7-9) 
 
 
Siren 
 
“the hot assault of love” (4.2.84-85) 
 
 
The Woman in the Moon 
 
Iphicles 
 
“thy Utopians, poor and simple men, 
As yet bewail their want of female sex” (1.1.49-50) 
 
“Now Cyprian Queen, guider of loving thoughts…” (2.1.102) 
 
“But waking, what sweet pastime have I had! 
For love is watchful, and can never sleep.” (4.1.25-26) 
 
“Love is deaf, blind, and incredulous.” (4.1.52) 
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“It was a strategem laid for my love.” (4.1.143) 
  
“Now would I fall in Pandora’s lap.” (4.1.255) 
 
“Pandora’s love… almost burst my heart!” (5.1.184) 
 
 
Jupiter 
 
“Danae was fair, and Leda pleased me well; 
Lovely Callisto set my heart on fire, 
And in mine eye Europa was a gem, 
But… / in this one are all my loves contained” (2.1.13-16, 18) 
 
“High Jove himself, who, ravished with thy blaze, 
Receives more influence than he pours on thee, 
And humbly sues for succour at thy hands.” (2.1.24-26) 
 
 
Juno 
 
“I thought Ganymede had weaned thy heart 
From lawless lust of any woman’s love, 
But well I see that every time thou strayest 
Thy lust but looks for strumpet stars below.” (2.1.54-57) 
 
 
Gunophilus 
 
“As I beheld the glory of thy face,  
My feeble eyes, admiring majesty, 
Did sink into my heart such holy fear, 
That very fear, amazing every sense, 
Withheld my tongue from saying what I would, 
And freezed my joints from bowing when they should.” (2.1.94-99) 
 
“I dare not love…” (3.2.87) 
 
“Shall I provide a banquet, and be cozened of the best dish?” (3.2.264-65) 
 
“I would not refuse her, provided she be not clipped within the ring.” (3.2.271-72) 
 
“Hate me a-days, and love me in the night.” (5.1.48) 
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“I was ne’er in love with her till now.  Oh, absolute Pandora because foolish—for folly is 
women’s perfection! To talk idly, to look wildly, to laugh at every breach and play with a 
feather is that would make a Stoic in love, yea, thou thyself.” (5.1.119-23) 
 
 
Stesias 
 
“…when comes that happy hour 
Whereon thy love shall guerdon my desire?” (2.1.115) 
 
“…in thy pleasure must be my content.” (2.1.139) 
 
“…in my death my love may find some relief.” (2.1.214) 
 
“Lance up my side, 
that when my heart leaps out, 
Thou mayst behold how it is scorched with love, 
And every way cross-wounded with desire. 
There shalt thou read my passions deep engraven, 
And in the midst, only Pandora’s name.” (2.1.215-19) 
 
“Blest be the hand that made so happy wound, 
for in my sufferance have I won thy love.” (3.1.72-73) 
 
“I [am] in the paradise of my delight.” (3.1.77) 
 
“in thy looks I live.” (3.1.86) 
 
“She played the wanton with these amorous swains.” (4.1.65) 
 
 
Learchus  
 
“How long… 
Before my suit obtain thy sweet consent?” (2.1.117-18) 
 
“Oh, let thy tongue first salve Learchus’ wound, 
That first was made with those immortal eyes!” (2.1.125-26) 
 
“Love hath decreed thy word must govern me.” (2.1.144) 
 
“Therefore only gaze, eyes, to please yourselves, 
Let not my inward sense know what you see, 
Lest that my fancy dote upon her still. 
Pandora is divine!  But say not so, 
Lest that thy heart hear thee, and break in twain.” (3.2.96-102) 
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“Make me thy love…” (3.2.125) 
 
“How many thousand kisses gave she me! 
And every kiss mixed with an amorous glance.” (4.1.21-22). 
 
“Oh, the iteration of my name argues her affection!” (4.1.214-15) 
 
 
Melos  
 
“How long… 
 Before the harvest of my love be in?” (2.1.122-23). 
 
“The only promise of thy future love 
Will drown the secret heaps of my despair 
In an endless ocean of unexpected joys!” (2.1.127-29) 
 
“Oh, grant me love, or wound me to the death.” (3.1.31) 
 
“How oft have I leant on her silver breast, 
She singing on her lute, and Melos being the note!” (4.1.23-24). 
 
“…If Melos love not thee more than his heart!” (4.1.197) 
 
 
Pandora 
 
“…my breast yet never harboured love.” (2.1.130) 
 
“I shall reward thy sufferance with love. 
These eyes, that were like two malignant stars, 
Shall yield thee comfort with their sweet aspect; 
And these my lips, that did blaspheme thy love, 
Shall speak thee fair and bless thee with a kiss…” (3.1.16-19) 
 
 “…the joys that I conceive in thee” (3.1.64). 
 
“What honey thoughts are in Pandora’s brain?” (3.2.53) 
 
“Must I be tied to him?  No!  I’ll be loose, 
As loose as Helen, for I am as fair.” (3.2.66-67) 
 
“I am lovesick for thee.” (3.2.83) 
 
“I languish for thee, therefore be my love!” (3.2.85). 
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“…Now, sweet love, begone, 
Lest Stesias take thee in this amorous vein.” (3.2.135-36) 
 
“Now have I played with wanton Iphicles, 
Yea, and kept touch with Melos.  Both are pleased.” (3.2.224-25) 
 
“Thus will I hang about Learchus’ neck, 
And suck out happiness from forth his lips.” (3.2.257-58) 
 
“Tell him I rave and languish for his love.” (4.1.114) 
 
“Here will I sit till I see Iphicles, 
Sighing my breath, out-weeping my heart-blood. 
Go, soul, and fly unto my liefest love…” (4.1.146-48) 
 
“Dost thou not love me more than all the world?” (4.1.290) 
 
“Why call you me your love? 
Love is a little boy; so am not I.” (5.1.97-98) 
 
“…bid Love untruss…” (5.1.205) 
 
“Venus, mad’st me love all that I saw…” (5.1.311) 
 
 
Venus 
 
“All those are strumpets that are over-chaste, 
Defying such as keep their company. 
‘Tis not the touching of a woman’s hand, 
Kissing her lips, hanging about her neck, 
A speaking look, no, nor a yielding word, 
That men expect.  Believe me, Sol, ‘tis more…” (3.2.19-24) 
 
 
Cupid 
 
“…you shall see her straight in love.” (3.2.34) 
 
 
Joculus 
 
“Were I a man, I could love thee.” (3.2.41) 
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Nature 
 
“Let them be mutable in all their loves, 
Fantastical, childish, and foolish in their desires…” (5.1.329-30) 
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Appendix C: 
Erotic Language in Plays by Shakespeare 
 
The Two Gentlemen of Verona 
 
Valentine 
 
“…affection chains thy tender days 
To the sweet glances of thy honored love…. 
…living dully sluggardized at home, 
Wear out thy youth with shapeless idleness.” (1.1.3-4; 7-8) 
 
“you are over boots in love.” (1.1.25) 
 
“Love is your master, for he masters you; 
And he that is so yoked by a fool 
Methinks should not be chronicled for wise.” (1.1.39-41) 
 
Proteus is “a votary to fond desire.” (1.1.52) 
 
“I stand affected to her.” (2.1.81)  
  
“Love hath chased sleep from my enthralled eyes, 
And made them watchers of mine own heart’s sorrow. 
O gentle Proteus, Love’s a mighty lord, 
And hath so humbled me as I confess 
There is no woe to his correction, 
Nor to his service no such joy on earth. 
Now no discourse, except it be of Love; 
Now can I break my fast, dine, sup, and sleep, 
Upon the very naked name of Love.” (2.4.132-40) 
 
“O, flatter me, for love delights in praises.” (2.4.156) 
 
“For scorn at first makes after-love the more.” (3.1.95) 
 
“She is my essence, and I leave to be, 
If I be not by her fair influence 
Fostered, illumined, cherished, kept alive.” (3.1.182-84) 
 
 
Proteus 
 
“…he was more than over shoes in love.” (1.1.24) 
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Pro:  “Yet writers say, as in the sweetest bud 
 The eating canker dwells, so eating love 
 Inhabits in the finest wits of all. 
Val:  And writers say, as the most forward bud 
 Is eaten by the canker ere it blow, 
 Even so by love the young and tender wit 
 Is turned to folly.” (1.1.42-48) 
 
 “I [hunt] after love.” (1.1.63) 
 
“Thou, Julia, thou hast metamorphosed me, 
Made me neglect my studies, lose my time, 
War with good counsel, set the world at nought; 
Made wit with musing weak, heart sick with thought.” (1.1.66-69) 
 
“What, gone without a word? 
Ay, so true love should do; it cannot speak, 
For truth hath better deeds than words to grace it.” (2.2.16-18) 
 
“Even as one heat another heat expels, 
Or as one nail by strength drives out another, 
So the remembrance of my former love 
Is by a newer object quite forgotten.”  (2.4.190-93) 
 
…“for now my love is thawed, 
Which, like a waxen image ‘gainst a fire, 
Bears no impression of the thing it was…” (2.4.198-200) 
 
“How shall I dote on her with more advice, 
That thus without advice begin to love her!” (2.4.205-206) 
 
Her image “hath dazzled my reason’s light” (2.4.208) 
 
“If I can check my erring love, I will; 
If not, to compass her I’ll use my skill.” (2.4.211-12) 
 
“O sweet-suggesting Love, if thou hast sinned, 
Teach me, thy tempted subject, to excuse it.” (2.6.7-8) 
 
“You must lay lime to tangle her desires…” (3.2.68) 
 
“Yet, spaniel-like, the more she spurns my love, 
The more it grows, and fawneth on her still.” (4.2.14-15) 
 
Sil: “What’s your will? 
Pro: That I may compass yours.” (4.2.92-93) 
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“…since the substance of your perfect self 
Is else devoted, I am but a shadow, 
And to your shadow [portrait] will I make true love.” (4.2.124-26) 
 
“Nay, if the gentle spirit of moving words 
Can no way change you to a milder form, 
I’ll woo you like a soldier, at arm’s end, 
And love you ‘gainst the nature of love – force ye.” (5.4.55-58) 
 
“I’ll force thee yield to my desire.” (5.4.59) 
 
 
Julia 
 
Jul:  “Wouldst thou then counsel me to fall in love? 
Luc:   Ay, madam, so you stumble not unheedfully.” (1.2.2-3) 
 
“And wouldst thou have me cast my love on him?” (1.2.25) 
 
Jul: “Why, he, of all the rest, hath never moved me. 
Luc: Yet he, of all the rest, I think best loves ye. 
Jul: His little speaking shows his love but small. 
Luc: Fire that’s closest kept burns most of all. 
Jul: They do not love that do not show their love. 
Luc: O they love least that let men know their love.” (1.2.27-32) 
 
“Fie, fie, how wayward is this foolish love 
That, like a testy babe, will scratch the nurse 
And presently all humbled kiss the rod!” (1.2.57-59) 
 
 “Thus will I fold them [pieces of a love letter] one upon another – 
Now kiss, embrace, contend, do what you will.” (1.2.129-30) 
 
“Didst thou but know the inly touch of love…” (2.7.18) 
 
“…I would prevent 
The loose encounters of lascivious men.” (2.7.40-41) 
 
“She dreams on him that has forgot her love; 
You dote on her that cares not for your love. 
‘Tis pity love should be so contrary” (4.4.80-82) 
 
“Alas, how love can trifle with itself!” (4.4.182) 
 
“love will not be spurred to what it loathes.” (5.2.7) 
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Speed 
 
“And now you are metamorphosed with a mistress…” (2.1.29-30) 
 
“my master is become a notable lover… my master is become a hot lover…” (2.5.36, 42) 
 
 
Launce 
 
“I care not though he burn himself in love…” (2.5.43-44) 
 
 
Lucetta 
 
Luc:  “I do not seek to quench your love’s hot fire, 
 But qualify the fire’s extreme rage, 
 Lest it should burn above the bounds of reason. 
Jul: The more thou damm’st it up, the more it burns. 
 The current that with gentle murmur glides, 
 Thou know’st, being stopped, impatiently doth rage.” (2.7.21-26) 
 
 
Duke 
 
“This weak impress of love is as a figure 
Trenched in ice, which with an hour’s heat 
Dissolves to water and doth lose his form.” (3.2.6-8) 
 
 
The Taming of the Shrew 
 
Tranio 
 
“is it possible 
That love should of a sudden take such hold?” (1.1.139-40) 
 
“Nay, then, ‘tis time to stir him from his trance.” (1.1.171) 
 
“If you love the maid 
Bend thoughts and wits to achieve her.” (1.1.176-77) 
 
“O despiteful love, unconstant womankind!” (4.2.14) 
 
“see how beastly she doth court him.” (4.2.34) 
  251   
 
 
Lucentio 
 
“…while idly I stood looking on 
I found the effect of love in idleness…” (1.1.144-45) 
 
“…Tranio, I burn, I pine, I perish, Tranio, 
If I achieve not this young modest girl.” (1.1.149-50) 
 
“Lucentio loves, 
And let me be a slave t’achieve that maid 
Whose sudden sight hath thrilled my wounded eye.” (1.1.212-14) 
 
“you, sweet dear, prove mistress of my heart.” (4.3.10) 
 
 
Baptista 
 
“when the special thing is well obtained, 
That is, her love, for that is all in all.” (2.1.129-30) 
 
 
Petruccio 
 
“where two raging fires meet together 
They do consume the thing that feeds their fury. 
Though little fire grows great with little wind, 
Yet extreme gusts will blow out fire and all 
So I to her, and so she yields to me, 
For I am rough and woo not like a babe.” (2.1.133-38) 
 
“Now, by the world, it is a lusty wench! 
I love her ten times more than e’er I did. 
O, how I long to have some chat with her!” (2.1.158-60) 
 
will “woo her with some spirit when she comes.” (2.1.170) 
 
“Myself am moved to woo thee for my wife.” (2.1.195) 
 
“I tell you, ‘tis incredible to believe 
How much she loves me. O the kindest Kate! 
She hung about my neck, and kiss on kiss 
She vied so fast, protesting oath on oath, 
That in a twink she won me to her love.” (2.1.307-11) 
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“I thank you all, 
That have beheld me give away myself 
To this most patient, sweet, and virtuous wife.” (3.2.191-93) 
 
 
Hortensio 
 
“Methinks he looks as though he were in love.” (3.1.87) 
 
“Kindness in women, not their beauteous looks, 
Shall win my love.” (4.2.41-42) 
 
 
Kate 
 
“He does it all under the name of perfect love…” (4.3.12) 
 
 
 
The Comedy of Errors 
 
 
Luciana 
 
“know he is the bridle of your will.” (2.1.13) 
 
“Ere I learn love, I’ll practice to obey.” (2.1.29) 
 
“Shall, Antipholus, 
Even in the spring of love, thy love-springs rot?” (3.2.2-3) 
 
“Shall love, in building, grow so ruinous?” (3.2.4) 
 
“Muffle your false love with some show of blindness.” (3.2.8) 
 
“We in your motion turn, and you may move us.” (3.2.24) 
 
 
 
Adriana 
 
“I know his eye doth homage otherwhere” (2.1.104) 
 
“undividable, incorporate, 
Am better than thy dear self’s better part.” (2.2.121-22) 
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“How dearly would it touch thee to the quick, 
Shouldst thou but hear I were licentious, 
And that this body, consecrate to thee, 
By ruffian lust should be contaiminate!” (2.2.129-32) 
 
“I am possessed with an adulterate blot; 
My blood is mingled with the crime of lust. 
For if we two be one, and thou play false, 
I do digest the poison of thy flesh, 
Being strumpeted by thy contagion.” (2.2.139-43) 
 
“Come, I will fasten on this sleeve of thine: 
Thou art an elm, my husband, I a vine, 
Whose weakness married to thy stronger state 
Makes me with thy strength to communicate.” (2.2.172-75) 
 
“…his heart’s meteors tilting in his face” (4.3.6) 
 
“With what persuasion did he tempt thy love?” (4.3.13) 
 
 
Antipholus of Syracuse 
 
“Are you a god? Would you create me new? 
Transform me then, and to your power I’ll yield.” (3.2.39-40) 
 
“…to you I do decline.” (3.2.44) 
 
“Sing, siren, for thyself, and I will dote.” (3.2.47) 
 
“Spread o’er the silver waves thy golden hairs, 
And as a bed I’ll take them and there lie; 
And in that glorious supposition think 
He gains by death that hath such means to die. 
Let Love, being light, be drownèd if she sink!” (3.2.48-52) 
 
“It is thyself, mine own self’s better part; 
Mine eye’s clear eye, my dear heart’s dearer heart” (3.2.61-62) 
 
 
Dromio of Syracuse 
 
“I am due to a woman: one that claims me, one that haunts me, one that will have me.” 
(3.2.81-83) 
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Love’s Labor’s Lost 
 
Armado 
 
“I will hereupon confess I am in love. … If drawing my sword against the humour of 
affection would deliver me from the reprobate thought of it, I would take desire prisoner 
and ransom him…” (1.2.53-57) 
 
“My spirit grows heavy in love.” (1.2.109) 
 
“I do affect the very ground – which is base – where her shoe – which is baser – guided 
by her foot – which is basest – doth tread.  I shall be forsworn – which is a great 
argument of falsehood – if I love.  And how can that be true love which is falsely 
attempted?  Love is a familiar; love is a devil.  There is no evil angel but love.” (1.2.149-
54) 
 
Moth:      “Negligent student! learn her by heart. 
Armado:   By heart, and in heart, boy. 
Moth:       And out of heart, master. All those three I will prove. 
Armado:   What wilt thou prove? 
Moth:      A man, if I live; and this, “by,” “in,” and “without,” upon the instant. By heart 
     if you love her, because your heart cannot come by her; in heart you love her 
     because your heart is in love with her; and out of heart you love her, being out 
     of heart that you cannot enjoy her.” (3.1.33-43) 
 
 
Boyet 
 
“God bless my ladies! Are they all in love, 
That every one her own hath garnishéd  
With such bedecking ornaments of praise?” (2.1.77-79) 
 
Boyet: “Navarre is infected.” 
Princess: “With what?” 
Boyet: “With that which we lovers entitle ‘affected.’” (2.1.229-31) 
 
[Reads] “Shall I command thy love? I may. Shall I enforce thy love? I could. Shall I 
entreat thy love? I will.” (4.1.81-82) 
 
 
Berowne 
 
“And I, forsooth, in love – I that have been love’s whip…” (3.1.159) 
 
“Well, I will love, write, sigh, pray, sue, groan: 
Some men must love my lady, and some Joan.” (3.1.189-90) 
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“The King, he is hunting the deer.  I am coursing myself.  They have pitched a toil.  I am 
toiling in a pitch – pitch that defiles.” (4.3.1-2) 
 
“I will not love; if I do, hang me.  I’ faith, I will not. O but her eye! By this light, but for 
her eye, I would not love her—yes for her two eyes. Well, I do nothing in the world but 
lie and lie in my throat. By heaven, I do love…” (4.3.7-11) 
 
“But love, first learnéd in a lady’s eyes, 
Lives not alone immuréd in the brain, 
But, with the motion of all elements, 
Courses as swift as thought in every power, 
And gives to every power a double power 
Above their functions and their offices.” (4.3.301-6) 
 
“They are infected, in their hearts it lies. 
They have the plague, and caught it of your eyes.” (5.2.420-21) 
 
Dumaine: “O that I had my wish!” 
Longueville: “And I had mine!” 
King:  “And I mine too, good Lord!” 
Berowne: “Amen, so I had mine.  Is not that a good word?” (4.3.87-90) 
 
 
Nathaniel 
 
[Reads] “If love make me forsworn, how shall I swear to love?” (4.3.104) 
 
 
A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
 
Lysander 
 
Helena “dotes, 
Devoutly dotes, dotes in idolatry 
Upon this spotted and inconstant man.” (1.1.108-10) 
 
“Not Hermia but Helena I love.” (2.2.119) 
 
Lys:  “Helen, I love thee; by my life I do. 
 I swear by that which I will lose for thee 
 To prove him false that says I love thee not. 
Dem: “I say I love thee more than he can do.” (3.2.252-55) 
 
 
Helena 
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“O, teach me how you look, and with what art 
You sway the motion of Demetrius’ heart.” (1.1.192-93) 
 
“And as he errs, doting on Hermia’s eyes, 
So I, admiring of his qualities.” (1.1.230-31) 
 
“You draw me, you hard-hearted adamant, 
But yet you draw not iron; for my heart 
Is true as steel.  Leave you your power to draw, 
And I shall have no power to follow you.” (2.1.195-98) 
 
“I am your spaniel, and, Demetrius, 
The more you beat me I will fawn on you, 
Use me but as your spaniel; spurn me, strike me, 
Neglect me, lose me; only give me leave, 
Unworthy as I am, to follow you.” (2.1.203-207) 
 
“For you in my respect are all the world.” (2.1.224) 
 
 
Oberon 
 
The flower’s juice “Will make or man or woman madly dote 
Upon the next live creature that it sees.” (2.1.171-72) 
 
“What thou seest when thou dost wake, 
Do it for thy true love take; 
Love and languish for his sake.” (2.2.33-35) 
 
 
 
Titania 
 
“Mine ear is much enamoured of thy note; 
So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape; 
And thy fair virtue’s force perforce doth move me 
On the first view to say, to swear, I love thee.” (3.1.122-25) 
 
“O how I love thee, how I dote on thee!” (4.1.42) 
 
 
Demetrius 
 
“I love thee not, therefore pursue me not.” (2.1.188) 
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“If e’er I loved her, all that love is gone. 
My heart to her but as guestwise sojourned 
And now to Helen is it home returned, 
There to remain.” (3.2.170-73) 
 
“all the faith, the virtue of my heart, 
The object and the pleasure of mine eye 
Is only Helens.  To her, my lord, 
Was I betrothed ere I saw Hermia. 
But like in sickness did I loathe this food; 
But, as in health come to my natural taste, 
Now I do wish it, love it, long for it, 
And will for evermore be true to it.” (4.1.166-73) 
 
 
The Merchant of Venice 
 
Bassanio 
 
“Sometimes from her eyes 
I did receive fair speechless messages.” (1.2.163-64) 
 
“that ugly treason of mistrust 
…makes me fear th’ enjoying of my love.” (3.2.28-29) 
 
“Yet look, how far 
The substance of my praise doth wrong this shadow 
In underprizing it, so far this shadow 
Doth limp behind the substance.” (3.2.126-29) 
 
 
Jessica 
 
“…love is blind, and lovers cannot see 
The pretty follies that themselves commit.” (2.6.36-37) 
 
 
Lorenzo 
 
“Beshrew me but I love her heartily!” (2.6.52) 
 
“…Shall she be placed in my constant soul.” (2.6.57) 
 
“Troilus methinks mounted the Troyan walls, 
And sighed his soul toward the Grecian tents 
Where Cressid lay that night.” (5.1.4-6) 
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Jessica “with an unthrift love did run from Venice” (5.1.16) 
 
 
Salarino: “Turning his face, he put his hand behind him, 
       And with affection wondrous sensible 
       He wrung Bassanio’s hand; and so they parted. 
Solanio:     I think he only loves the world for him. 
       I pray thee let us go and find him out 
       And quicken his embracéd heaviness 
       With some delight or other.” (2.8.47-53) 
 
 
Portia 
 
“Beshrew your eyes! 
They have o’erlooked me and divided me. 
One half of me is yours, the other half yours— 
Mine own, I would say, but if mine, then yours, 
And so all yours.” (3.2.14-18) 
 
“…confess 
What treason there is mingled with your love.” (3.2.26-27) 
 
[Song] 
 
“Tell me where is fancy bred, 
Or in the heart, or in the head? 
How begot, how nourishéd? 
 Reply, reply. 
It is engendered in the eye, 
With gazing fed, and fancy dies 
In the cradle where it lies. 
 Let us all ring fancy’s knell…” (3.2.63-70) 
 
“How all the other passions fleet to air…” (3.2.108) 
 
“O love, be moderate!  Allay thy ecstasy. 
In measure rain thy joy; scant this excess. 
I feel too much thy blessing: make it less, 
For fear I surfeit.” (3.2.111-14) 
 
“I will become as liberal as you; 
I’ll not deny him anything I have, 
No, not my body nor my husband’s bed.” (5.1.226-28) 
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Gratiano 
 
“You saw the mistress, I beheld the maid. 
You loved, I loved.” (3.2.198-99) 
 
“I got a promise of this fair one here 
To have her love…” (3.2.206-7) 
 
 
Much Ado About Nothing 
 
Don Pedro 
 
“Thou wilt be like a lover presently, 
And tire the hearer with a book of words.” (1.1.254-55) 
 
“thou lovest, 
And I will fit thee with the remedy.” (1.1.266-67) 
 
“…in her bosom I’ll unclasp my heart 
and take her hearing prisoner with the force 
and strong encounter of my amorous tale.” (1.1.271-73) 
 
 
Leonato 
 
“she loves him with an enraged affection it is past the infinite of thought.” (2.3.94-95) 
 
“the ecstasy hath so much overborne her that my daughter is sometime afeard she will do 
a desperate outrage to herself.” (2.3.136-38) 
 
 
Benedick 
 
“I will be horribly in love with her.” (2.3.207-8) 
 
“I do love nothing in the world so well as you.  Is not that strange?” (4.1.266-67) 
 
“why they [great poets] were never so truly turned over and over as my poor self in love.” 
(5.2.29-30) 
 
Bea:  “for which of my good parts did you first suffer love for me? 
Ben:   Suffer love—a good epithet.  I do suffer love indeed, for I love thee against my 
will. 
Bea:  In spite of your heart, I think.” (5.2.54-58) 
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“I will live in thy heart, die in thy lap, and be buried in thy eyes.” (5.2.86-87) 
 
Ben:  “They swore that you were almost sick for me. 
Bea: They swore that you were wellnigh dead for me.” (5.4.80-81) 
 
 
Hero 
 
“My talk to thee must be how Benedick 
Is sick in love with Beatrice.”  (3.1.20-21) 
 
“Therefore let Benedick, like covered fire, 
Consume away in sighs, waste inwardly.” (3.1.78-79) 
 
 
Beatrice 
 
“And, Benedick, love on.  I will requite thee, 
Taming my wild heart to thy loving hand.” (3.1.112-13) 
 
“I love you with so much of my heart that none is left to protest.” (4.1.184-85) 
 
 
As You Like It 
 
Orlando 
 
“What passion hangs these weights upon my tongue? 
I cannot speak to her, yet she urged conference. 
O poor Orlando!  Thou art overthrown, 
Or Charles or something weaker masters thee.” (1.2.224-27) 
 
“O Rosalind, these trees shall be my books, 
And in their barks my thoughts I’ll character 
That every eye which in this forest looks 
Shall see thy virtue witnessed everywhere. 
Run, run, Orlando; carve on every tree 
The fair, the chaste, and unexpressive she.” (3.2.5-10) 
 
“I am he that is so love-shaked.  I pray you, tell me your remedy.” (3.2.332-33) 
 
Ros:  “But are you so much in love as your rhymes speak? 
Orl:  Neither rhyme nor reason can express how much.” (3.2.358-59) 
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“Is’t possible that on so little acquaintance you should like her?  That but seeing, you 
should love her? And loving, woo? And wooing, she should grant?  And will you 
persevere to enjoy her?” (5.1.1-4) 
 
 
Silvius 
 
“O Corin, that thou knew’st how I do love her!” (2.4.18) 
 
“It [Love] is to be all made of sighs and tears” (5.2.74) 
 
“It [Love] is to be all made of faith and service” (5.2.79) 
  
“It [Love] is to be all made of fantasy, 
All made of passion, and all made of wishes, 
All adoration, duty, and observance, 
All humbleness, all patience and impatience, 
All purity, all trial, all obedience.” (5.2.84-88) 
 
 
Touchstone 
 
“We that are true lovers run into strange capers.” (2.4.47-48) 
 
“As the ox hath his bow, sir, the horse his curb, and the falcon her bells, so man hath his 
desires; and as pigeons bill, so wedlock would be nibbling.” (3.3.66-68) 
 
 
Rosalind 
 
“If I could meet that fancy-monger, I would give him some good counsel, for he seems to 
have the quotidian of love upon him.” (3.2.329-31) 
 
“The sight of lovers feedeth those in love.” (3.4.51) 
 
“Shepherd, ply her hard” (3.5.77) 
 
“Come, woo me, woo me, for now I am in a holiday humour, and like enough to 
consent.” (4.1.59-60) 
 
“Why then, can one desire too much of a good thing?” (4.1.105) 
 
“O…that thou didst know how many fathom deep I am in love.  But it cannot be 
sounded.  My affection hath an unknown bottom, like the Bay of Portugal.” (4.1.175-77) 
 
“Come, come, you are a fool, 
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And turned into the extremity of love.” (4.3.22-23) 
 
“If the scorn of your bright eyne 
Have power to raise such love in mine, 
Alack, in me what strange effect 
Would they work in mild aspect?” (4.3.50-53) 
 
“for your brother and my sister no sooner met but they looked; no sooner looked but they 
loved; no sooner loved but they sighed; no sooner sighed but they asked one another the 
reason; no sooner knew the reason but they sought the remedy.” (5.2.28-32) 
 
“They are in the very wrath of love.” (5.2.35) 
 
 
Twelfth Night 
 
Orsino 
 
“If music be the food of love, play on, 
Give me excess of it that, surfeiting, 
The appetite may sicken and so die.” (1.1.1-3) 
 
“O, when mine eyes did see Olivia first 
Methought she purged the air of pestilence; 
That instance was I turned into a hart, 
And my desires, like fell and cruel hounds, 
E’er since pursue me.” (1.1.18-22) 
 
“unfold the passion of my love, 
Surprise her with discourse of my dear faith.” (1.4.23-24) 
 
“For such as I am, all true lovers are, 
Unstaid and skittish in all motions else 
Save in the constant image of the creature 
That is beloved.” (2.4.16-19) 
 
“There is no woman’s sides 
Can bide the beating of so strong a passion 
As love doth give my heart; no woman’s heart 
So big, to hold so much.  They lack retention. 
Alas, their love may be called appetite, 
No motion of the liver, but the palate, 
That suffer surfeit, cloyment, and revolt. 
But mine is all as hungry as the sea, 
And can digest as much.” (2.5.91-99) 
 
  263   
 
Viola 
 
Oli:  “How does he love me? 
Vio:  With adorations, fertile tears, 
 With groans that thunder love, with sighs of fire.” (1.5.223-25) 
 
“She loves me, sure.  The cunning of her passion 
Invites me in this churlish messenger.” (2.2.20-21) 
 
“My master loves her dearly, 
And I, poor monster, fond as much on him, 
And she, mistaken, seems to dote on me.” (2.2.31-33) 
 
I go “After him I love 
More than I love these eyes, more than my life, 
More by all mores than e’er I shall love wife.” (5.1.131-32) 
 
 
Olivia 
 
“How now? 
Even so quickly may one catch the plague? 
Methinks I feel this youth’s perfections 
With an invisible and subtle stealth 
To creep in at mine eyes.” (1.5.264-68) 
 
“I love thee so that, maugre all thy pride, 
Nor wit nor reason can my passion hide.” (3.1.142-43) 
 
“thou perhaps mayst move 
That heart which now abhors, to like his love.” (3.1.154-55) 
 
 
Malvolio 
 
“Maria once told me she did affect me, and I have heard herself come thus near, that she 
should fancy it should be one of my complexion.” (2.5.20-22) 
 
“I have limed her” (3.4.68) 
 
 
Antonio 
 
“My desire, 
More sharp than filed steel, did spur me forth.” (3.3.4-5) 
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Troilus and Cressida 
 
Troilus 
 
“And when fair Cressid comes into my thoughts— 
So, traitor!  When she comes?  When is she thence?” (1.1.28-29) 
 
“I tell thee I am mad 
In Cressid’s love; thou answer’st ‘She is fair’, 
Pourest in the open ulcer of my heart 
Her eyes, her hair, her cheek, her gait, her voice” (1.1.48-51) 
 
“But saying thus, instead of oil and balm 
Thou lay’st in every gash that love hath given me 
The knife that made it.” (1.1.58-60) 
 
“I am giddy.  Expectation whirls me round. 
Th’imaginary relish is so sweet 
That it enchants my sense.  What will it be 
When that the wat’ry palates taste indeed 
Love’s thrice-repured nectar?  Death, I fear me, 
Swooning destruction, or some joy too fine, 
Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness 
For the capacity of my ruder powers. 
I fear it much, and I do fear besides 
That I shall lose distinction in my joys, 
As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps 
The enemy flying.” (3.2.16-27) 
 
“This is the monstruosity of love, lady—that the will is infinite and the execution 
confined; that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit.” (3.2.75-77) 
 
“…something may be done that we will not, 
And sometimes we are devils to ourselves, 
When we will tempt the frailty of our powers, 
Presuming on their changeful potency.” (4.5.96-99) 
 
“She was beloved, she loved; she is, and doth.” (4.7.176) 
 
 
Cressida 
 
“That she was never yet that ever knew 
Love got so sweet as when desire did sue.” (1.2.268-69) 
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“my heart’s contents firm love doth bear” (1.2.272) 
 
“They say all lovers swear more performance that they are able, and yet reserve an ability 
that they never perform.” (3.2.78-79) 
 
“I love you now, but till now not so much 
But I might master it.  In faith, I lie: 
My thoughts were like unbridled children, grown 
Too headstrong for their mother.” (3.2.109-112) 
 
“Sweet, bid me hold my tongue, 
For in this rapture I shall surely speak 
The thing I shall repent.  See, see your silence, 
Cunning in thy dumbness, in my weakness draws 
My soul of counsel from me.” (3.2.118-22) 
 
“If I could temporize with my affection 
Or brew it to a weak and colder palate, 
The like allayment could I give my grief. 
My love admits no qualifying dross 
No more my grief, in such a precious loss.” (4.5.6-10) 
 
 
 
Ulysses 
 
“Then everything includes itself in power, 
Power into will, will into appetite; 
And appetite, an universal wolf, 
So doubly seconded with will and power, 
Must make perforce an universal pray, 
And last eat up himself.” (1.3.119-24) 
 
“There’s language in her eye, her cheek, her lip; 
Nay, her foot speaks.  Her wanton spirits look out 
At every joint and motive of her body. 
O these encounters so glib of tongue, 
That give accosting welcome ere it comes, 
And wide unclasp the tables of their thoughts 
To every ticklish reader, set them down 
For sluttish spoils of opportunity 
And daughters of the game.” (4.6.56-64) 
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Hector 
 
“And the will dotes that is inclinable 
To what infectiously itself affects 
Without some image of th’affected merit.” (2.2.57-59) 
 
 
Paris 
 
“He eats nothing but doves, love, and that breeds hot blood, and hot blood begets hot 
thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love.” (3.1.119-21) 
 
“Sweet above thought, I love thee!” (3.1.148) 
 
 
Thersites 
 
“What’s become of the wenching rogues?  I think they have swallowed one another.  I 
would laugh at that miracle – yet in a sort of lechery eats itself.” (5.4.29-31) 
 
 
Measure for Measure 
 
Claudio 
 
“As surfeit is the father of much fast, 
So every scope, by the immoderate use, 
Turns to restraint.  Our natures do pursue, 
Like rats that raven down their proper bane, 
A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.” (1.2.106-10) 
 
 
Duke 
 
“Believe not that the dribbling dart of love 
Can pierce a complete bosom.” (1.3.2-3) 
 
“This forenamed maid hath yet in her the continuance of her first affection.  His unjust 
unkindness, that in all reason should have quenched her love, hath, like an impediment in 
the current, made it more violent and unruly.” (3.1.231-35) 
 
Lucio 
 
“…Lord Angelo—a man who never feels 
The wanton stings and motions of the sense…” (1.4.57-58) 
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Angelo 
 
“’Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus, 
Another thing to fall.” (2.1.17-18) 
 
“She speaks, and ‘tis such sense 
That my sense breeds with it.” (2.2.144-45) 
 
“For I am that way going to temptation, 
Where prayer is crossed.” (2.2.63-64) 
 
“What’s this? What’s this? Is this her fault or mine? 
The tempter or the tempted, who sins most, ha? 
Not she, nor doth she tempt: but it is I 
That, lying by the violet in the sun, 
Do, as the carrion does, not as the flower, 
Corrupt with virtuous season.” (2.2.167-72)   
 
“Can it be 
That modesty may more betray the sense 
Than woman’s lightness?  Having waste ground enough, 
Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary, 
And pitch our evils there?” (2.2.172-76) 
 
“Dost thou desire her foully for those things 
That make her good?” (2.2.178-79) 
 
“What, do I love her, 
That I desire to hear her speak again, 
And feast upon her eyes?  What is’t I dream on?” (2.2.181-83) 
 
“O cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint, 
With saints dost bait thy hook!  Most dangerous 
Is that temptation that doth goad us on 
To sin in loving virtue.” (2.2.183-86)  
 
“Never could the strumpet, 
With all her double vigour – art and nature –  
Once stir my temper; but this virtuous maid 
Subdues me quite.  Ever till now 
When men were fond, I smiled, and wondered how.” (2.2.187-91) 
 
“heaven hath my empty words 
Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue, 
Anchors on Isabel; God in my mouth, 
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As if I did but only chew his name, 
And in my heart the strong and swelling evil 
Of my conception.” (2.4.2-7) 
 
Isa: “I am come to know your pleasure. 
Ang: That you might know it would much better please me.” (2.4.31-32) 
 
“I have begun,  
And now I give my sensual race the rein. 
Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite. 
Lay by all nicety and prolixious blushes 
That banish what they sue for.  Redeem thy brother 
By yielding up thy body to my will.” (2.4.159-64) 
 
 
Isabella 
 
“He would not, but by gift of my chaste body 
To his concupiscible intemperate lust, 
Release my brother.” (5.1.97-98) 
 
 
All’s Well That Ends Well 
 
 
Helena 
 
“My imagination 
Carries no favor in’t but Bertram’s.” (1.1.84-85) 
 
“Th’ ambition in my love thus plagues itself: 
The hind that would be mated by the lion 
Must die for love.” (1.1.92-94) 
 
“But now he’s gone, and my idolatrous fancy 
Must sanctify his relics.” (1.1.99-100) 
 
It’s a pity “That wishing had not a body in’t, 
Which might be felt; that we, the poorer born, 
Whose baser stars do shut us up in wishes, 
Might with the effects of them follow our friends, 
And show what we alone must think, which never 
Returns us thanks.” (1.1.180-85) 
 
“What power is it which mounts my love so high? 
That makes me see, and cannot feed mine eye?” (1.1.218-19) 
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“I know I love in vain, strive against hope; 
Yet in this captious and intenible sieve 
I still pour in the waters of my love 
And lack not to lose still.” (1.3.197-200) 
 
“The count he woos your daughter, 
Lays down his wanton siege before her beauty, 
Resolved to carry her.” (3.7.17-19) 
 
“But, O strange men! 
That can such sweet use make of what they hate, 
When saucy trusting of the cozened thoughts 
Defiles the pitchy night; so lust doth play 
With what it loathes, for that which is away.” (4.4.21-25) 
 
 
Bertram 
 
“Stand no more off, 
But give thyself unto my sick desires, 
Who then recovers.  Say thou art mine, and ever 
My love, as it begins, shall so persever.” (4.3.34-37) 
 
“Certain it is I liked her, 
And boarded her i’ th’ wanton way of youth. 
She knew her distance and did angle for me, 
Madding my eagerness with her restraint – 
As all impediments in fancy’s course 
Are motives of more fancy – and in fine 
Her infinite cunning with her modern grace 
Subdued me to her rate.” (5.3.209-16) 
 
Lavatch 
 
“I am driven on by the flesh; and he must needs go that the devil drives.” (1.3.28-30) 
 
“The brains of my Cupid’s knocked out, and I begin to love, as an old man loves money, 
with no stomach.” (3.2.14-16) 
 
 
Countess 
 
“If ever we are nature’s, these [desires] are ours.  This thorn 
Doth to our rose of youth rightly belong; 
Our blood to us, this to our blood is born. 
It is the show and seal of nature’s truth, 
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Where love’s strong passion is impressed in youth… 
Here eye is sick on’t.”  (1.3.125-29, 132) 
 
“Come, come, disclose 
The state of your affection, for your passions 
Have to the full appeached.” (1.3.185-87) 
 
 
Parolles 
 
“Virginity being blown down, man will quicklier be blown up; marry, in blowing him 
down again, with the breach yourselves made you lose your city.” (1.1.125-27) 
 
“Virginity breeds mites, much like cheese, consumes itself to the very paring, and so dies 
with feeding his own stomach.” (1.1.143-45) 
 
 
Macbeth 
 
First Witch: 
 
“…like a rat without a tail, 
I’ll do, I’ll do, and I’ll do.” (1.3.9-10) 
 
 “I’ll drain him dry as hay, 
Sleep shall neither night nor day 
Hang upon his penthouse lid. 
He shall live a man forbid.” (1.3.18-21) 
 
 
Lady Macbeth 
 
“Art thou afeard 
To be the same in thine own act and valor 
As thou art in desire?” (1.7.39-41) 
 
“Naught’s had, all’s spent, 
Where our desire is got without content.” (3.2.5-6) 
 
 
Antony and Cleopatra 
 
Philo 
 
“Nay, but this dotage of our general’s 
O’erflows the measure.” (1.1.1-2) 
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Cleopatra 
 
Cleo: “If it be love indeed, tell me how much. 
Ant: There’s beggary in the love that can be reckoned. 
Cleo: I’ll set a bourn how far to be beloved. 
Ant: Then must thou needs find out new heaven, new earth.” (1.1.14-17) 
 
“O, my oblivion is a very Antony, 
And I am all forgotten.” (1.3.90-91) 
 
“…great Pompey 
Would stand and make his eyes grow in my brow, 
There would he anchor his aspect, and die 
With looking on his life.” (1.5.31-34) 
 
Cleo: “Hast thou affections? 
Mar:   Yes, gracious madam. 
Cleo:   Indeed? 
Mar:   Not in deed, madam; for I can do nothing 
           But what indeed is honest to be done: 
          Yet I have fierce affections, and think 
          What Venus did with Mars.” (1.5.12-18) 
 
“My bended hook shall pierce 
Their slimy jaws, and as I draw them up, 
I’ll think them every one an Antony, 
And say, ‘Ah, ha! You’re caught!’” (2.5.12-15) 
 
“I laughed him out of patience; and that night 
I laughed him into patience; and next morn 
Ere the ninth hour I drunk him to his bed…” (2.5.19-21) 
 
“His delights 
Were dolphinlike, they showed his back 
Above the element they lived in” (5.2.89-91) 
 
“…if there be not ever were one such, 
It’s past the size of dreaming. Nature wants stuff 
To fie strange forms with fancy, yet t’ imagine 
An Antony were nature’s piece against fancy, 
Condemning shadows quite.” (5.2.97-100) 
 
“Husband, I come” (5.2.287) 
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“The stroke of death is as a lover’s pinch, 
Which hurts, and is desired.” (5.2.295-96) 
 
 
Antony 
 
“…stirred by Cleopatra.” (1.1.43) 
 
“There’s not a minute of our lives should stretch 
Without some pleasure now” (1.1.46-47) 
 
“These strong Egyptian fetters I must break 
Or lose myself in the dotage.” (1.2.115-16) 
 
“Egypt, thou knew’st too well 
My heart was to thy rudder tied by the strings, 
And thou shouldst tow me after.  O’er my spirit 
Thy full supremacy thou knew’st, and that 
Thy beck might from the bidding of the gods 
Command me.” (3.11.56-61) 
 
“You did know 
How much you were my conqueror, and that 
My sword, made weak by my affection, would 
Obey it on all cause.” (3.11.65-68) 
 
“O thou day o’ th’ world, 
Chain mine armed neck; leap thou, attire and all, 
Through proof of harness to my heart, and there 
Ride on the pants triumphing!” (4.8.13-16) 
 
 
Enobarbus 
 
“her passions are made of nothing but the finest part of true love.” (1.2.146-47) 
 
“When she first met Marc Antony, she pursed up his heart…” (2.2.196-97) 
 
“the oars…made 
The water which they beat to follow faster, 
As amorous of their strokes.” (2.2.204-7) 
 
“The city cast 
Her people out upon her; and Antony, 
Enthroned i’ th’ marketplace, did sit alone, 
Whistling to the air; which, but for vacancy, 
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Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too, 
And made a gap in nature.” (2.2.223-28)   
 
“Other women cloy 
The appetites they feed, but she makes hungry 
Where most she satisfies.” (2.3.246-48) 
 
“Your presence needs must puzzle Antony; 
Take from his heart, take from his brain, from’s time 
What should not then be spared.” (3.7.10-12) 
 
 
Caesar 
 
“…he which is was wished until he were; 
And the ebbed man, ne’er loved till ne’er worth love, 
Comes deared by being lacked.” (1.4.42-44) 
 
Pompey 
 
“Epicurean cooks 
Sharpen with cloyless sauce his appetite, 
That sleep and feeding may prorogue his honor…” (2.1.24-26) 
 
“…The ne’er lust-wearied Antony.” (2.1.38) 
 
 
Agrippa 
 
“She made great Caesar lay his sword to bed; 
He plowed her, and she cropped.” (2.3.237-38) 
 
 
Titus Andronicus 
 
Saturninius 
 
“Behold, I choose thee, Tamora, for my bride, 
And will create thee Empress of Rome.” (1.1.316-17) 
 
 
Tamora 
 
“If Saturnine advance the Queen of the Goths 
She will a handmaid be to his desires, 
A loving nurse, a mother to his youth.” (1.1.327-29) 
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“let my spleenful sons this trull deflower.” (2.3.191) 
 
 
Aaron 
 
“fit thy thoughts 
To mount aloft with thy imperial mistress, 
And mount her pitch whom thou in triumph long 
Hast prisoner held fettered in amorous chains, 
And faster bound to Aaron’s charming eyes 
Than is Prometheus tied to Caucasus.” (2.1.13-17) 
 
Plans “to wanton with this queen…” (2.1.21) 
 
“’Tis policy and stratagem must do 
That you affect, and so must you resolve 
That what you cannot as you would achieve, 
You must perforce accomplish as you may.” (2.2.105-8) 
 
“A speedier course than ling’ring languishment 
Must we pursue…” (2.2.111-12) 
 
“There speak and strike, brave boys, and take your turns, 
There serve your lust, shadowed from heaven’s eye, 
And revel in Lavinia’s treasury.” (2.1.130-32) 
 
 
Demetrius 
 
“[I] may, for aught thou knowest, affected be.” (2.1.28) 
 
“She is a woman, therefore may be wooed; 
She is a woman, therefore may be won; 
She is Lavinia, therefore must be loved.” (2.1.82-84) 
 
“Sit fas aut nefas, till I find the stream 
To cool this heat, a charm to calm these fits, 
Per styga, per manes vehor.” (2.1.134-36) 
 
 
Chiron 
 
“my sword upon thee shall approve, 
And plead my passions for Lavinia’s love.” (2.1.35-36) 
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Chi:   “Drag hence her husband to some secret hole, 
 And make his dead trunk pillow to our lust. 
Tam:    But when ye have the honey ye desire 
 Let not this wasp outlive, us both to sting.” (2.3.129-32) 
 
 
Lavinia 
 
“O, keep me from their worse-than-killing lust” (2.3.175) 
 
 
Romeo and Juliet 
 
Romeo 
 
“Love is a smoke made with a fume of sighs, 
Being purged, a fire sparkling in lovers’ eyes, 
Being vexed, a sea nourished with lovers’ tears.” (1.1.183-85) 
 
Rom: “Is love a tender thing?  It is too rough, 
 Too rude, too boist’rous, and it pricks like thorn. 
Mer: If love be rough with you, be rough with love. 
 Prick love for pricking, and you beat love down.” (1.4.25-28) 
 
“For stony limits cannot hold love out, 
And what love can do, that dares love attempt” (2.1.109-10) 
 
“…on a sudden one hath wounded me 
That’s by me wounded.” (2.2.50-51) 
 
“Then plainly know my heart’s dear love is set 
On the fair daughter of rich Capulet. 
As mine on hers, so hers is set on mine” (2.2.57-59) 
 
 
Benvolio 
 
“Take thou some new infection to thy eye, 
And the rank poison of the old will die.” (1.2.47-48) 
 
 
Mercutio 
 
“This is the hag, when maids lie on their backs, 
That presses them and learns them first to bear, 
Making them women of good carriage.” (1.4.92-95) 
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Chorus 
 
“Now old desire doth in his deathbed lie, 
And young affection gapes to be his heir.” (2.0.1-2) 
 
“Now Romeo is beloved and loves again, 
Alike bewitched by the charm of looks” (2.0.5-6) 
 
“But passion lends them power, time means, to meet, 
Temp’ring extremities with extreme sweet.” (2.0.13-14) 
 
 
Juliet 
 
“In truth, fair Montague, I am too fond…” (2.1.140) 
 
“I should have been more strange, I must confess, 
But that thou overheard’st, ere I was ware, 
My true-love passion.” (2.1.144-46) 
 
“And yet I wish but for the thing I have. 
My bounty is as boundless as the sea, 
My love as deep.  The more I give to thee 
The more I have, for both are infinite.” (2.1.174-77) 
 
Rom:  “I would I were thy bird. 
Jul: Sweet, so would I. 
 Yet I should kill thee with much cherishing.” (2.1.226-27) 
 
Rom: “let rich music’s tongue 
 Unfold the imagined happiness that both 
 Receive in either by this dear encounter. 
Jul: Conceit, more rich in matter than in words, 
 Brags of his substance, not of ornament. 
 They are but beggars that can count their worth, 
 But my true love is grown to such excess 
 I cannot sum up some of half my wealth.” (2.5.27-34) 
 
“Spread thy close curtain, love-performing night, 
That runaways’ eyes may wink, and Romeo 
Leap to these arms untalked of and unseen.” (3.2.5-7) 
 
“…learn me how to lose a winning match 
Played for a pair of stainless maidenhoods. 
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Hood my unmanned blood, bating in my cheeks, 
With thy black mantle till strange love grown bold 
Think true love acted simple modesty.” (3.2.12-16) 
 
“O, I have bought the mansion of a love 
But not possessed it, and though I am sold, 
Not yet enjoyed.” (3.2.26-28) 
 
 
Friar Lawrence 
 
Chides Romeo “For doting, not for loving” (2.2.82) 
 
“These violent delights have violent ends, 
And in their triumph die like fire and powder, 
Which as they kiss consume.  The sweetest honey 
Is loathsome in his own deliciousness, 
And in the tastes confounds the appetite. 
Therefore love moderately.  Long love doth so.” (2.5.9-14) 
 
 
Hamlet 
 
Hamlet 
 
He was “so loving to my mother 
That he might not beteem the winds of heaven 
Visit her face too roughly.” (1.2.140-42) 
 
“Why, she would hang on him 
As if increase of appetite had grown  
By what it fed on” (1.2.143-45) 
 
“Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed, 
And batten on this moor?  […] 
You cannot call it love, for at your age 
The heyday in the blood is tame, it’s humble, 
And waits upon the judgment.” (3.4.66-70) 
 
“Nay, but to live 
In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed, 
Stewed in corruption, honeying and making love 
Over the nasty sty - ” (3.4.91-94) 
 
Do not “Let the bloat king tempt you again to bed, 
Pinch wanton on your cheek, call you his mouse, 
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And let him, with a pair of reechy kisses, 
Or paddling in your neck with his damned fingers, 
Make you to ravel all this matter out” (3.4.182-86) 
 
“I loved Ophelia.  Forty thousand brothers 
Could not with all their quantity of love 
Make up my sum.” (5.1.258-60) 
 
 
Laertes 
 
“For Hamlet, and the trifling of his favor, 
Hold it a fashion and a toy in blood” (1.3.5-6) 
 
“Then weigh what loss your honor may sustain 
If with too credent ear you list his songs, 
Or lose your heart, or your chaste treasure open 
To his unmastered importunity.” (1.3.28-31) 
 
“And keep you in the rear of your affection, 
Out of the shot and danger of desire.” (1.3.33-34) 
 
 
Ophelia 
 
“He hath, my lord, of late made many tenders 
Of his affection to me.” (1.3.98-99) 
 
 
Polonius 
 
“These blazes, daughter, 
Giving more light than heat, extinct both 
Even in their promise, as it is a-making.” (1.3.116-18) 
 
“This is the very ecstasy of love, 
Whose violent property fordoes itself 
And leads the will to desperate undertakings 
As oft as any passion under heaven 
That does afflict our natures.” (2.1.101-105) 
 
 
Ghost 
 
“Ay, that incestuous, that adulterate beast, 
With witchcraft of his wit, with traitorous gifts – 
  279   
O wicked wit and gifts, that have the power 
So to seduce! – won to his shameful lust 
The will of my most seeming-virtuous queen.” (1.5.42-45) 
 
“But virtue, as it will never be moved, 
Though lewdness court it in a shape of heaven, 
So lust, though to a radiant angel linked, 
Will sate itself in a celestial bed, 
And prey on garbage.”(1.5.54-57) 
 
 
Othello 
 
Othello 
 
“I will a round unvarnished tale deliver 
Of my whole course of love, what drugs, what charms, 
What conjuration and what mighty magic – 
For such proceeding I am charged withal – 
I won his daughter.” (1.3.90-94) 
 
“These things to hear 
Would Desdemona seriously incline…  
and with a greedy ear 
devour up my discourse” (1.3.144-45, 148-49) 
 
“my story being done, 
She gave me for my pains a world of kisses. 
She swore in faith ‘twas strange, ‘twas passing strange, 
‘Twas pitiful, ‘twas wondrous pitiful. 
She wished she had not heard it, yet she wished 
That heaven had made her such a man.  She thanked me, 
And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her, 
I should but teach him how to tell my story, 
And that would woo her.” (1.3.157-65) 
 
“I therefore beg it not 
To please the palate of my appetite, 
Nor to comply with heat – the young affects 
In me defunct – and proper satisfaction, 
But to be free and bounteous to her mind.” (1.3.261-65) 
 
“If it were now to die 
‘Twere now to be most happy, for I fear 
My soul hath her content so absolute 
That not another comfort like to this 
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Succeeds in unknown fate.” (2.1.188-92) 
 
“I cannot speak enough of this content. 
It stops me here, it is too much of joy.” (2.1.195-96) 
 
“Come, my dear love, 
The purchase made, the fruits are to ensue. 
The profit’s yet to come ‘tween me and you.” (2.3.8-10) 
 
“Excellent wretch!  Perdition catch my soul 
But I do love thee, and when I love thee not, 
Chaos is come again.” (3.3.91-93) 
 
“O curse of marriage, 
That we can call these delicate creatures ours 
And not their appetites!” (3.3.272-74) 
 
“This argues fruitfulness and liberal heart. 
Hot, hot and moist – this hand of yours requires 
A sequester from liberty; fasting, and prayer, 
Much castigation, exercise devout; 
For here’s a young and sweating devil here 
That commonly rebels.” (3.4.35-41) 
 
“while she kept it [the handkerchief] 
‘Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father 
Entirely to her love; but if she lost it, 
Or made a gift of it, my father’s eye 
Should hold her loathed, and his spirits should hunt 
After new fancies.” (3.4.61) 
 
“…she can turn and turn, and yet go on 
And turn again…” (4.1.250-51) 
 
“Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee 
And love thee after.” (5.2.18-19) 
 
“Speak of me as I am.  Nothing extenuate, 
Nor set down aught in malice.  Then must you speak 
Of one that loved not wisely but too well…” (5.2.351-53) 
 
 
Senator 
 
“Did you by indirect and forced courses 
Subdue and poison this young maid’s affections, 
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Or came it by request and such fair question 
As soul to soul affordeth?” (1.3.111-14) 
 
 
Desdemona 
 
“That I did love the Moor to live with him, 
My downright violence and storm of fortunes 
May trumpet to the world.  My heart’s subdued 
Even to the very quality of my lord. 
I saw Othello’s visage in his mind, 
And to his honours and his valiant parts 
Did I my soul and fortunes consecrate.” (1.3.247-53) 
 
“The heavens forbid 
But that our loves and comforts should increase 
Even as our days do grow.” (2.1.192-94) 
 
 
Iago 
 
“I am one, sir, that comes to tell you your daughter and the Moor are making the beast 
with two backs.” (1.1.112) 
 
“Our bodies are our gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners; . . . If the beam of our 
lives had not one scale of reason to peise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of 
our natures would conduct us to the most preposterous conclusions.  But we have reason 
to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings, our umbitted lusts; whereof I take this that 
you call love to be a sect or scion.” (1.3.317-27) 
 
“It [love] is merely a lust of the blood and a permission of the will. . . . It was a violent 
commencement in her, and thou shalt see an answerable sequestration. . . . These Moors 
are changeable in thy wills. . . . The food that to him now is as luscious as locusts shall be 
to him shortly as bitter as coloquintida.  She must change for youth.  When she is sated 
with his body, she will find the error of her choice.” (1.3.329, 337-43) 
 
“Mark me with what violence she first loved the Moor, but for bragging and telling her 
fantastical lies.  To love him still for prating? – let not thy discreet heart think it.  Her eye 
must be fed, and what delight shall she have to look on the devil?  When the blood is 
made dull with the act of sport, there should be again to inflame it, and to give satiety a 
fresh appetite, loveliness in favour…” (2.1.217-24) 
 
“Lechery, by this hand; an index and obscure prologue to the history of lust and foul 
thoughts.” (2.1.248-49) 
 
“He hath not yet made wanton the night with her, and she is sport for Jove.” (2.3.15-16) 
  282   
 
“Now my sick fool Roderigo, 
Whom love hath turned almost the wrong side out, 
To Desdemona hath tonight caroused” (2.3.44-46) 
 
“His soul is so enfettered to her love 
That she may make, unmake, do what she list, 
Even as her appetite shall play the god 
With his weak function.” (2.3.318-21) 
 
“…she repeals him for her body’s lust” (2.3.331) 
 
“…O, what damned minutes tells he o’er 
Who dotes yet doubts, suspects yet fondly loves!” (3.3.173-74) 
 
“I see, sir, you are eaten up with passion.” (3.3.396) 
 
“A hussy that by selling her desires 
Buys herself bread and cloth.  It is a creature 
That dotes on Cassio…” (4.1.92-94) 
 
 
Emilia 
 
Men “are all but stomachs, and we all but food. 
They eat us hungrily, and when they are full, 
They belch us.” (3.4.100-102) 
 
“Let husbands know 
Their wives have sense like them.  They see, and smell, 
And have their palates both for sweet and sour, 
As husbands have.  What is it they do 
When they change us for others?  Is it sport? 
I think it is.  And doth affection breed it? 
I think it doth.  Is’t frailty that thus errs? 
It is so, too.  And have not we affections, 
Desires for sport, and frailty, as men have?” (4.3.91-99) 
 
 
King Lear 
 
France 
 
“Thee and thy virtues here I seize upon: 
Be it lawful I take up what’s cast away. 
Gods, gods! ‘t is strange that from their cold’st neglect 
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My love should kindle to inflamed respect.” (1.1.253-56) 
 
 
Regan 
 
“She gave strange oeillades and most speaking looks 
To noble Edmund.” (4.5.26-27) 
 
“I am doubtful that you have been conjunct 
And bosomed with her, as far as we call hers. . . .  
Be not familiar with her.” (5.1.12-13, 16) 
 
 
Goneril 
 
“O, the difference of man and man! 
To thee a woman’s services are due: 
My fool usurps my body.” (4.2.26-28) 
 
“I had rather lose the battle than that sister 
Should loosen him and me.” (5.1.18-19) 
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